§247ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAE. Yes.
ΞΕ. τί δέ;
STR. What then?
ψυχὴν οὐ τὴν μὲν δικαίαν, τὴν δὲ ἄδικόν φασιν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνιμον, τὴν δὲ ἄφρονα;
Do they not say that one soul is just, and another unjust, and one wise, and another foolish?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
THEAE. Why, of course.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ οὐ δικαιοσύνης ἕξει καὶ παρουσίᾳ τοιαύτην αὐτῶν ἑκάστην γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν ἐναντίαν;
STR. But is it not by the possession and presence of justice that each of them becomes such, and by the opposites that they become the opposite?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, καὶ ταῦτα σύμφασιν.
THEAE. Yes, they agree to this too.
ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δυνατόν τῳ παραγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι πάντως εἶναί τι φήσουσιν.
STR. But indeed they will say that that which is capable of being present to something and absent from it is certainly something.
ΘΕΑΙ. φασὶ μὲν οὖν.
THEAE. Yes, indeed.
ΞΕ. οὔσης οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν ᾗ ταῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, πότερον ὁρατὸν καὶ ἁπτὸν εἶναί φασί τι αὐτῶν ἢ πάντα ἀόρατα;
STR. Since, then, justice, wisdom, the other virtues, and their opposites exist, and indeed also the soul in which these arise, do they say that any of these is visible and tangible, or are they all invisible?
ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδὸν οὐδὲν τούτων γε ὁρατόν.
THEAE. Virtually none of these at least is visible.
ΞΕ. τί δὲ τῶν τοιούτων;
STR. What about such things?
μῶν σῶμά τι λέγουσιν ἴσχειν;
Do they say they have any body?
ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀποκρίνονται πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὧν ἠρώτηκας, αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν ἢ μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν ἢ πάντʼ εἶναι σώματα διισχυρίζεσθαι.
THEAE. To this they no longer all answer in the same way, but they think that the soul itself possesses a kind of body, whereas as for wisdom and each of the other things you asked about, they are ashamed to venture either to agree that they are nothing among things that are, or to insist that they are all bodies.
ΞΕ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, βελτίους γεγόνασιν ἇνδρες·
STR. For clearly, Theaetetus, our men have become better.
ἐπεὶ τούτων οὐδʼ ἂν ἓν ἐπαισχυνθεῖεν οἵ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοί τε καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνοιντʼ ἂν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν εἰσίν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστίν.
Since those of them who are the sown-men and earthborn would not feel ashamed of any of these things, but would contend that whatever they are not able to squeeze with their hands is absolutely nothing at all.
ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδὸν οἷα διανοοῦνται λέγεις.
THEAE. You describe pretty much what they think.
ΞΕ. πάλιν τοίνυν ἀνερωτῶμεν αὐτούς·
STR.
εἰ γάρ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώματον, ἐξαρκεῖ.
Let us then ask them again; for if they are willing to concede that even some small part of things that are is bodiless, that is sufficient.
τὸ γὰρ ἐπί τε τούτοις ἅμα καὶ ἐπʼ ἐκείνοις ὅσα ἔχει σῶμα συμφυὲς γεγονός, εἰς ὃ βλέποντες ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγουσι, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥητέον.
For they must state what that is which is innate in both these things and those which have a body, looking to which they say that both exist.
τάχʼ οὖν ἴσως ἂν ἀποροῖεν· εἰ δή τι τοιοῦτον πεπόνθασι, σκόπει, προτεινομένων ἡμῶν, ἆρʼ ἐθέλοιεν ἂν δέχεσθαι καὶ ὁμολογεῖν τοιόνδʼ εἶναι τὸ ὄν.
Perhaps, then, they might be at a loss; if they have experienced something of this kind, see whether, when we propose it, they would be willing to accept and agree that being is as follows.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δή;
THEAE. What kind of thing?
λέγε, καὶ τάχα εἰσόμεθα.
Say, and we shall soon know.
ΞΕ. λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἴτʼ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτʼ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἅπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι·
STR. I say, then, that anything which possesses any power whatsoever, whether to act upon any other thing by nature, or to be acted upon, even in the slightest degree by the most trivial thing, even if only once, all this really is.
τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις.
For I set up as a definition of things that are, that they are nothing other than power.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἐπείπερ αὐτοί γε οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τούτου βέλτιον λέγειν, δέχονται τοῦτο.
THEAE. But since they themselves do not have anything better than this to say at present, they accept this.
§248ΞΕ. καλῶς·
STR.
ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εἰς ὕστερον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τούτοις ἕτερον ἂν φανείη.
Good; for perhaps later something else might appear both to us and to them.
πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐνταῦθα μενέτω συνομολογηθέν.
For now, let this remain agreed upon with them.
