Humanitext Reader

Plato · Protagoras §361-362

Reversal of Positions and Conclusion of the Dialogue

Passage 33 of 33 · Greek

Summary

Socrates portrays the comical self-contradiction in which their arguments have ended—reversing their initial positions on whether virtue is teachable—and urges that they continue examining the nature of virtue. Protagoras praises Socrates' passion, agrees to postpone the discussion, and the dialogue concludes.

§361ΣΩ. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τούτου φανεροῦ γενομένου μάλιστʼ ἂν κατάδηλον γένοιτο ἐκεῖνο περὶ οὗ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ μακρὸν λόγον ἑκάτερος ἀπετείναμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν λέγων ὡς οὐ διδακτὸν ἀρετή, σὺ δʼ ὡς διδακτόν.
Socrates: "For I know that if this becomes clear, that which both you and I have spun out in a long speech, each of us, would become most manifest—I saying that virtue is not teachable, and you that it is teachable.
καί μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἄρτι ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελᾶν, καὶ εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, εἰπεῖν ἂν ὅτι ἄτοποί γʼ ἐστέ, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα·
And it seems to me that the recent outcome of our arguments accuses and mocks us like a human being, and if it could take a voice, it would say: 'How strange you are, Socrates and Protagoras!
σὺ μὲν λέγων ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, νῦν σεαυτῷ τἀναντία σπεύδεις, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς πάντα χρήματά ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, ᾧ τρόπῳ μάλιστʼ ἂν διδακτὸν φανείη ἡ ἀρετή.
You, on the one hand, who said in the former part that virtue is not teachable, are now eager for the opposite of yourself, attempting to demonstrate that all things are knowledge—justice, temperance, and courage—in which way virtue would most of all appear to be teachable.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετή, ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἐπεχείρει λέγειν, σαφῶς οὐκ ἂν ἦν διδακτόν· νῦν δὲ εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλον, ὡς σὺ σπεύδεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, θαυμάσιον ἔσται μὴ διδακτὸν ὄν.
For if virtue were something other than knowledge, as Protagoras was attempting to say, it would clearly not be teachable; but now, if it shall appear to be entirely knowledge, as you are eager to show, Socrates, it will be a wonder if it is not teachable.
Πρωταγόρας δʼ αὖ διδακτὸν τότε ὑποθέμενος, νῦν τοὐναντίον ἔοικεν σπεύδοντι ὀλίγου πάντα μᾶλλον φανῆναι αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπιστήμην· καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἥκιστα εἴη διδακτόν. ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἄνω κάτω ταραττόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν ἔχω καταφανῆ αὐτὰ γενέσθαι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας ἡμᾶς ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅτι ἔστιν, καὶ πάλιν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτόν, μὴ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐν τῇ σκέψει σφήλῃ ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ διανομῇ ἠμέλησεν ἡμῶν, ὡς φῂς σύ.
Protagoras, on the other hand, having assumed then that it was teachable, now seems, on the contrary, eager for it to appear to be almost anything rather than knowledge; and in this way it would least of all be teachable.' I therefore, Protagoras, seeing all these things terribly turned upside down, have every desire for them to become clear, and I should wish us, having gone through these things, to go on also to what virtue is, and then to examine again concerning it whether it is teachable or not teachable, lest that Epimetheus should deceive us and trip us up also in our inquiry, just as he neglected us in the distribution, as you say.
ἤρεσεν οὖν μοι καὶ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὁ Προμηθεὺς μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἐπιμηθέως· ᾧ χρώμενος ἐγὼ καὶ προμηθούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ παντὸς πάντα ταῦτα πραγματεύομαι, καὶ εἰ σὺ ἐθέλοις, ὅπερ καὶ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, μετὰ σοῦ ἂν ἥδιστα ταῦτα συνδιασκοποίην. καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπαινῶ σου τὴν προθυμίαν καὶ τὴν διέξοδον τῶν λόγων.
Thus Prometheus in the myth pleased me more than Epimetheus; whom I use as an example and, taking forethought for my own whole life, busy myself with all these matters, and if you were willing, as I was also saying at the beginning, I should most gladly examine these things together with you." And Protagoras said: "I, Socrates," he said, "praise your eagerness and the way you go through arguments.
καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τἆλλα οἶμαι κακὸς εἶναι ἄνθρωπος, φθονερός τε ἥκιστʼ ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ σοῦ πρὸς πολλοὺς δὴ εἴρηκα ὅτι ὧν ἐντυγχάνω πολὺ μάλιστα ἄγαμαι σέ, τῶν μὲν τηλικούτων καὶ πάνυ· καὶ λέγω γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένοιο ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ.
For indeed, in other respects I do not think I am a bad man, and of all men I am the least envious, since indeed I have already said to many about you that of those whom I meet, I admire you by far the most, especially of those of your age; and indeed I say that I should not wonder if you were to become one of the men distinguished for wisdom.
καὶ περὶ τούτων δὲ εἰς αὖθις, ὅταν βούλῃ, διέξιμεν· νῦν δʼ ὥρα ἤδη καὶ ἐπʼ ἄλλο τι τρέπεσθαι. §362ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ.
But about these things we shall go through again at another time, whenever you wish; but now it is already time to turn to something else." Socrates: "But," I said, "so we must do, if it seems good to you.
καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ οἷπερ ἔφην ἰέναι πάλαι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ Καλλίᾳ τῷ καλῷ χαριζόμενος παρέμεινα. ταῦτʼ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀπῇμεν.
For indeed for me too it was time to go long ago, where I said, but I remained to gratify the beautiful Callias." Having said and heard these things, we went away.

