Humanitext Reader

Plato · Phaedrus §233-234

Conclusion of Lysias' Speech and Socrates' Reaction

Passage 4 of 28 · Greek

Summary

Phaedrus finishes reading Lysias' speech arguing that one should favor non-lovers, and boasts of its eloquence to Socrates. Socrates praises it with playful irony, but Phaedrus demands a serious evaluation.

§233ΦΑΙ. καὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν μὲν ἐρώντων πολλοὶ πρότερον τοῦ σώματος ἐπεθύμησαν ἢ τὸν τρόπον ἔγνωσαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων ἔμπειροι ἐγένοντο, ὥστε ἄδηλον αὐτοῖς εἰ ἔτι τότε βουλήσονται φίλοι εἶναι, ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται· τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσιν, οἳ καὶ πρότερον ἀλλήλοις φίλοι ὄντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἂν εὖ πάθωσι ταῦτα εἰκὸς ἐλάττω τὴν φιλίαν αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μνημεῖα καταλειφθῆναι τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι.
PHAEDRUS: And indeed, many of those who love desire the body before they know the character and become acquainted with the other personal affairs, so that it is unclear to them whether they will still wish to be friends then, when they cease from their desire; whereas for non-lovers, who, being friends with one another even beforehand, did these things, it is not likely that these things, because of the benefits they received, will diminish their friendship, but rather that these things will be left as memorials of what is to be in the future.
καὶ μὲν δὴ βελτίονί σοι προσήκει γενέσθαι ἐμοὶ πειθομένῳ ἢ ἐραστῇ.
And indeed, it is proper for you to become better by obeying me rather than a lover.
ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ πραττόμενα ἐπαινοῦσιν, τὰ μὲν δεδιότες μὴ ἀπέχθωνται, τὰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ χεῖρον διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν γιγνώσκοντες.
For they praise both what is said and what is done even contrary to what is best, partly because they fear being hated, and partly because they themselves also judge worse because of their desire.
τοιαῦτα γὰρ ὁ ἔρως ἐπιδείκνυται· δυστυχοῦντας μέν, ἃ μὴ λύπην τοῖς ἄλλοις παρέχει, ἀνιαρὰ ποιεῖ νομίζειν· εὐτυχοῦντας δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἡδονῆς ἄξια παρʼ ἐκείνων ἐπαίνου ἀναγκάζει τυγχάνειν· ὥστε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐλεεῖν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις ἢ ζηλοῦν αὐτοὺς προσήκει.
For love shows itself in such ways: for those who are unfortunate in love, it makes them think that even things which cause no pain to others are vexatious; and for those who are fortunate, it forces even things not worthy of pleasure to obtain praise from them; so that it is much more proper to pity the beloved than to envy them.
ἐὰν δέ μοι πείθῃ, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ τὴν παροῦσαν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύων συνέσομαί σοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν ὠφελίαν ἔσεσθαι, οὐχ ὑπʼ ἔρωτος ἡττώμενος ἀλλʼ ἐμαυτοῦ κρατῶν, οὐδὲ διὰ σμικρὰ ἰσχυρὰν ἔχθραν ἀναιρούμενος ἀλλὰ διὰ μεγάλα βραδέως ὀλίγην ὀργὴν ποιούμενος, τῶν μὲν ἀκουσίων συγγνώμην ἔχων, τὰ δὲ ἑκούσια πειρώμενος ἀποτρέπειν· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι φιλίας πολὺν χρόνον ἐσομένης τεκμήρια.
And if you obey me, first of all I shall associate with you, not serving the present pleasure, but also caring for the benefit that is to be in the future, not being conquered by love but being master of myself, nor conceiving strong enmity for small things but slowly showing little anger for great things, forgiving involuntary errors and trying to prevent voluntary ones; for these are the proofs of a friendship that will last for a long time.
εἰ δʼ ἄρα σοι τοῦτο παρέστηκεν, ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἰσχυρὰν φιλίαν γενέσθαι ἐὰν μή τις ἐρῶν τυγχάνῃ, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι χρὴ ὅτι οὔτʼ ἂν τοὺς ὑεῖς περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμεθα οὔτʼ ἂν τοὺς πατέρας καὶ τὰς μητέρας, οὔτʼ ἂν πιστοὺς φίλους ἐκεκτήμεθα, οἳ οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιθυμίας τοιαύτης γεγόνασιν ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἑτέρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων.
And if, indeed, this thought has come to you, that it is impossible for a strong friendship to arise unless one happens to be in love, you should reflect that we would neither value our sons highly, nor our fathers and mothers, nor would we have acquired faithful friends, who have come to be not from such a desire but from other associations.
ἔτι δὲ εἰ χρὴ τοῖς δεομένοις μάλιστα χαρίζεσθαι, προσήκει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μὴ τοὺς βελτίστους ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους εὖ ποιεῖν· μεγίστων γὰρ ἀπαλλαγέντες κακῶν πλείστην χάριν αὐτοῖς εἴσονται.
Furthermore, if it is necessary to favor most of all those who are in need, it is proper also in other cases to do good not to the best but to the most destitute; for being freed from the greatest evils, they will feel the greatest gratitude to them.
καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις δαπάναις οὐ τοὺς φίλους ἄξιον παρακαλεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς προσαιτοῦντας καὶ τοὺς δεομένους πλησμονῆς· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ καὶ ἀγαπήσουσιν καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσιν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἥξουσι καὶ μάλιστα ἡσθήσονται καὶ οὐκ ἐλαχίστην χάριν εἴσονται καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς εὔξονται.
