§165καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατόν γε, φαμέν, δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεῖναι· φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ὡς σμικρῶν ὄντων. πῶς δʼ οὔ; καὶ ἴσος μὴν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβαινεν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φαινόμενος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξειεν ἐλθεῖν, τοῦτο δʼ εἴη ἂν φάντασμα ἰσότητος. εἰκός. οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὄγκον πέρας ἔχων, αὐτός γε πρὸς αὑτὸν οὔτε ἀρχὴν οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον ἔχων; πῇ δή; ὅτι ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὥς τι τούτων ὄν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη ἀεὶ φαίνεται ἀρχή, μετά τε τὴν τελευτὴν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευτή, ἔν τε τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δέ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἑνὸς αὐτῶν ἑκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἑνός. ἀληθέστατα. θρύπτεσθαι δὴ οἶμαι κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν, ὃ ἄν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ· ὄγκος γάρ που ἄνευ ἑνὸς ἀεὶ λαμβάνοιτʼ ἄν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν τό γε τοιοῦτον πόρρωθεν μὲν ὁρῶντι καὶ ἀμβλὺ ἓν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ ὀξὺ νοοῦντι πλήθει ἄπειρον ἓν ἕκαστον φανῆναι, εἴπερ στέρεται τοῦ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος; ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν. οὕτω δὴ ἄπειρά τε καὶ πέρας ἔχοντα καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἕκαστα τἆλλα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τἆλλα δὲ τοῦ ἑνός. δεῖ γάρ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξει εἶναι; πῇ δή; οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἓν πάντα φαινόμενα ταὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι καὶ ὅμοια εἶναι. πάνυ γε. προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἑαυτοῖς. οὕτω. καὶ ὁμοίους δὴ καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτούς τε αὑτοῖς ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀλλήλοις. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἁπτομένους καὶ χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κινουμένους πάσας κινήσεις καὶ ἑστῶτας πάντῃ, καὶ γιγνομένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα που τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἃ διελθεῖν εὐπετὲς ἤδη ἡμῖν, εἰ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἔστιν. ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν. ἔτι δὴ ἅπαξ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴπωμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἆλλα δὲ τοῦ ἑνός, τί χρὴ εἶναι. εἴπωμεν γὰρ οὖν. οὐκοῦν ἓν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται τἆλλα. πῶς γάρ; οὐδὲ μὴν πολλά γε· ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς οὖσιν ἐνείη ἂν καὶ ἕν.
"And indeed, we say, even a smallest thing will seem to be in them; but this appears many and large in relation to each of the many things, since they are small." "How could it not be?" "And indeed, each mass will be thought to be equal to the many and small things; for it would not transition from appearing larger to smaller, before it should seem to come to the intermediate, and this would be a semblance of equality." "Likely." "Therefore, is it also having a limit in relation to another mass, but itself in relation to itself having neither beginning, nor limit, nor middle?" "How so?" "Because whenever one grasps in thought any part of them as being some one of these, before the beginning another beginning always appears, and after the end another end is left behind, and in the middle other things more middle than the middle, but smaller, because of the inability to grasp each one of them as 'one,' since the one is not." "Most true." "I think, then, that every being which one might grasp in thought must be broken into pieces and minced; for it would always be grasped, I suppose, as a mass without one." "Most certainly." "Therefore, must such a thing, to one seeing from afar and dimly, necessarily appear to be 'one,' but to one contemplating closely and sharply, must each appear to be infinite in multitude, if indeed it is deprived of the one, since it is not?" "Most necessary indeed." "Thus, indeed, each of the other things must appear both infinite and having a limit, and one and many, if the one is not, and the other things than the one are." "Indeed they must." "Therefore, will they also seem to be both like and unlike?" "How so?" "Like things painted in perspective, to one standing back, appearing all as one, they seem to have undergone the same and to be alike." "Quite so." "But to one coming close, they appear many and different, and by the semblance of the different, diverse and unlike themselves." "So it is." "Therefore, the masses must necessarily appear both like and unlike, both to themselves and to one another." "Most certainly." "Therefore, also the same and different from one another, and touching and separate from themselves, and moving with all movements and standing still in every way, and coming into being and perishing and neither, and surely all such things, which are now easy for us to go through, if many are when the one is not." "Most true indeed." "Let us speak once more, returning again to the beginning, if the one is not, and the other things than the one are, what they must be." "Yes, let us speak." "Therefore, the other things will not be one." "For how could they be?" "Nor indeed will they be many; for if they were many, 'one' would also be in them.
εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἕν, ἅπαντα οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὥστε οὐδʼ ἂν πολλὰ εἴη. ἀληθῆ. μὴ ἐνόντος δὲ ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ἕν ἐστι τἆλλα. οὐ γάρ. §166οὐδέ γε φαίνεται ἓν οὐδὲ πολλά. τί δή; ὅτι τἆλλα τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμίαν κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδέ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῴ ἐστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν. ἀληθῆ. οὐδʼ ἄρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐστὶν οὐδέ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἓν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δοξάζεταί τι τῶν ἄλλων ἓν εἶναι οὐδὲ πολλά· ἄνευ γὰρ ἑνὸς πολλὰ δοξάσαι ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γάρ. ἓν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἆλλα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε δοξάζεται ἓν οὐδὲ πολλά. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδʼ ἄρα ὅμοια οὐδὲ ἀνόμοια. οὐ γάρ. οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ αὐτά γε οὐδʼ ἕτερα, οὐδὲ ἁπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρίς, οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διήλθομεν ὡς φαινόμενα αὐτά, τούτων οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται τἆλλα, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. ἀληθῆ. οὐκοῦν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἴποιμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποιμεν; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἓν εἴτʼ ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεταί τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται. ἀληθέστατα.
For if none of them is one, all are nothing, so that they would not even be many." "True." "And since 'one' is not in the others, the others are neither many nor one." "Indeed not." "Nor indeed do they appear to be one or many." "Why so?" "Because the others have no communion whatsoever, in any way or in any place, with any of the things that are not, nor is any of the things that are not present with any of the others; for there is no part for the things that are not." "True." "Therefore, neither is there opinion of the non-being thing among the others, nor any semblance, nor is the non-being thing thought in any way or in any place in relation to the others." "Indeed not." "Therefore, if the one is not, none of the other things is even thought to be one or many; for without one, it is impossible to think of many." "For it is impossible." "Therefore, if the one is not, the other things neither are nor are thought to be one or many." "It does not seem so." "Therefore, neither like nor unlike." "Indeed not." "Nor indeed same nor different, nor touching nor separate, nor any of the other things we previously went through as appearing to them—none of these either is or appears to the other things, if the one is not." "True." "Therefore, if we should say in short, 'if the one is not, nothing is,' would we say correctly?" "Most certainly indeed." "Let this then be said, and also that, as it seems, whether the one is or is not, both itself and the other things, both in relation to themselves and to one another, all things in every way both are and are not, and both appear and do not appear." "Most true."