§145καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ὅλου τὰ μόρια μόρια, πεπερασμένον ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἕν· ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια;
And indeed, since the parts of a whole are parts, the one would be limited in respect of the whole; or are not the parts contained by the whole?
ἀνάγκη.
Of necessity.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε περιέχον πέρας ἂν εἴη.
But indeed, that which contains would be a limit.
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
How could it not be?
τὸ ἓν ἄρα ὂν ἕν τέ ἐστί που καὶ πολλά, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλήθει.
The one which is, therefore, is somehow both one and many, and whole and parts, and limited and infinite in multitude.
φαίνεται.
It appears so.
ἆρʼ οὖν οὐκ, ἐπείπερ πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον;
Is it not so, then, since it is limited, that it also has extremities?
ἀνάγκη.
Of necessity.
τί δέ;
What then?
εἰ ὅλον, οὐ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν;
If it is a whole, would it not also have a beginning, a middle, and an end?
ἢ οἷόν τέ τι ὅλον εἶναι ἄνευ τριῶν τούτων;
Or is it possible for anything to be a whole without these three?
κἄν του ἓν ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν ἀποστατῇ, ἐθελήσει ἔτι ὅλον εἶναι;
And if any one of them is absent from it, will it still be willing to be a whole?
οὐκ ἐθελήσει.
It will not.
καὶ ἀρχὴν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον ἔχοι ἂν τὸ ἕν.
And indeed, as it seems, the one would have a beginning, an end, and a middle.
ἔχοι.
It would.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μέσον ἴσον τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπέχει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως μέσον εἴη.
But indeed, the middle is equidistant from the extremities; for otherwise it would not be a middle.
οὐ γάρ.
Indeed not.
καὶ σχήματος δή τινος, ὡς ἔοικε, τοιοῦτον ὂν μετέχοι ἂν τὸ ἕν, ἤτοι εὐθέος ἢ στρογγύλου ἤ τινος μεικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν.
And indeed, being such, as it seems, the one would participate in some shape, either straight or round or some mixture of both.
μετέχοι γὰρ ἄν. ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ; πῶς;
For it would indeed participate. Then, being in this state, will it not be both in itself and in another? How?
τῶν μερῶν που ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὅλου.
Each of the parts, I suppose, is in the whole, and nothing is outside the whole.
οὕτω.
So it is.
πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου περιέχεται;
And are all the parts contained by the whole?
ναί.
Yes.
καὶ μὴν τά γε πάντα μέρη τὰ αὑτοῦ τὸ ἕν ἐστι, καὶ οὔτε τι πλέον οὔτε ἔλαττον ἢ πάντα.
And indeed, the one is all its own parts, and neither more nor less than all.
οὐ γάρ.
Indeed.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἕν ἐστιν;
Is not, then, the whole also the one?
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
How could it not be?
εἰ ἄρα πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὅλῳ τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἔστι δὲ τά τε πάντα τὸ ἓν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, περιέχεται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἂν περιέχοιτο τὸ ἕν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη.
If, then, all the parts happen to be in the whole, and all the parts are the one and the whole itself, and all are contained by the whole, the one would be contained by the one, and thus now the one itself would be in itself.
φαίνεται.
It appears so.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε ὅλον αὖ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσίν ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε ἐν τινί.
But indeed, on the other hand, the whole is not in the parts, neither in all nor in any.
εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἑνί· ἔν τινι γὰρ ἑνὶ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι που δύναιτο ἔν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι·
For if it is in all, it must also be in one; for if it is not in any single one, it could no longer, I suppose, be in all.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἁπάντων ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ μὴ ἔνι, πῶς ἔτι ἔν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνέσται;
And if this one is one of all the parts, and the whole is not in this, how will it still be in all?
οὐδαμῶς.
In no way.
οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν μερῶν· εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅλον εἴη, τὸ πλέον ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι εἴη, ὅ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον.
Nor indeed is it in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.
ἀδύνατον γάρ.
For it is impossible.
μὴ ὂν δʼ ἐν πλέοσιν μηδʼ ἐν ἑνὶ μηδʼ ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ εἶναι ἢ μηδαμοῦ ἔτι εἶναι;
But if the whole is neither in several, nor in one, nor in all the parts, is it not necessary that it be in some other thing, or else be nowhere at all?
ἀνάγκη.
Necessary.
οὐκοῦν μηδαμοῦ μὲν ὂν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον δὲ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν αὑτῷ ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι;
Is it not so, then, that if it were nowhere it would be nothing, but since it is a whole, and is not in itself, it must of necessity be in another?
πάνυ γε.
Very much so.
ἧι μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἓν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν· ᾗ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν ἀνάγκη αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ.
Insofar, then, as the one is a whole, it is in another; but insofar as it happens to be all the parts, it is in itself; and thus the one must of necessity be both in itself and in another.
ἀνάγκη. οὕτω δὴ πεφυκὸς τὸ ἓν ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι; πῇ;
Necessary. Then, being of such a nature, must not the one both move and stand still? In what way?