And indeed, even in private entertainments, it is not proper to invite friends, but those who beg and those who need to be filled; for they will both love and follow, and will come to the doors, and will be most pleased, and will feel no small gratitude, and will pray for many blessings upon them.
§234ΦΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἴσως προσήκει οὐ τοῖς σφόδρα δεομένοις χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μάλιστα ἀποδοῦναι χάριν δυναμένοις· οὐδὲ τοῖς προσαιτοῦσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἀξίοις· οὐδὲ ὅσοι τῆς σῆς ὥρας ἀπολαύσονται, ἀλλʼ οἵτινες πρεσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ τῶν σφετέρων ἀγαθῶν μεταδώσουσιν· οὐδὲ οἳ διαπραξάμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοτιμήσονται, ἀλλʼ οἵτινες αἰσχυνόμενοι πρὸς ἅπαντας σιωπήσονται· οὐδὲ τοῖς ὀλίγον χρόνον σπουδάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὁμοίως διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου φίλοις ἐσομένοις· οὐδὲ οἵτινες παυόμενοι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχθρας πρόφασιν ζητήσουσιν, ἀλλʼ οἳ παυσαμένου τῆς ὥρας τότε τὴν αὑτῶν ἀρετὴν ἐπιδείξονται.
PHAEDRUS: But perhaps it is proper to favor not those who are exceedingly in need, but those who are best able to return the favor; nor those who merely beg, but those who are worthy of the matter; nor those who will enjoy your youth, but those who will share their own goods when you have grown older; nor those who, having succeeded, will show off to others, but those who, feeling shame, will keep silence before all; nor those who are eager for a short time, but those who will be friends likewise through all their life; nor those who, when ceasing from their desire, will seek a pretext for enmity, but those who, when your youth has ceased, will then display their own virtue.
σὺ οὖν τῶν τε εἰρημένων μέμνησο καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἐνθυμοῦ, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶντας οἱ φίλοι νουθετοῦσιν ὡς ὄντος κακοῦ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσιν οὐδεὶς πώποτε τῶν οἰκείων ἐμέμψατο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο κακῶς βουλευομένοις περὶ ἑαυτῶν.
You, then, remember what has been said and bear this in mind: that while friends admonish lovers on the ground that their practice is bad, no one of their relatives has ever blamed non-lovers on the ground that they make bad decisions for themselves because of this.
ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἔροιό με εἰ ἅπασίν σοι παραινῶ τοῖς μὴ ἐρῶσι χαρίζεσθαι.
Perhaps, then, you might ask me if I advise you to favor all non-lovers.
ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι οὐδʼ ἂν τὸν ἐρῶντα πρὸς ἅπαντάς σε κελεύειν τοὺς ἐρῶντας ταύτην ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν.
I think that not even a lover would bid you to have this mind toward all lovers.
οὔτε γὰρ τῷ λαμβάνοντι χάριτος ἴσης ἄξιον, οὔτε σοὶ βουλομένῳ τοὺς ἄλλους λανθάνειν ὁμοίως δυνατόν· δεῖ δὲ βλάβην μὲν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ μηδεμίαν, ὠφελίαν δὲ ἀμφοῖν γίγνεσθαι.
For it is neither worthy of equal gratitude for the one who receives it, nor is it equally possible for you, if you wish to escape the notice of others; but there must be no harm from it, and benefit must arise for both.
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἱκανά μοι νομίζω τὰ εἰρημένα· εἰ δʼ ἔτι τι σὺ ποθεῖς, ἡγούμενος παραλελεῖφθαι, ἐρώτα.
I, then, consider what has been said to be sufficient; but if you still desire anything, thinking it has been omitted, ask.
τί σοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ λόγος;
What does the speech seem to you, Socrates?
οὐχ ὑπερφυῶς τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εἰρῆσθαι;
Has it not been spoken extraordinarily both in other respects and in its words?
ΣΩ. δαιμονίως μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὥστε με ἐκπλαγῆναι.
SOCRATES: Divinely indeed, my friend, so that I was amazed.
καὶ τοῦτο ἐγὼ ἔπαθον διὰ σέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, πρὸς σὲ ἀποβλέπων, ὅτι ἐμοὶ ἐδόκεις γάνυσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου μεταξὺ ἀναγιγνώσκων· ἡγούμενος γὰρ σὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ἐπαΐειν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοὶ εἱπόμην, καὶ ἑπόμενος συνεβάκχευσα μετὰ σοῦ τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς.
And I experienced this because of you, Phaedrus, looking at you, because you seemed to me to be delighted by the speech while reading it; for thinking that you understand such matters better than I, I followed you, and following, I joined in your frenzy with you, your divine head.
ΦΑΙ. εἶεν·
PHAEDRUS: Well!
οὕτω δὴ δοκεῖ παίζειν;
Does it really seem to you to mock in this way?
ΣΩ. δοκῶ γάρ σοι παίζειν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐσπουδακέναι;
SOCRATES: Do I seem to you to mock and not to have been serious?
ΦΑΙ. μηδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀληθῶς εἰπὲ πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου, οἴει ἄν τινα ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἄλλον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἕτερα τούτων μείζω καὶ πλείω περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος;
PHAEDRUS: Not at all, Socrates, but tell me truly, by Zeus of friendship, do you think any other of the Greeks would have anything to say on the same subject that is greater and more abundant than this?