Notes

  1. 361aεἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, εἰπεῖν ἂν — A conditional construction with the personified "outcome of arguments" (ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων) as the subject. While the protasis is in the optative (εἰ ... λάβοι), the expected potential optative apodosis (εἴποι ἂν) is converted into an infinitive with ἄν (εἰπεῖν ἂν) because it depends on the governing verb δοκεῖ. The subject accusative of the infinitive is omitted because it is co-referential with the subject of the main clause.
  2. 361bμὴ διδακτὸν ὄν — The present participle ὄν is negated by μή, which indicates that it functions as a conditional participle ("if it is not teachable"). This is why the subjective/conditional negator μή is used instead of the objective negator οὐ.
  3. 361cἔοικεν σπεύδοντι ὀλίγου πάντα μᾶλλον φανῆναι αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπιστήμην — A personal construction with Protagoras as the subject of ἔοικεν (governing the dative participle σπεύδοντι) rather than an impersonal one. It combines the genitive ὀλίγου (elliptical for ὀλίγου δεῖν, meaning "almost") and the strongly contrasting idiom πάντα μᾶλλον ... ἤ ... ("anything rather than..."), conveying a sharp irony: "he seems like one eager for it to appear as almost anything rather than knowledge."
  4. 361cἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅτι ἔστιν — An instance of prolepsis (anticipation). The noun ἡ ἀρετή, which logically serves as the subject of the subordinate clause (ὅτι ἔστιν), is pulled forward into the main clause as the accusative object of the preposition ἐπί. Literally "to advance to virtue, what it is," meaning "to advance to the question of what virtue is."
  5. 361dμὴ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἐκεῖνος ... σφήλῃ — A subjunctive of apprehension in an independent clause. The main verb of fearing is omitted, and μή + subjunctive (σφήλῃ) stands on its own to express an anxious warning ("lest..." or "I fear that..."). The adverb πολλάκις does not mean "often" here, but is used in conditional/apprehensive contexts to mean "perhaps" or "by any chance."
  6. 361eὧν ἐντυγχάνω — The relative pronoun ὧν would logically be in the dative οἷς as governed by the verb of encountering, ἐντυγχάνω. However, it has been attracted into the genitive case of its omitted antecedent τούτων, which functions as a partitive genitive ("of those whom I meet").

Cite this passage

Plato, Protagoras §361-362. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg022.humanitext-grc2:361-362

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