§385ΣΩ. ἴσως μέντοι τὶ λέγεις, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες· σκεψώμεθα δέ.
SOCRATES: Perhaps, however, you have a point, Hermogenes; but let us examine it.
ὃ ἂν φῂς καλῇ τις ἕκαστον, τοῦθʼ ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα;
Is that which one says they call each thing, this is the name for each?
ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
HERMOGENES: So it seems to me.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἐὰν ἰδιώτης καλῇ καὶ ἐὰν πόλις;
SOCRATES: Both if a private individual calls it, and if a city does?
ΕΡΜ. φημί.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
ἐὰν ἐγὼ καλῶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων, οἷον ὃ νῦν καλοῦμεν ἄνθρωπον, ἐὰν ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἵππον προσαγορεύω, ὃ δὲ νῦν ἵππον, ἄνθρωπον, ἔσται δημοσίᾳ μὲν ὄνομα ἄνθρωπος τῷ αὐτῷ, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἵππος;
If I call any of the things that are—for instance, what we now call 'man'—if I address this as 'horse', and what we now call 'horse' as 'man', will the name for the same thing be 'man' publicly, but 'horse' privately?
καὶ ἰδίᾳ μὲν αὖ ἄνθρωπος, δημοσίᾳ δὲ ἵππος;
And again, privately 'man', but publicly 'horse'?
οὕτω λέγεις;
Is this what you mean?
ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
HERMOGENES: So it seems to me.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή μοι τόδε εἰπέ· καλεῖς τι ἀληθῆ λέγειν καὶ ψευδῆ;
SOCRATES: Come then, tell me this: do you call something 'speaking truth' and 'speaking falsehood'?
ΕΡΜ. ἔγωγε.
HERMOGENES: I do.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴη ἂν λόγος ἀληθής, ὁ δὲ ψευδής;
SOCRATES: Therefore there would be a true statement, and a false one?
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὗτος ὃς ἂν τὰ ὄντα λέγῃ ὡς ἔστιν, ἀληθής· ὃς δʼ ἂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ψευδής;
SOCRATES: Is that one which says things that are as they are, true; and that which says them as they are not, false?
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, λόγῳ λέγειν τὰ ὄντα τε καὶ μή;
SOCRATES: Is this possible then, to state by speech things that are and things that are not?
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ὁ λόγος δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀληθὴς πότερον μὲν ὅλος ἀληθής, τὰ μόρια δʼ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀληθῆ;
SOCRATES: But is a true statement, on the one hand, true as a whole, while its parts are not true?
ΕΡΜ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια.
HERMOGENES: No, but the parts are also true.
ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μόρια ἀληθῆ, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ οὔ· ἢ πάντα;
SOCRATES: And are the large parts true, but the small ones not; or all of them?
ΕΡΜ. πάντα, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
HERMOGENES: All of them, I think.
ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅτι λέγεις λόγου σμικρότερον μόριον ἄλλο ἢ ὄνομα;
SOCRATES: Is there any other part of speech you say is smaller than a name?
ΕΡΜ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο σμικρότατον.
HERMOGENES: No, but this is the smallest.
ΣΩ. καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λόγου λέγεται;
SOCRATES: And is this part of the true statement also said to be true?
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἀληθές γε, ὡς φῄς.
SOCRATES: True indeed, as you say.
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ τοῦ ψεύδους μόριον οὐ ψεῦδος;
SOCRATES: And is the part of a false statement not false?
ΕΡΜ. φημί.
HERMOGENES: I say so.
ΣΩ. ἔστιν ἄρα ὄνομα ψεῦδος καὶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, εἴπερ καὶ λόγον;
SOCRATES: Is there then a false and a true name, if indeed there is also a false and true statement?
ΕΡΜ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
HERMOGENES: How could there not be?
ΣΩ. ὃ ἂν ἄρα ἕκαστος φῇ τῳ ὄνομα εἶναι, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα;
SOCRATES: Therefore, whatever each person says is the name for something, this is the name for it?
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ὁπόσα ἂν φῇ τις ἑκάστῳ ὀνόματα εἶναι, τοσαῦτα ἔσται καὶ τότε ὁπόταν φῇ;
SOCRATES: And also, however many names one says there are for each thing, so many will there be, and at the time when he says so?
ΕΡΜ. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀνόματος ἄλλην ὀρθότητα ἢ ταύτην, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἕτερον εἶναι καλεῖν ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα, ὃ ἐγὼ ἐθέμην, σοὶ δὲ ἕτερον, ὃ αὖ σύ.
HERMOGENES: For I, Socrates, have no other correctness of name than this: that for me there is one name to call each thing, which I established, and for you another, which you in turn did.
