§152ΣΩ. κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλʼ ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας.
SOCRATES: Well, you seem to have given a by no means ordinary account of knowledge, but rather the very one that Protagoras also used to give.
τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.
However, he has said these same things in a somewhat different way.
φησὶ γάρ που
πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον
ἄνθρωπον εἶναι,
τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που;
For he says somewhere, "Man is the measure of all things, of those that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not." You have read this, I suppose?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.
THEAETETUS: Yes, and many times.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί·
SOCRATES: Does he not mean something like this: that as each thing appears to me, so it is to me, and as it appears to you, so it is in turn to you?
ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ;
And you and I are "man"?
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτω.
THEAETETUS: Indeed, that is what he says.
ΣΩ. εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν· ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ.
SOCRATES: It is likely, however, that a wise man is not talking nonsense; so let us follow him.
ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐνίοτε πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγῷ, ὁ δʼ οὔ;
Does it not sometimes happen that when the same wind is blowing, one of us feels cold and the other does not?
καὶ ὁ μὲν ἠρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα;
And one feels it slightly, and the other extremely?
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.
THEAETETUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν;
SOCRATES: Shall we say then, at that time, that the wind itself in itself is cold or not cold?
ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγῶντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὔ;
Or shall we believe Protagoras, that it is cold for the one who feels cold, and for the one who does not, it is not?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
THEAETETUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτω ἑκατέρῳ;
SOCRATES: And does it not also appear so to each of them?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γε
φαίνεται
αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: And "appears" means "is perceived"?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν γάρ.
THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed.
ΣΩ. φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἔν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις.
SOCRATES: Appearance, then, and perception are the same in the case of hot things and all such things.
οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.
For as each person perceives things, so they also tend to be for each person.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
THEAETETUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί ἐστιν καὶ ἀψευδὲς ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα.
SOCRATES: Perception, then, is always of what is, and is unerring, since it is knowledge.
ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.
THEAETETUS: So it appears.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ᾐνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν;
SOCRATES: By the Graces, then, was Protagoras some all-wise man, and did he speak this in riddles to us, the common rabble, while telling the truth in secret to his disciples?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις;
THEAETETUS: What in the world do you mean by this, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλʼ οὐ φαῦλον λόγον, ὡς ἄρα ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδʼ ἄν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδʼ ὁποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κοῦφον, σύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιουοῦν·
SOCRATES: I will tell you a by no means ordinary theory: that nothing is one thing by itself, nor could you rightly call anything by any name or as being of any kind; but if you call it large, it will also appear small, and if heavy, light, and so with everything, as though nothing were one, nor anything, nor of any kind.
ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτʼ οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται.
Rather, from motion, change, and mixture with one another, all things arise which we say "are," calling them so incorrectly; for nothing ever is, but is always becoming.
καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου συμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος, ὃς εἰπών—
"
Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν
"
πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως·
And on this point let all the wise men in turn, except Parmenides, agree: Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles, and of the poets, the leaders of each kind of poetry, Epicharmus in comedy, and Homer in tragedy, who, by saying: "Oceanus, the origin of the gods, and mother Tethys," has said that all things are the offspring of flow and motion.
ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν;
Or does he not seem to mean this?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε.
THEAETETUS: To me he does.
§153ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρός γε τοσοῦτον στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;
SOCRATES: Who then could still dispute with such a great army, and with Homer as its commander, without becoming ridiculous?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
THEAETETUS: It is not easy, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε.
SOCRATES: Indeed not, Theaetetus.
ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ σημεῖα ἱκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία·
For the following are also sufficient proofs for this theory: that what seems to be and what becomes is provided by motion, whereas what is not and what perishes is provided by rest.
τὸ γὰρ θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τἆλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· τούτω δὲ κινήσεις.
For heat and fire, which indeed generate and govern all other things, are themselves generated from change and friction; and these two are motions.
ἢ οὐχ αὗται γενέσεις πυρός;
Or are these not the generations of fire?
ΘΕΑΙ. αὗται μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Indeed they are.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τό γε τῶν ζῴων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται.
SOCRATES: Furthermore, the class of animals also grows from these same things.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
THEAETETUS: How could it be otherwise?
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: And what of this?
ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ σῴζεται;
Is not the condition of bodies destroyed by rest and inactivity, but preserved for a long time by exercise and motion?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἡ δʼ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, κτᾶταί τε μαθήματα καὶ σῴζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δʼ ἡσυχίας, ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὔσης, οὔτε τι μανθάνει ἅ τε ἂν μάθῃ ἐπιλανθάνεται;
SOCRATES: And does not the condition in the soul, through learning and practice, which are motions, acquire knowledge, and is preserved, and becomes better, whereas through rest, which is lack of practice and ignorance, it learns nothing and forgets what it has learned?
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.
THEAETETUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν κίνησις κατά τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοὐναντίον;
SOCRATES: Is motion, then, the good for both soul and body, and the opposite the bad?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
THEAETETUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δʼ ἕτερα σῴζει;
SOCRATES: Shall I speak to you further of windless calms and still seas and all such things, that rest rots and destroys, while the other preserves?
καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, προσβιβάζω τὴν χρυσῆν σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὅμηρος λέγει, καὶ δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ᾖ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, πάντα ἔστι καὶ σῴζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις, εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρήματʼ ἂν διαφθαρείη καὶ γένοιτʼ ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα;
And to crown all these, I will bring in the "golden chain," by which Homer means nothing other than the sun, and he makes it clear that as long as the revolution is moving and the sun, all things exist and are preserved among both gods and men; but if this should stand still as if bound, all things would be destroyed and, as the saying goes, everything would be turned upside down?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα δηλοῦν ἅπερ λέγεις.
THEAETETUS: To me at least, Socrates, they seem to make clear what you say.
ΣΩ. ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὑτωσί· κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων μηδʼ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι μηδέ τινʼ αὐτῷ χώραν ἀποτάξῃς· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν εἴη τε δήπου ἐν τάξει καὶ μένον καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο.
SOCRATES: Assume then, my excellent friend, in this way: first, regarding the eyes, that what you call white color is not itself some other thing outside your eyes, nor in your eyes, nor should you assign any place to it; for then it would already be in a certain position and at rest, and would not be in the process of becoming.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ πῶς;
THEAETETUS: But how then?