§251ΞΕ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα κείσθω διηπορημένον·
STR.
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐξ ἴσου τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀπορίας μετειλήφατον, νῦν ἐλπὶς ἤδη καθάπερ ἂν αὐτῶν θάτερον εἴτε ἀμυδρότερον εἴτε σαφέστερον ἀναφαίνηται, καὶ θάτερον οὕτως ἀναφαίνεσθαι·
Let this, then, lie here as a matter of perplexity; but since being and non-being have shared equally in the difficulty, there is now hope that, in whatever way one of them appears, whether more dimly or more clearly, the other also will appear in the same way.
καὶ ἐὰν αὖ μηδέτερον ἰδεῖν δυνώμεθα, τὸν γοῦν λόγον ὅπῃπερ ἂν οἷοί τε ὦμεν εὐπρεπέστατα διωσόμεθα οὕτως ἀμφοῖν ἅμα.
And if, on the other hand, we are unable to see either, we shall at least, in whatever way we can, push our argument through both of them together in the most decent manner.
ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς.
THEAE. Good.
ΞΕ. λέγωμεν δὴ καθʼ ὅντινά ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἑκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν.
STR. Let us then state in what way we address this same thing by many names on each occasion.
ΘΕΑΙ. οἷον δὴ τί;
THEAE. Such as what?
παράδειγμα εἰπέ.
Give an example.
ΞΕ. λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δήπου πόλλʼ ἄττα ἐπονομάζοντες, τά τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς, ἐν οἷς πᾶσι καὶ ἑτέροις μυρίοις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν εἶναί φαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερα ἄπειρα, καὶ τἆλλα δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἓν ἕκαστον ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγομεν.
STR. We speak of a man, surely, naming him by many additional terms, applying to him colors, shapes, sizes, vices, and virtues, in all of which, and in countless other things, we say that he is not only a "man," but also "good" and countless other things. And so with other things, according to the same principle, assuming each to be one, we again speak of it as many and by many names.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
THEAE. What you say is true.
ΞΕ. ὅθεν γε οἶμαι τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν·
STR. Hence, I suppose, we have provided a feast for the young and for those of the old who have come to learning late.
εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὡς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δήπου χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐῶντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον. ἐντυγχάνεις γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθαυμακόσι, καὶ δή τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰομένοις τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀνηυρηκέναι.
For it is easy for anyone to grasp immediately that it is impossible for many things to be one, and for one to be many; and so they surely delight in not allowing us to call a man "good," but rather the good "good," and the man "man." For I suppose, Theaetetus, you often meet people who take such things seriously, sometimes older men who, because of their poverty in acquiring wisdom, marvel at such things, and indeed think they have discovered this very thing as something all-wise.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
THEAE. Certainly.
ΞΕ. ἵνα τοίνυν πρὸς ἅπαντας ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ τοὺς πώποτε περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὁτιοῦν διαλεχθέντας, ἔστω καὶ πρὸς τούτους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅσοις ἔμπροσθεν διειλέγμεθα, τὰ νῦν ὡς ἐν ἐρωτήσει λεχθησόμενα.
STR. In order, then, that our argument may be addressed to all who have ever discussed anything whatsoever about being, let what is now about to be said, as if in a form of questioning, be addressed both to these and to the others with whom we have previously conversed.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὰ ποῖα δή;
THEAE. What sort of things do you mean?
ΞΕ. πότερον μήτε τὴν οὐσίαν κινήσει καὶ στάσει προσάπτωμεν μήτε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ μηδὲν μηδενί, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἄμεικτα ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατον μεταλαμβάνειν ἀλλήλων οὕτως αὐτὰ ἐν τοῖς παρʼ ἡμῖν λόγοις τιθῶμεν;
STR. "Shall we neither attach being to motion and rest, nor anything else to any other thing, but posit them in our arguments as being unmixed and unable to participate in one another?
ἢ πάντα εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγάγωμεν ὡς δυνατὰ ἐπικοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις;
Or shall we bring all things together into the same, on the ground that they are capable of communicating with one another?
ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δὲ μή; τούτων, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τί ποτʼ ἂν αὐτοὺς προαιρεῖσθαι φήσομεν;
Or some, and others not?" Of these options, Theaetetus, which shall we say they would choose?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχω πρὸς ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι.
THEAE. I have nothing to answer to these on their behalf.
ΞΕ. τί οὖν οὐ καθʼ ἓν ἀποκρινόμενος ἐφʼ ἑκάστου τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω;
STR. Why then don't you examine the consequences in each case by answering one by one?
ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς λέγεις.
THEAE. You speak well.
ΞΕ. καὶ τιθῶμέν γε αὐτοὺς λέγειν, εἰ βούλει, πρῶτον μηδενὶ μηδὲν μηδεμίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν κοινωνίας εἰς μηδέν.
STR. Let us then posit them as saying, if you like, first, that nothing has any power of communication with anything for any purpose.
οὐκοῦν κίνησίς τε καὶ στάσις οὐδαμῇ μεθέξετον οὐσίας;
Then motion and rest will in no way participate in being, will they?
§252ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
THEAE. No, indeed.
