Humanitext Reader

Plato · Euthydemus §306-307

The Inferiority of the In-Betweens and Value of Philosophy

Passage 25 of 25 · Greek

Summary

Socrates logically demonstrates that those who pride themselves on standing between philosophy and politics are actually only "third-rate" and inferior to both. In response, Crito shares his concerns regarding his sons' education, and Socrates advises him to evaluate the worth of philosophy itself rather than judging it by its practitioners.

§306ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ὄντως, ὦ Κρίτων, εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλήθειαν.
SOCRATES: 'For indeed, Crito, their speech has a certain plausibility rather than truth.
οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον αὐτοὺς πεῖσαι ὅτι καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσα μεταξύ τινοιν δυοῖν ἐστιν καὶ ἀμφοτέροιν τυγχάνει μετέχοντα, ὅσα μὲν ἐκ κακοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ μὲν βελτίω, τοῦ δὲ χείρω γίγνεται· ὅσα δὲ ἐκ δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν μὴ πρὸς ταὐτόν, ἀμφοῖν χείρω πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἑκάτερον ᾖ χρηστὸν ἐκείνων ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη· ὅσα δʼ ἐκ δυοῖν κακοῖν συντεθέντα μὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ὄντοιν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἐστίν, ταῦτα μόνα βελτίω ἑκατέρου ἐκείνων ἐστίν, ὧν ἀμφοτέρων μέρος μετέχουσιν.
For it is not easy to persuade them that both human beings and all other things which are between any two things and happen to share in both—those which are composed of evil and good become better than the one (evil) and worse than the other (good); and those which are composed of two good things not directed toward the same purpose are worse than both with respect to that for which each of those from which they were composed is useful; and those which are composed of two evil things not directed toward the same purpose and are in the middle, these alone are better than each of those of which they share a part.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀγαθόν ἐστιν καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις, πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἑκατέρα, οὗτοι δʼ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες τούτων ἐν μέσῳ εἰσίν, οὐδὲν λέγουσιν—ἀμφοτέρων γάρ εἰσι φαυλότεροι—εἰ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, τῶν μὲν βελτίους, τῶν δὲ χείρους· εἰ δὲ κακὰ ἀμφότερα, οὕτως ἄν τι λέγοιεν ἀληθές, ἄλλως δʼ οὐδαμῶς.
If, therefore, philosophy is something good and political action is too, each being directed toward a different purpose, and these men, sharing in both, are in the middle, they are saying nothing of weight—for they are worse than both—but if one is good and the other evil, they are better than the one and worse than the other; and if both are evil, in that case they might speak some truth, but otherwise in no way.
οὐκ ἂν οὖν οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ὁμολογῆσαι οὔτε κακὼ αὐτὼ ἀμφοτέρω εἶναι οὔτε τὸ μὲν κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθόν· ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι οὗτοι ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες ἀμφοτέρων ἥττους εἰσὶν πρὸς ἑκάτερον πρὸς ὃ ἥ τε πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀξίω λόγου ἐστόν, καὶ τρίτοι ὄντες τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ζητοῦσι πρῶτοι δοκεῖν εἶναι.
I do not think, therefore, they would admit either that both are evil, or that the one is evil and the other good; but in reality, sharing in both, they are inferior to both with respect to each purpose for which both politics and philosophy are worthy of account, and being third in truth, they seek to seem to be first.
συγγιγνώσκειν μὲν οὖν αὐτοῖς χρὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ χαλεπαίνειν, ἡγεῖσθαι μέντοι τοιούτους εἶναι οἷοί εἰσιν· πάντα γὰρ ἄνδρα χρὴ ἀγαπᾶν ὅστις καὶ ὁτιοῦν λέγει ἐχόμενον φρονήσεως πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀνδρείως ἐπεξιὼν διαπονεῖται. ΚΡ. καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τῶν ὑέων, ὥσπερ ἀεὶ πρός σε λέγω, ἐν ἀπορίᾳ εἰμὶ τί δεῖ αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι.
We ought, therefore, to forgive them their desire and not be angry, but nevertheless consider them to be such as they are; for we ought to value every man who speaks anything whatsoever that clings to wisdom, and who laboriously works it out, pursuing it courageously.' CRITO: 'Indeed, Socrates, I myself also, as I always say to you, am in difficulty about my sons, as to what I must do with them.
ὁ μὲν οὖν νεώτερος ἔτι καὶ σμικρός ἐστιν, Κριτόβουλος δʼ ἤδη ἡλικίαν ἔχει καὶ δεῖταί τινος ὅστις αὐτὸν ὀνήσει.
The younger one indeed is still young and small, but Critobulus is already of age and needs someone who will benefit him.
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὅταν σοὶ συγγένωμαι, οὕτω διατίθεμαι ὥστʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ μανίαν εἶναι τὸ ἕνεκα τῶν παίδων ἄλλων μὲν πολλῶν σπουδὴν τοιαύτην ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ περὶ τοῦ γάμου ὅπως ἐκ γενναιοτάτης ἔσονται μητρός, καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὅπως ὡς πλουσιώτατοι, αὐτῶν δὲ περὶ παιδείας ἀμελῆσαι·
When I am with you, I am so disposed that it seems to me to be madness to have taken such care for many other things for the sake of the children, both about marriage, that they should be from a mother of most noble birth, and about money, that they should be as rich as possible, but to have neglected their education.
ὅταν δὲ εἴς τινα ἀποβλέψω τῶν φασκόντων ἂν παιδεῦσαι ἀνθρώπους, ἐκπέπληγμαι καί μοι δοκεῖ εἷς ἕκαστος αὐτῶν σκοποῦντι πάνυ ἀλλόκοτος εἶναι, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως προτρέπω τὸ μειράκιον ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν. §307ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἐν παντὶ ἐπιτηδεύματι οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι πολλοὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, οἱ δὲ σπουδαῖοι ὀλίγοι καὶ παντὸς ἄξιοι;
But when I look at any of those who claim to be able to educate people, I am astonished, and each one of them seems to me, as I examine them, to be altogether strange, to tell you the truth; so that I do not know how to turn the youth toward philosophy.' SOCRATES: 'Dear Crito, do you not know that in every pursuit the worthless are many and of no account, but the serious are few and of every account?
ἐπεὶ γυμναστικὴ οὐ καλὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ καὶ στρατηγία; ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε πάντως δήπου. ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
For does not gymnastics seem to you to be a beautiful thing, and money-making, and rhetoric, and generalship?' CRITO: 'To me, by all means, certainly.' SOCRATES: 'What then?
ἐν ἑκάστῃ τούτων τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς ἕκαστον τὸ ἔργον οὐ καταγελάστους ὁρᾷς; ΚΡ. ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, καὶ μάλα ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν τούτου ἕνεκα αὐτός τε φεύξῃ πάντα τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τῷ ὑεῖ οὐκ ἐπιτρέψεις; ΚΡ. οὔκουν δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν ὅ γε οὐ χρὴ ποίει, ὦ Κρίτων, ἀλλʼ ἐάσας χαίρειν τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας φιλοσοφίαν, εἴτε χρηστοί εἰσιν εἴτε πονηροί, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα βασανίσας καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ, ἐὰν μέν σοι φαίνηται φαῦλον ὄν, πάντʼ ἄνδρα ἀπότρεπε, μὴ μόνον τοὺς ὑεῖς· ἐὰν δὲ φαίνηται οἷον οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἐγὼ εἶναι, θαρρῶν δίωκε καὶ ἄσκει, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ παιδία.
In each of these, do you not see the many as ridiculous with respect to each work?' CRITO: 'Yes, by Zeus, you speak very truly indeed.' SOCRATES: 'Will you then on this account flee all pursuits yourself and not permit your son?' CRITO: 'That would indeed not be just, Socrates.' SOCRATES: 'Do not therefore do what you ought not, Crito, but having bid farewell to those who practice philosophy, whether they are good or bad, and having tested the thing itself well and truly, if it indeed seems to you to be worthless, turn every man away from it, not only your sons; but if it seems to be such as I think it is, pursue and practice it courageously, as the saying goes, both yourself and your children.'