Notes

  1. 233aοὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἂν εὖ πάθωσι ταῦτα εἰκὸς ἐλάττω τὴν φιλίαν αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι — The subject of the infinitive `ποιῆσαι` and the subsequent `καταλειφθῆναι` is `ταῦτα` (the acts/benefits done as non-lovers). The phrase `οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἂν εὖ πάθωσι` (not because of the benefits they received) explains why those acts are not likely to diminish their friendship.
  2. 233bδυστυχοῦντας μέν, ἃ μὴ λύπην τοῖς ἄλλοις παρέχει, ἀνιαρὰ ποιεῖ νομίζειν — The subject of `ποιεῖ` is `ὁ ἔρως` from the previous sentence. `δυστυχοῦντας` (unfortunate lovers) is the accusative subject of `νομίζειν`, while `ἃ μὴ λύπην... παρέχει` is the relative clause acting as the object of `νομίζειν`. `ἀνιαρὰ` serves as the object complement. Love makes them think that even harmless things are vexatious.
  3. 234bτοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσιν οὐδεῖς πώποτε τῶν οἰκείων ἐμέμψατο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο κακῶς βουλευομένοις — The conjunction `ὡς` with the dative participle `βουλευομένοις` agrees with `τοῖς μὴ ἐρῶσιν` and expresses the subjective reason ('on the ground that they make bad decisions'). `τοῖς μὴ ἐρῶσιν` is the dative object governed by `ἐμέμψατο`.
  4. 234dσυνεβάκχευσα μετὰ σοῦ τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς — `τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς` ('the divine head') is a figurative expression in apposition with or parallel to the preceding pronoun `σοῦ`, affectionately referring to Phaedrus himself as the companion in the Bacchic frenzy (`συνεβάκχευσα`).

Cite this passage

Plato, Phaedrus §233-234. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg012.humanitext-grc2:233-234

Please note the AI-draft status of the translation and the date accessed.

Translation, notes and summary are AI-generated drafts, revised through reader feedback.