§190ΣΩ. εἰ τυγχάνομεν ἐπιστάμενοι ὅτι ὄψις παραγενομένη ὀφθαλμοῖς βελτίους ποιεῖ ἐκείνους οἷς παρεγένετο, καὶ προσέτι οἷοί τʼ ἐσμὲν ποιεῖν αὐτὴν παραγίγνεσθαι ὄμμασι, δῆλον ὅτι ὄψιν γε ἴσμεν αὐτὴν ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν, ἧς πέρι σύμβουλοι ἂν γενοίμεθα ὡς ἄν τις αὐτὴν ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστα κτήσαιτο.
Socrates: If we happen to know that sight, when present in eyes, makes those in which it is present better, and furthermore we are able to make it become present in eyes, it is clear that we know sight itself, what on earth it is, about which we would become advisers as to how one might acquire it most easily and best.
εἰ γὰρ μηδʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰδεῖμεν, ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν ὄψις ἢ ὅτι ἔστιν ἀκοή, σχολῇ ἂν σύμβουλοί γε ἄξιοι λόγου γενοίμεθα καὶ ἰατροὶ ἢ περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἢ περὶ ὤτων, ὅντινα τρόπον ἀκοὴν ἢ ὄψιν κάλλιστʼ ἂν κτήσαιτό τις.
For if we did not know even this very thing, what on earth sight is or what hearing is, we would hardly become advisers worthy of mention, or doctors, either about eyes or about ears, as to in what way one might acquire hearing or sight best.
ΛΑ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Laches: You speak the truth, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Λάχης, καὶ νῦν ἡμᾶς τώδε παρακαλεῖτον εἰς συμβουλήν, τίνʼ ἂν τρόπον τοῖς ὑέσιν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴ παραγενομένη ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀμείνους ποιήσειε;
Socrates: Therefore, Laches, is it not the case that now also these two men are calling upon us for advice, as to in what way virtue, by becoming present in the souls of their sons, might make them better?
ΛΑ. πάνυ γε.
Laches: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτό γʼ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν ἀρετή;
Socrates: Must we, then, have this at least as a starting point, namely, to know what on earth virtue is?
εἰ γάρ που μηδʼ ἀρετὴν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν ὅτι ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν, τίνʼ ἂν τρόπον τούτου σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθʼ ἂν ὁτῳοῦν, ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸ κάλλιστα κτήσαιτο;
For if we did not know at all what virtue on earth happens to be, in what way could we become advisers to anyone about this, as to how one might acquire it best?
ΛΑ. οὐδένα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Laches: In no way, it seems to me, Socrates.
ΣΩ. φαμὲν ἄρα, ὦ Λάχης, εἰδέναι αὐτὸ ὅτι ἔστιν.
Socrates: We say, then, Laches, that we know what it is.
ΛΑ. φαμὲν μέντοι.
Laches: Indeed, we say so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅ γε ἴσμεν, κἂν εἴποιμεν δήπου τί ἐστιν.
Socrates: Therefore, what we know, we could presumably also say what it is.
ΛΑ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Laches: How could we not?
ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, περὶ ὅλης ἀρετῆς εὐθέως σκοπώμεθα—πλέον γὰρ ἴσως ἔργον—ἀλλὰ μέρους τινὸς πέρι πρῶτον ἴδωμεν εἰ ἱκανῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι· καὶ ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ῥᾴων ἡ σκέψις ἔσται.
Socrates: Let us not, then, my excellent friend, investigate about the whole of virtue straight away—for that is perhaps too great a task—but let us first see about some part of it, whether we are sufficiently equipped to know it; and for us, in all likelihood, the inquiry will be easier.
ΛΑ. ἀλλʼ οὕτω ποιῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ βούλει.
Laches: Well, let us do so, Socrates, as you wish.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν ἂν προελοίμεθα τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μερῶν;
Socrates: What part of virtue, then, should we choose?
ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τοῦτο εἰς ὃ τείνειν δοκεῖ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις μάθησις;
Or is it indeed clear that we should choose that to which the learning of fighting in armor seems to tend?
δοκεῖ δέ που τοῖς πολλοῖς εἰς ἀνδρείαν.
And it seems to most people, I suppose, to tend toward courage.
ἦ γάρ;
Is that not so?
ΛΑ. καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ.
Laches: Yes, indeed, it seems so.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν, ὦ Λάχης, εἰπεῖν, ἀνδρεία τί ποτʼ ἐστίν· ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο σκεψόμεθα καὶ ὅτῳ ἂν τρόπῳ τοῖς νεανίσκοις παραγένοιτο, καθʼ ὅσον οἷόν τε ἐξ ἐπιτηδευμάτων τε καὶ μαθημάτων παραγενέσθαι.
Socrates: Let us, therefore, first attempt, Laches, to say what courage is; and then, after this, we shall consider in what way it might become present in the youths, so far as it is possible for it to become present from practices and studies.
ἀλλὰ πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ὃ λέγω, τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία.
But try to say what I mean, what courage is.
ΛΑ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν· εἰ γάρ τις ἐθέλοι ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ μὴ φεύγοι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἀνδρεῖος ἂν εἴη.
Laches: By Zeus, Socrates, it is not difficult to say: for if anyone should be willing to keep his place in the rank and ward off the enemy, and should not flee, know well that he would be courageous.
ΣΩ. εὖ μὲν λέγεις, ὦ Λάχης· ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἐγὼ αἴτιος, οὐ σαφῶς εἰπών, τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ τοῦτο ὃ διανοούμενος ἠρόμην, ἀλλʼ ἕτερον.
Socrates: You speak well, Laches; but perhaps I am the cause, by not speaking clearly, of your answering not this which I had in mind when I asked, but something else.
ΛΑ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Laches: How do you mean this, Socrates?