Notes

  1. 306aὅσα δὲ ἐκ δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν μὴ πρὸς ταὐτόν, ἀμφοῖν χείρω πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἑκάτερον ᾖ χρηστὸν ἐκείνων ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη — Meaning 'those composed of two good things not directed toward the same purpose are worse than both with respect to that for which each of those from which they were composed is useful.' The relative clause introduced by `πρὸς ὃ` has `ἑκάτερον... ἐκείνων ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη` (each of the original components) as its subject, and the entire clause modifies the comparative `χείρω` to specify in what respect the composite is 'worse'.
  2. 306cτρίτοι ὄντες τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ζητοῦσι πρῶτοι δοκεῖν εἶναι — Meaning 'being third in truth, they seek to seem to be first.' Since those who position themselves between philosophy (a good) and politics (a good) are inferior to both in their respective pursuits, they are 'third' (the lowest) after philosophy (first) and politics (second). The phrase contrasts this reality with their desire to be seen as the 'wisest' (first).
  3. 306dμανίαν εἶναι τὸ ἕνεκα τῶν παίδων ἄλλων μὲν πολλῶν σπουδὴν τοιαύτην ἐσχηκέναι... αὐτῶν δὲ περὶ παιδείας ἀμελῆσαι — An accusative-and-infinitive construction within the result clause introduced by `ὥστε`. `μανίαν` (madness) is the predicate accusative for the infinitive `εἶναι`, while the actual subject is the entire articular infinitive phrase `τὸ ... ἐσχηκέναι ... ἀμελῆσαι` (to have taken such care... but to have neglected...).
  4. 307aὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι — An absolute (or parenthetical) use of the infinitive, forming an idiomatic expression meaning 'to tell you the truth' or 'so as to speak the truth to you.'

Cite this passage

Plato, Euthydemus §306-307. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg021.humanitext-grc2:306-307

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