ΞΕ. τί δέ;
STR. What then?
ἔσται πότερον αὐτῶν οὐσίας μὴ προσκοινωνοῦν;
Will either of them exist, if it does not share in being?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔσται.
THEAE. It will not.
ΞΕ. ταχὺ δὴ ταύτῃ γε τῇ συνομολογίᾳ πάντα ἀνάστατα γέγονεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἅμα τε τῶν τὸ πᾶν κινούντων καὶ τῶν ὡς ἓν ἱστάντων καὶ ὅσοι κατʼ εἴδη τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναί φασιν ἀεί·
STR. By this agreement, then, it seems everything has quickly been turned upside down, both for those who move the universe, those who make it stand as one, and all those who say that things which are exist as forms, always remaining in the same state and in the same way.
πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τό γε εἶναι προσάπτουσιν, οἱ μὲν ὄντως κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ὄντως ἑστηκότʼ εἶναι.
For all of these attach "to be" to them, some saying that they really move, others that they really exist at rest.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
THEAE. Quite so.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅσοι τοτὲ μὲν συντιθέασι τὰ πάντα, τοτὲ δὲ διαιροῦσιν, εἴτε εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἄπειρα εἴτε εἰς πέρας ἔχοντα στοιχεῖα διαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐκ τούτων συντιθέντες, ὁμοίως μὲν ἐὰν ἐν μέρει τοῦτο τιθῶσι γιγνόμενον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἀεί, κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα λέγοιεν ἂν οὐδέν, εἴπερ μηδεμία ἔστι σύμμειξις.
STR. And furthermore, all those who at one time combine all things, and at another time divide them, whether they divide them into one and from one into infinite things, or into elements that have a limit and combine them from these—whether they posit this as happening in turn or always, in all these cases they would be saying nothing, if indeed there is no mixture at all.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.
THEAE. Correct.
ΞΕ. ἔτι τοίνυν ἂν αὐτοὶ πάντων καταγελαστότατα μετίοιεν τὸν λόγον οἱ μηδὲν ἐῶντες κοινωνίᾳ παθήματος ἑτέρου θάτερον προσαγορεύειν.
STR. Furthermore, those who do not allow one thing to be addressed by the name of another through sharing in its attribute would be pursuing their argument in the most ridiculous way of all.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
THEAE. How so?
ΞΕ. τῷ τε
εἶναί
που περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ
χωρὶς
καὶ τῷ
τῶν ἄλλων
καὶ τῷ
καθʼ αὑτὸ
καὶ μυρίοις ἑτέροις, ὧν ἀκρατεῖς ὄντες εἴργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἄλλων δέονται τῶν ἐξελεγξόντων, ἀλλὰ τὸ λεγόμενον οἴκοθεν τὸν πολέμιον καὶ ἐναντιωσόμενον ἔχοντες, ἐντὸς ὑποφθεγγόμενον ὥσπερ τὸν ἄτοπον Εὐρυκλέα περιφέροντες ἀεὶ πορεύονται.
STR. Because they are forced to use "to be" somehow about everything, and "apart," and "from others," and "by itself," and countless other terms. Since they are powerless to refrain from these and not to connect them in their arguments, they do not need others to refute them, but, as the saying goes, they have their enemy and adversary at home, and go about carrying him always within them, whispering from inside like the strange Eurycles.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ λέγεις ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀληθές.
THEAE. You say what is completely like them and true.
ΞΕ. τί δʼ, ἂν πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐῶμεν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἐπικοινωνίας;
STR. But what if we allow all things to have the power of communicating with one another?
ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦτο μὲν οἷός τε κἀγὼ διαλύειν.
THEAE. This, even I am able to solve.
ΞΕ. πῶς;
STR. How?
ΘΕΑΙ. ὅτι κίνησίς τε αὐτὴ παντάπασιν ἵσταιτʼ ἂν καὶ στάσις αὖ πάλιν αὐτὴ κινοῖτο, εἴπερ ἐπιγιγνοίσθην ἐπʼ ἀλλήλοιν.
THEAE. Because motion itself would altogether stand still, and rest itself, in turn, would move, if they were to come upon one another.
ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γέ που ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατον, κίνησίν τε ἵστασθαι καὶ στάσιν κινεῖσθαι;
STR. But surely this is impossible by the greatest necessities, that motion should stand still and rest should move?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
THEAE. How could it not be?
ΞΕ. τὸ τρίτον δὴ μόνον λοιπόν.
STR. Then only the third option is left.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAE. Yes.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἕν γέ τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον, ἢ πάντα ἢ μηδὲν ἢ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλειν, τὰ δὲ μὴ συμμείγνυσθαι.
STR. And indeed, one of these is necessary: either all things, or nothing, or some are willing to mix and others not.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
THEAE. How could it not be?
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν τά γε δύο ἀδύνατον ηὑρέθη.
STR. And yet two of them have been found to be impossible.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAE. Yes.
ΞΕ. πᾶς ἄρα ὁ βουλόμενος ὀρθῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν τριῶν θήσει.
STR. Therefore, everyone who wishes to answer correctly will posit the remaining one of the three.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
THEAE. Quite so.