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Plato · Euthydemus §293

Euthydemus' Fallacy on Knowing All Things

Passage 16 of 25 · Greek

Summary

Socrates calls upon the two sophists to rescue them from their difficulty, and Euthydemus, taking advantage of Socrates' admission that he 'knows' something, presents a sophistical argument that knowing one thing entails knowing all things and already possessing the sought-after knowledge.

§293ΣΩ. ἔγωγε οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἐνεπεπτώκη, πᾶσαν ἤδη φωνὴν ἠφίειν, δεόμενος τοῖν ξένοιν ὥσπερ Διοσκούρων ἐπικαλούμενος σῶσαι ἡμᾶς, ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸ μειράκιον, ἐκ τῆς τρικυμίας τοῦ λόγου, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ σπουδάσαι, καὶ σπουδάσαντας ἐπιδεῖξαι τίς ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἧς τυχόντες ἂν καλῶς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον διέλθοιμεν. ΚΡ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: "I myself indeed, Crito, since I had fallen into this difficulty, was by then letting clear every cry, begging the two strangers and calling upon them as if they were the Dioscuri to save us—both myself and the youth—from the triple wave of the argument, and by all means to be serious, and having become serious to display what on earth is that knowledge by acquiring which we might beautifully pass the remainder of our life." CRITO: "What happened then?
ἠθέλησέν τι ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι ὁ Εὐθύδημος; ΣΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Was Euthydemus willing to display anything to you?" SOCRATES: "How could he not?
καὶ ἤρξατό γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πάνυ μεγαλοφρόνως τοῦ λόγου ὧδε— πότερον δή σε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην, περὶ ἣν πάλαι ἀπορεῖτε, διδάξω, ἢ ἐπιδείξω ἔχοντα; ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἔστι δὲ ἐπὶ σοὶ τοῦτο; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
And indeed, my friend, he began his argument very magnanimously in this way— 'Socrates,' he said, 'should I teach you this knowledge, about which you have long been in difficulty, or should I display you as already possessing it?' 'My good sir,' I said, 'is that really in your power?' 'Very much so indeed,' he said.
ἐπίδειξον τοίνυν με νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἔχοντα· πολὺ γὰρ ῥᾷον ἢ μανθάνειν τηλικόνδε ἄνδρα. φέρε δή μοι ἀπόκριναι, ἔφη· ἔστιν ὅτι ἐπίστασαι; —πάνυ γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ πολλά, σμικρά γε. — ἀρκεῖ, ἔφη.
'Then by Zeus, display me as possessing it,' I said, 'for that is much easier than for a man of my age to learn.' 'Come then, answer me,' he said; 'is there anything that you know?' —'Certainly,' I said, 'and many things, though small ones.'— 'That's enough,' he said.
ἆρʼ οὖν δοκεῖς οἷόν τέ τι τῶν ὄντων τοῦτο ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι; —ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε. — οὐκοῦν σύ, ἔφη, ἐπίστασαί τι; —ἔγωγε. — οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμων εἶ, εἴπερ ἐπίστασαι; —πάνυ γε, τούτου γε αὐτοῦ.
'Do you then think it possible for any of the things that are, this very thing which happens to be, not to be this very thing?' —'By Zeus, I certainly do not.'— 'Therefore,' he said, 'you know something?' —'I do.'— 'Therefore you are knowing, if indeed you know?' —'Certainly, of this very thing at least.'— 'That makes no difference.
— οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη σε ἔχει πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμονά γε ὄντα; —μὰ Δίʼ, ἔφην ἐγώ· ἐπεὶ πολλὰ ἄλλʼ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι. — οὐκοῦν εἴ τι μὴ ἐπίστασαι, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ. —ἐκείνου γε, ὦ φίλε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. — ἧττον οὖν τι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ;
But is it not necessary for you, being knowing, to know all things?' —'By Zeus, no,' I said, 'since there are many other things I do not know.'— 'Therefore, if you do not know something, you are not knowing.' —'Of that thing, indeed, my friend,' I said.— 'Are you then any the less,' he said, 'not knowing?
ἄρτι δὲ ἐπιστήμων ἔφησθα εἶναι· καὶ οὕτως τυγχάνεις ὢν αὐτὸς οὗτος ὃς εἶ, καὶ αὖ πάλιν οὐκ εἶ, κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἅμα. εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, Εὐθύδημε· τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενον, καλὰ δὴ παταγεῖς·
But just now you said you were knowing; and so you happen to be this very same person who you are, and again on the other hand not to be so, at the same time and in the same respect.' 'Well,' I said, 'Euthydemus; as the saying goes, you certainly make a fine clatter.
πῶς οὖν ἐπίσταμαι ἐκείνην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἣν ἐζητοῦμεν;
How then do I know that knowledge which we were seeking?
ὡς δὴ τοῦτο ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναί τε καὶ μή, εἴπερ ἓν ἐπίσταμαι, ἅπαντα ἐπίσταμαι—οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴην ἐπιστήμων τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων ἅμα—ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι, κἀκείνην δὴ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχω·
Since, indeed, it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, if indeed I know one thing, I know all things—for I could not be both knowing and not knowing at the same time—and since I know all things, I also possess that very knowledge.
ἆρα οὕτως λέγεις, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ σοφόν; αὐτὸς σαυτόν γε δὴ ἐξελέγχεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Is this what you mean, and is this where the wisdom lies?' 'You are indeed refuting yourself, Socrates,' he said.
τί δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, σὺ οὐ πέπονθας τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος;
'But what about you,' I said, 'Euthydemus? Have you not suffered this very same thing?
ἐγὼ γάρ τοι μετὰ σοῦ ὁτιοῦν ἂν πάσχων καὶ μετὰ Διονυσοδώρου τοῦδε, φίλης κεφαλῆς, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ἀγανακτοίην.
For I assure you, if I suffer anything whatsoever along with you and this Dionysodorus here, my dear friend, I should not be very displeased.
εἰπέ μοι, σφὼ οὐχὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπίστασθον τῶν ὄντων, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐπίστασθον; ἥκιστά γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος. πῶς λέγετον; ἔφην ἐγώ·
Tell me, do you two not know some of the things that are, while not knowing others?' 'Not in the least,' said Dionysodorus, 'Socrates.' 'How do you two mean?' I said.
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπίστασθον; καὶ μάλα, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
'Do you then know nothing at all?' 'On the contrary, very much so,' he said.

