Humanitext Reader

Plato · Sophist §255

The Same and the Other as the Five Greatest Kinds

Passage 22 of 30 · Greek

Summary

The Visitor and Theaetetus argue that 'the same' and 'the other' are independent genera distinct from the three previously agreed greatest genera (being, rest, and motion), thereby establishing that there are five greatest genera in total.

§255ΞΕ. τί ποτʼ αὖ νῦν οὕτως εἰρήκαμεν τό τε ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον;
STR. What then did we mean just now by mentioning 'the same' and 'the other'?
πότερα δύο γένη τινὲ αὐτώ, τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἄλλω, συμμειγνυμένω μὴν ἐκείνοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀεί, καὶ περὶ πέντε ἀλλʼ οὐ περὶ τριῶν ὡς ὄντων αὐτῶν σκεπτέον, ἢ τό τε ταὐτὸν τοῦτο καὶ θάτερον ὡς ἐκείνων τι προσαγορεύοντες λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;
Are they two genera, distinct from the three, but always necessarily mixing with them, and should we examine them as five and not as three as being? Or are we, in calling this 'the same' and 'the other' unconsciously referring to one of those three?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.
THEAE. Perhaps.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ οὔ τι μὴν κίνησίς γε καὶ στάσις οὔθʼ ἕτερον οὔτε ταὐτόν ἐστι.
STR. But surely motion and rest are neither 'the other' nor 'the same'.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
THEAE. How so?
ΞΕ. ὅτιπερ ἂν κοινῇ προσείπωμεν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν, τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι.
STR. Because whatever we call both motion and rest in common, cannot be either of them.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;
THEAE. Why indeed?
ΞΕ. κίνησίς τε στήσεται καὶ στάσις αὖ κινηθήσεται· περὶ γὰρ ἀμφότερα θάτερον ὁποτερονοῦν γιγνόμενον αὐτοῖν ἀναγκάσει μεταβάλλειν αὖ θάτερον ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως, ἅτε μετασχὸν τοῦ ἐναντίου.
STR. Motion would rest, and rest in turn would move; for in the case of both, whichever of the two becomes 'the other' will compel the other to change in turn to the opposite of its own nature, as it participates in the opposite.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ γε.
THEAE. Completely so.
ΞΕ. μετέχετον μὴν ἄμφω ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρου.
STR. Yet both participate in 'the same' and 'the other'.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAE. Yes.
ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν κίνησίν γʼ εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἢ θάτερον, μηδʼ αὖ στάσιν.
STR. Let us not say, then, that motion is 'the same' or 'the other', nor again rest.
ΘΕΑΙ. μὴ γάρ.
THEAE. Indeed not.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ ἆρα τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν ὡς ἕν τι διανοητέον ἡμῖν;
STR. But should we conceive of 'being' and 'the same' as some one thing?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.
THEAE. Perhaps.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ εἰ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν μηδὲν διάφορον σημαίνετον, κίνησιν αὖ πάλιν καὶ στάσιν ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγοντες ἀμφότερα οὕτως αὐτὰ ταὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα προσεροῦμεν.
STR. But if 'being' and 'the same' signify nothing different, then when we say again that both motion and rest 'are', we shall thereby address both of them as 'the same' since they are.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον.
THEAE. But surely this is impossible.
ΞΕ. ἀδύνατον ἄρα ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναι.
STR. It is impossible, then, for 'the same' and 'being' to be one.
ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδόν.
THEAE. Pretty much.
ΞΕ. τέταρτον δὴ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶν εἴδεσιν τὸ ταὐτὸν τιθῶμεν;
STR. Then shall we place 'the same' as a fourth in addition to the three forms?
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
THEAE. By all means.
ΞΕ. τί δέ;
STR. What then?
τὸ θάτερον ἆρα ἡμῖν λεκτέον πέμπτον;
Should we call 'the other' a fifth?
ἢ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὂν ὡς δύʼ ἄττα ὀνόματα ἐφʼ ἑνὶ γένει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ;
Or must we conceive of this and 'being' as two names for one genus?
ΘΕΑΙ. τάχʼ ἄν.
THEAE. Perhaps so.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ οἶμαί σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθʼ αὑτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι.
STR. But I think you agree that of things that are, some are always said themselves by themselves, and others in relation to other things.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δʼ οὔ;
THEAE. Of course.
ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γʼ ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον· ἦ γάρ;
STR. And 'the other' is always in relation to another; is that not so?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
THEAE. Just so.
ΞΕ. οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ πάμπολυ διεφερέτην·
STR. This would not be so, if 'being' and 'the other' did not differ very much.
ἀλλʼ εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν, ἦν ἄν ποτέ τι καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον· νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν ὅτιπερ ἂν ἕτερον ᾖ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρου τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι.
But if 'the other' participated in both forms as 'being' does, there would sometimes be some of the other things that is other not in relation to another; but as it is, quite simply for us, whatever is other is of necessity what it is in relation to another.
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις καθάπερ ἔχει.
THEAE. You speak just as it is.
ΞΕ. πέμπτον δὴ τὴν θατέρου φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν οὖσαν, ἐν οἷς προαιρούμεθα.
STR. Then we must say that the nature of 'the other' is a fifth among the forms in which we select.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAE. Yes.
ΞΕ. καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν εἶναι διεληλυθυῖαν· ἓν ἕκαστον γὰρ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου.
STR. And we shall say that it has run through all of them; for each one is other than the others, not because of its own nature, but because of participating in the idea of 'the other'.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
THEAE. Completely so.
ΞΕ. ὧδε δὴ λέγωμεν ἐπὶ τῶν πέντε καθʼ ἓν ἀναλαμβάνοντες.
STR. Let us then speak of these five, taking them up one by one.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
THEAE. How?
ΞΕ. πρῶτον μὲν κίνησιν, ὡς ἔστι παντάπασιν ἕτερον στάσεως.
STR. First about motion, that it is entirely other than rest.
ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;
Or how do we say?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
THEAE. Just so.
ΞΕ. οὐ στάσις ἄρʼ ἐστίν.
STR. It is not, then, rest.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.
THEAE. By no means.

Notes

  1. 255aπερὶ γὰρ ἀμφότερα θάτερον ὁποτερονοῦν γιγνόμενον αὐτοῖν ἀναγκάσει — The subject is θάτερον ὁποτερονοῦν (whichever of the two becomes 'the other' or 'the same'). The argument is that if either motion or rest were identified with 'the same' or 'the other' itself, that identification would force the remaining one to change into the opposite of its own nature (μεταβάλλειν), causing a contradiction where motion would rest and rest would move.
  2. 255cτῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθʼ αὑτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι — The division of beings into those that are 'themselves by themselves' (αὐτὰ καθʼ αὑτά) and those that are 'in relation to other things' (πρὸς ἄλλα). This premise is crucial for establishing that while 'being' spans both categories, 'the other' is strictly relative, thus proving that 'being' and 'the other' are distinct genera.
  3. 255dἀλλʼ εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν — A counterfactual conditional structure (εἰ with indicative past ... ἂν with indicative past). It argues that if 'the other' participated in both forms (absolute and relative) like 'being' does, there would be something that is 'other' without being relative to another, which is not the case (νῦν δέ); hence, 'the other' is shown to be purely relative.

Cite this passage

Plato, Sophist §255. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg007.humanitext-grc2:255

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