§527ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης ὑόν, ἐπειδάν σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγῃ, χασμήσῃ καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἐκεῖ, καί σε ἴσως τυπτήσει τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως καὶ πάντως προπηλακιεῖ.
SOCRATES: But when you go before the judge, 527a¦ the son of Aegina, when he takes hold of you and leads you away, you will gape and become dizzy there no less than I do here, and perhaps someone will strike you even on the cheek dishonorably and utterly abuse you.
τάχα δʼ οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὥσπερ γραὸς καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐδέν γʼ ἂν ἦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πῃ ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὑρεῖν·
Perhaps, then, these things seem to you to be told like an old wife's tale, and you despise them. And indeed, there would be nothing wonderful in despising them, if by searching we were able to find somewhere things better and truer than them.
νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων, σύ τε καὶ πῶλος καὶ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖσε φαίνεται συμφέρων.
But now you see that, although you are three, you who are the wisest of the Greeks of today—you, Polus, and Gorgias—you are not able to prove that one ought to live any other life than this one, which indeed appears to be advantageous there too.
ἀλλʼ ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἠρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ·
Instead, among so many arguments, while the others are refuted, this argument alone remains unshaken: that one must be more on one's guard against doing injustice than suffering it, and that above all a man must practice not seeming to be good, but being so, both in private and in public.
ἐὰν δέ τις κατά τι κακὸς γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην·
And if anyone becomes bad in any respect, he must be punished, and this is the second good after being just: to become just and to pay the penalty by being punished.
καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλούς, φευκτέον· καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει.
And all flattery, both that which concerns oneself and that which concerns others, whether few or many, must be avoided; and rhetoric must always be used thus, for the sake of justice, and so indeed must every other action.
ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἷ ἀφικόμενος εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει.
Obey me, therefore, and follow me thither, where having arrived you will be happy both in life and in death, as the argument indicates.
καὶ ἔασόν τινά σου καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου καὶ προπηλακίσαι, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε θαρρῶν πατάξαι τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην πληγήν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσῃ, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι ᾖς καλὸς κἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετήν.
And let anyone despise you as a fool and abuse you, if he wishes; and, yes, by Zeus, do you boldly allow him to strike you with that insulting blow; for you will suffer nothing terrible if you are truly excellent, practicing virtue.
κἄπειτα οὕτω κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἢ ὁποῖον ἄν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ, τότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους ὄντες βουλεύεσθαι ἢ νῦν.
And then, having practiced thus in common, then at last, if it seems necessary, we will apply ourselves to political affairs, or whatever else seems best to us, then we will deliberate, being better able to deliberate than we are now.
αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντάς γε ὡς νῦν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν, ἔπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὡς τὶ ὄντας, οἷς οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων—εἰς τοσοῦτον ἥκομεν ἀπαιδευσίας—ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρησώμεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς ἡμῖν σημαίνει ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἄριστος τοῦ βίου, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι.
For it is shameful, being in the state in which we now appear to be, to behave then like youthfully bold people as if we were something, we to whom the same things never seem to hold regarding the same matters, and that too regarding the greatest things—to such a point of uneducation have we come. Let us therefore use as a guide the argument that has now appeared, which indicates to us that this way of life is best: to live and to die practicing justice and the rest of virtue.
τούτῳ οὖν ἑπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακαλῶμεν, μὴ ἐκείνῳ, ᾧ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ὦ Καλλίκλεις.
Let us then follow this, and let us exhort others to do the same, and not that other way which you, trusting in it, exhort me to follow; for it is worth nothing, Callicles.