§157ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβάλλῃ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξύ τινων τότε γίγνεται κινήσεών τε καὶ στάσεων, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε οὐκ ἔστι, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται;
Does it, then, hold this way also in regard to the other changes, when it changes from being to perishing, or from not-being to becoming, that it then comes to be between certain motions and rests, and at that time neither is nor is not, and neither becomes nor perishes?
ἔοικε γοῦν.
It seems so, at any rate.
κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰὸν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφʼ ἓν οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται.
By the same reasoning, indeed, when it goes from one to many and from many to one, it is neither one nor many, and is neither separated nor combined.
καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὅμοιον ἰὸν οὔτε ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιούμενον·
And when it goes from like to unlike and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, and is neither becoming like nor becoming unlike.
καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἰὸν οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθῖνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἄν.
And when it goes from small to great and to equal and to their opposites, it would be neither small nor great nor equal, and would be neither increasing nor decreasing nor being equalized.
οὐκ ἔοικε.
It seems not.
ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντʼ ἂν πάσχοι τὸ ἕν, εἰ ἔστιν.
Indeed, the one would experience all these conditions, if it is.
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
How could it be otherwise?
τί δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα οὐ σκεπτέον;
But must we not consider what it is fitting for the others to experience, if the one is?
σκεπτέον.
We must consider it.
λέγωμεν δή, ἓν εἰ ἔστι, τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς τί χρὴ πεπονθέναι;
Let us say, then, if the one is, what must be the case for the others than the one.
λέγωμεν.
Let us say.
οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός ἐστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἕν ἐστι τἆλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἦν.
Then, since they are other than the one, the others are not the one; for they would not be other than the one.
ὀρθῶς.
Correct.
οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεταί γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἑνὸς τἆλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πῃ.
Yet surely the others are not entirely deprived of the one, but participate in it in some way.
πῇ δή;
In what way, then?
ὅτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἓν εἴη.
Because the others than the one are other, surely, by having parts; for if they did not have parts, they would be completely one.
ὀρθῶς.
Correct.
μόρια δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστὶν ὃ ἂν ὅλον ᾖ.
But parts, we say, belong to that which is a whole.
φαμὲν γάρ.
Yes, we do.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅλον ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὗ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὅλου.
But surely the whole must be a one made of many, of which the parts will be parts; for each of the parts must not be a part of many, but of a whole.
πῶς τοῦτο;
How is that?
εἴ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἴη, ἐν οἷς αὐτὸ εἴη, ἑαυτοῦ τε δήπου μόριον ἔσται, ὅ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, εἴπερ καὶ πάντων.
If something were a part of many, among which it itself was, it would surely be a part of itself—which is impossible—and indeed a part of each of the others, if indeed of all of them.
ἑνὸς γὰρ μὴ ὂν μόριον, πλὴν τούτου τῶν ἄλλων ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως ἑνὸς ἑκάστου οὐκ ἔσται μόριον, μὴ ὂν δὲ μόριον ἑκάστου οὐδενὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἔσται.
For if it is not a part of one, it will be a part of the others except this one, and thus it will not be a part of each one, and not being a part of each, it will be a part of none of the many.
μηδενὸς δὲ ὂν πάντων τούτων τι εἶναι, ὧν οὐδενὸς οὐδέν ἐστι, καὶ μόριον καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν ἀδύνατον.
But if it is a part of none, it is impossible for it to be a part or anything else of all these things of which it is nothing to any of them.
φαίνεταί γε δή.
It certainly seems so, indeed.
οὐκ ἄρα τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ μόριον μόριον, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς τινὸς ἰδέας καὶ ἑνός τινος ὃ καλοῦμεν ὅλον, ἐξ ἁπάντων ἓν τέλειον γεγονός, τούτου μόριον ἂν τὸ μόριον εἴη.
Therefore, the part is a part neither of the many nor of all, but of a certain single form and of a certain one which we call a whole, which has become a perfect one out of all; of this, the part would be a part.
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Absolutely.
εἰ ἄρα τἆλλα μόρια ἔχει, κἂν τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἑνὸς μετέχοι.
If, then, the others have parts, they would also participate in the whole and the one.
πάνυ γε.
Quite so.
ἓν ἄρα ὅλον τέλειον μόρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός.
Therefore, the others than the one must be a perfect whole, having parts.
ἀνάγκη.
It is necessary.