Humanitext Reader

Plato · Lysis §210

Trust Gained through Wisdom and Humbling the Beloved

Passage 5 of 15 · Greek

Summary

Socrates argues that in matters where we possess wisdom, everyone will trust us and grant us freedom, whereas in areas of ignorance, even our parents will restrict us. He concludes that someone without knowledge cannot be proud, showing that one should humble rather than flatter a beloved.

§210τί δʼ εἰ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὁ ὑὸς αὐτοῦ ἀσθενοῖ, ἆρα ἐῴη ἂν αὐτὸν ἅπτεσθαι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ὀφθαλμῶν, μὴ ἰατρὸν ἡγούμενος, ἢ κωλύοι ἄν;
And what if his son should have a disease in his eyes?
>— κωλύοι ἄν. —ἡμᾶς δέ γε εἰ ὑπολαμβάνοι ἰατρικοὺς εἶναι, κἂν εἰ βουλοίμεθα διανοίγοντες τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐμπάσαι τῆς τέφρας, οἶμαι οὐκ ἂν κωλύσειεν, ἡγούμενος ὀρθῶς φρονεῖν. — ἀληθῆ λέγεις. —ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέποι ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῷ ὑεῖ, περὶ ὅσων ἂν δόξωμεν αὐτῷ σοφώτεροι ἐκείνων εἶναι; — ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Would he allow him to touch his own eyes, if he did not think he was a doctor, or would he prevent him?— He would prevent him.— But if he should suppose us to be skilled in medicine, even if we should wish to force open the eyes and sprinkle ashes in them, I think he would not prevent us, believing that we are of sound mind.— You speak the truth.— Would he then also entrust everything else to us rather than to himself and his son, in all matters where we appear to him to be wiser than they?— Necessarily so, he said, Socrates.
οὕτως ἄρα ἔχει, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Λύσι·
"Then this is how it is, my dear Lysis," I said.
εἰς μὲν ταῦτα, ἃ ἂν φρόνιμοι γενώμεθα, ἅπαντες ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέψουσιν, Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες, ποιήσομέν τε ἐν τούτοις ὅτι ἂν βουλώμεθα, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμᾶς ἑκὼν εἶναι ἐμποδιεῖ, ἀλλʼ αὐτοί τε ἐλεύθεροι ἐσόμεθα ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοντες, ἡμέτερά τε ταῦτα ἔσται—ὀνησόμεθα γὰρ ἀπʼ αὐτῶν—εἰς ἃ δʼ ἂν νοῦν μὴ κτησώμεθα, οὔτε τις ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέψει περὶ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν τὰ ἡμῖν δοκοῦντα, ἀλλʼ ἐμποδιοῦσι πάντες καθʼ ὅτι ἂν δύνωνται, οὐ μόνον οἱ ἀλλότριοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ καὶ εἴ τι τούτων οἰκειότερόν ἐστιν, αὐτοί τε ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐσόμεθα ἄλλων ὑπήκοοι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἔσται ἀλλότρια· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ὀνησόμεθα.
"In those matters where we become wise, everyone will entrust them to us—Greeks and barbarians, men and women—and we shall do in them whatever we want, and no one will willingly hinder us, but we ourselves shall be free in them and rulers over others, and these things will be ours, for we shall benefit from them. But in those things where we do not acquire understanding, no one will entrust us to do what seems best to us, but everyone will hinder us as much as they can, not only strangers, but also father and mother and if there is anything more close than these; and we ourselves shall be in them subjects of others, and they will be alien to us, for we shall derive no benefit from them.
συγχωρεῖς οὕτως ἔχειν; — συγχωρῶ. —ἆρʼ οὖν τῳ φίλοι ἐσόμεθα καί τις ἡμᾶς φιλήσει ἐν τούτοις, ἐν οἷς ἂν ὦμεν ἀνωφελεῖς; — οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. —νῦν ἄρα οὐδὲ σὲ ὁ πατὴρ οὐδὲ ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐδένα φιλεῖ, καθʼ ὅσον ἂν ᾖ ἄχρηστος. — οὐκ ἔοικεν, ἔφη. —ἐὰν μὲν ἄρα σοφὸς γένῃ, ὦ παῖ, πάντες σοι φίλοι καὶ πάντες σοι οἰκεῖοι ἔσονται—χρήσιμος γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἔσῃ—εἰ δὲ μή, σοὶ οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς οὔτε ὁ πατὴρ φίλος ἔσται οὔτε ἡ μήτηρ οὔτε οἱ οἰκεῖοι.
Do you agree that this is so?"— I agree.— Shall we then be friends to anyone, and will anyone love us in those matters in which we are useless?— Certainly not, he said.—Now, therefore, neither your father nor anyone else loves any other person, insofar as that person is useless.— It doesn't seem so, he said.—If then you become wise, my boy, everyone will be your friend and everyone will be your kin—for you will be useful and good—but if not, neither anyone else, nor your father, nor your mother, nor your kin will be a friend to you.
οἷόν τε οὖν ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Λύσι, μέγα φρονεῖν, ἐν οἷς τις μήπω φρονεῖ; — καὶ πῶς ἄν; ἔφη. —εἰ δʼ ἄρα σὺ διδασκάλου δέῃ, οὔπω φρονεῖς. — ἀληθῆ. —οὐδʼ ἄρα μεγαλόφρων εἶ, εἴπερ ἄφρων ἔτι. — μὰ Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
Is it possible then, O Lysis, to have high thoughts on those matters in which one does not yet think wisely?— And how could anyone? he said.—And if indeed you need a teacher, you do not yet think wisely.— True.— Then you are not high-minded either, if indeed you are still mindless.— By Zeus, he said, Socrates, I do not think so.
καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας αὐτοῦ ἀπέβλεψα πρὸς τὸν Ἱπποθάλη, καὶ ὀλίγου ἐξήμαρτον· ἐπῆλθε γάρ μοι εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὕτω χρή, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ταπεινοῦντα καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ σὺ χαυνοῦντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα.
And when I heard him, I looked towards Hippothales, and I almost made a blunder; for it occurred to me to say: "This is how one ought, Hippothales, to talk with his beloved, humbling him and drawing him in, and not, as you do, puffing him up and spoiling him."

Notes

  1. 210aμὴ ἰατρὸν ἡγούμενος — The negative particle μὴ negates the conditional participle ἡγούμενος, conveying the hypothetical sense "if he should not think him a doctor."
  2. 210bἑκὼν εἶναι — This is an idiomatic phrase featuring the infinitive εἶναι, used chiefly in negative assertions to mean "willingly" or "if they can help it." Combined with οὐδείς... ἐμποδιεῖ, it means "no one will willingly hinder us."
  3. 210eὀλίγου ἐξήμαρτον — The genitive ὀλίγου is used adverbially with the verb ἐξήμαρτον (second aorist) to mean "almost" or "came within a little of", expressing a near-miss or a narrow escape from making a mistake.

Cite this passage

Plato, Lysis §210. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg020.humanitext-grc2:210

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