ΘΕΑΙ. μένει.
THEAE. It remains.
ΞΕ. πρὸς δὴ τοὺς ἑτέρους ἴωμεν, τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους· σὺ δʼ ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ παρὰ τούτων ἀφερμήνευε.
STR. Let us go then to the others, the friends of forms; and you interpret for us what comes from them too.
ΘΕΑΙ. ταῦτʼ ἔσται.
THEAE. That shall be done.
ΞΕ. γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρίς που διελόμενοι λέγετε; ἦ γάρ;
STR. You speak of becoming, and of reality, separating them from one another, do you not?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAE. Yes.
ΞΕ. καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει διʼ αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, ἣν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως.
STR. And you say that by the body we communicate with becoming through sensation, but by the soul through reasoning with the true reality, which you say always remains in the same state in the same way, while becoming is now one way, now another.
ΘΕΑΙ. φαμὲν γὰρ οὖν.
THEAE. Yes, we do indeed say so.
ΞΕ. τὸ δὲ δὴ κοινωνεῖν, ὦ πάντων ἄριστοι, τί τοῦθʼ ὑμᾶς ἐπʼ ἀμφοῖν λέγειν φῶμεν;
STR. But as to this "communicating," O best of men, what shall we say you mean by it in both cases?
ἆρʼ οὐ τὸ νυνδὴ παρʼ ἡμῶν ῥηθέν;
Is it not what was just now spoken of by us?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
THEAE. What is that?
ΞΕ. πάθημα ἢ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεώς τινος ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα συνιόντων γιγνόμενον.
STR. An undergoing or an acting arising from some power from things that come together with one another.
τάχʼ οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αὐτῶν τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπόκρισιν σὺ μὲν οὐ κατακούεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἴσως διὰ συνήθειαν.
Perhaps, Theaetetus, you do not hear their answer to this, but I do, perhaps through familiarity.
ΘΕΑΙ. τίνʼ οὖν δὴ λέγουσι λόγον;
THEAE. What argument then do they state?
ΞΕ. οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν τὸ νυνδὴ ῥηθὲν πρὸς τοὺς γηγενεῖς οὐσίας πέρι.
STR. They do not concede to us what was just now said to the earthborn concerning reality.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
THEAE. What was that?
ΞΕ. ἱκανὸν ἔθεμεν ὅρον που τῶν ὄντων, ὅταν τῳ παρῇ ἡ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις;
STR. Did we not lay down as a sufficient definition of things that are, that whenever the power of being acted upon or acting, even in the slightest degree, is present to something, it exists?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAE. Yes.
ΞΕ. πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα τόδε λέγουσιν, ὅτι γενέσει μὲν μέτεστι τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ οὐσίαν τούτων οὐδετέρου τὴν δύναμιν ἁρμόττειν φασίν.
STR. In reply to this they say that becoming indeed participates in the power of acting and being acted upon, but they say that the power of neither of these fits reality.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν λέγουσί τι;
THEAE. So do they have a point?
ΞΕ. πρὸς ὅ γε λεκτέον ἡμῖν ὅτι δεόμεθα παρʼ αὐτῶν ἔτι πυθέσθαι σαφέστερον εἰ προσομολογοῦσι τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν γιγνώσκειν, τὴν δʼ οὐσίαν γιγνώσκεσθαι.
STR. To which we must say that we need still to learn more clearly from them whether they further agree that the soul knows, and that reality is known.
ΘΕΑΙ. φασὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε.
THEAE. They certainly say this at least.
ΞΕ. τί δέ;
STR. What then?
τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἢ τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαί φατε ποίημα ἢ πάθος ἢ ἀμφότερον;
Do you say that knowing or being known is an acting or an undergoing, or both?
ἢ τὸ μὲν πάθημα, τὸ δὲ θάτερον;
Or one an undergoing, and the other the other?
ἢ παντάπασιν οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου τούτων μεταλαμβάνειν;
Or that neither of them participates in either of these at all?
ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου· τἀναντία γὰρ ἂν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λέγοιεν.
THEAE. Clearly that neither participates in either; for otherwise they would be saying the opposite of what they said before.
ΞΕ. μανθάνω·
STR. I understand.
τόδε γε, ὡς τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἴπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὖ συμβαίνει πάσχειν.
This at least is clear, that if knowing is to be an acting on something, it follows of necessity that what is known in turn undergoes.
τὴν οὐσίαν δὴ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον γιγνωσκομένην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως, καθʼ ὅσον γιγνώσκεται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δή φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν.
And so, according to this argument, reality, when known by knowledge, insofar as it is known, to that extent is moved because of undergoing, which we say could not happen to that which is at rest.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.
THEAE. Correctly.