Notes

  1. 293aδεόμενος τοῖν ξένοιν — The present participle δεόμενος (from δέομαι, which governs the genitive) governs τοῖν ξένοιν, which is masculine dual genitive/dative, acting here as a genitive. This phrase is also loosely connected with the following participle ἐπικαλούμενος (which typically governs the accusative), exploiting the morphological ambiguity of the dual form to create a double dependency.
  2. 293bἐπιδείξω ἔχοντα — The present participle ἔχοντα is masculine accusative singular, with the omitted pronoun σε (Socrates) as its subject, functioning as a supplementary participle after the verb of showing (ἐπιδείξω). It literally means 'display you as possessing (knowledge).'
  3. 293cτοῦτο ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι — This is a complex structure within an accusative-with-infinitve construction dependent on οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ('it is possible'). The subject accusative is τι τῶν ὄντων ('something of existing things'), appositionally qualified by τοῦτο ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν ('this very thing which happens to be'). The infinitive μὴ εἶναι ('not to be') has αὐτὸ τοῦτο ('this very thing') as its predicate. Thus, it questions the negation of the law of identity: 'Is it possible for an existing thing not to be the very thing it happens to be?'
  4. 293dκαλὰ δὴ παταγεῖς — The phrase τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενον functions adverbially as an accusative absolute meaning 'as the saying goes'. καλὰ is a neuter plural accusative used adverbially (or as an internal accusative). The verb παταγέω originally means 'to make a clattering sound' or 'to clash', used here metaphorically to ridicule the hollow, resonant quality of Euthydemus's sophistical words.

Cite this passage

Plato, Euthydemus §293. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg021.humanitext-grc2:293

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