οὕτω δὲ καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ὁρῶ ἰδίᾳ ἐνίοις ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς κείμενα ὀνόματα, καὶ Ἕλλησι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, καὶ Ἕλλησι παρὰ βαρβάρους.
And so also I see that for cities privately there are names established for some of the same things, both for Greeks compared to other Greeks, and for Greeks compared to barbarians.
§386ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ ἴδωμεν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, πότερον καὶ τὰ ὄντα οὕτως ἔχειν σοι φαίνεται, ἰδίᾳ αὐτῶν ἡ οὐσία εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν λέγων
πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον
εἶναι ἄνθρωπον—ὡς ἄρα οἷα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί· οἷα δʼ ἂν σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ σοί—ἢ ἔχειν δοκεῖ σοι αὐτὰ αὑτῶν τινα βεβαιότητα τῆς οὐσίας;
SOCRATES: Come then, let us see, Hermogenes, whether the things that are also seem to you to be this way: that their essence is private to each, just as Protagoras said, saying that 'man is the measure of all things'—implying that, as things appear to me, so indeed they are to me; and as they appear to you, so they are to you—or do they seem to you to have some stability of their own essence?
ΕΡΜ. ἤδη ποτὲ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπορῶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξηνέχθην εἰς ἅπερ Πρωταγόρας λέγει· οὐ πάνυ τι μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν.
HERMOGENES: Before now, Socrates, in my perplexity, I have been carried away even to what Protagoras says; however, it does not seem to me to be entirely so.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: What then?
ἐς τόδε ἤδη ἐξηνέχθης, ὥστε μὴ πάνυ σοι δοκεῖν εἶναί τινα ἄνθρωπον πονηρόν;
Have you already been carried away to this point, so as not to think at all that there is any bad man?
ΕΡΜ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ πέπονθα, ὥστε μοι δοκεῖν πάνυ πονηροὺς εἶναί τινας ἀνθρώπους, καὶ μάλα συχνούς.
HERMOGENES: No, by Zeus, on the contrary, I have often experienced this, so that it seems to me that some men are entirely bad, and very many indeed.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: What then?
πάνυ χρηστοὶ οὔπω σοι ἔδοξαν εἶναι;
Have they never seemed to you to be entirely good?
ΕΡΜ. καὶ μάλα ὀλίγοι.
HERMOGENES: Yes, indeed, but very few.
ΣΩ. ἔδοξαν δʼ οὖν;
SOCRATES: But they did seem so, at any rate?
ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε.
HERMOGENES: To me they did.
ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν τοῦτο τίθεσαι; ἆρʼ ὧδε·
SOCRATES: How then do you establish this?
τοὺς μὲν πάνυ χρηστοὺς πάνυ φρονίμους, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ πονηροὺς πάνυ ἄφρονας;
Is it like this: that the entirely good are entirely wise, and the entirely bad are entirely foolish?
ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.
HERMOGENES: So it seems to me.
ΣΩ. οἷόν τε οὖν, εἰ Πρωταγόρας ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ ἀλήθεια, τὸ οἷα ἂν δοκῇ ἑκάστῳ τοιαῦτα καὶ εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν ἡμῶν φρονίμους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας;
SOCRATES: Is it possible then, if Protagoras spoke the truth and this is the truth—that as things seem to each, so they also are—for some of us to be wise, and others foolish?
ΕΡΜ. οὐ δῆτα.
HERMOGENES: Certainly not.
ΣΩ. καὶ ταῦτά γε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, σοὶ πάνυ δοκεῖ, φρονήσεως οὔσης καὶ ἀφροσύνης μὴ πάνυ δυνατὸν εἶναι Πρωταγόραν ἀληθῆ λέγειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν που τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου φρονιμώτερος εἴη, εἴπερ ἃ ἂν ἑκάστῳ δοκῇ ἑκάστῳ ἀληθῆ ἔσται.
SOCRATES: And indeed this, as I think, seems very much so to you: that since wisdom and foolishness exist, it is not at all possible for Protagoras to speak the truth; for surely one would not be any wiser than another in truth, if indeed whatever seems to each will be true for each.
ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
HERMOGENES: That is so.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατʼ Εὐθύδημόν γε οἶμαι σοὶ δοκεῖ πᾶσι πάντα ὁμοίως εἶναι ἅμα καὶ ἀεί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως εἶεν οἱ μὲν χρηστοί, οἱ δὲ πονηροί, εἰ ὁμοίως ἅπασι καὶ ἀεὶ ἀρετή τε καὶ κακία εἴη.
SOCRATES: But surely you do not think, according to Euthydemus either, that all things belong to all people in the same way, at the same time and always; for neither in this way would some be good and others bad, if virtue and vice belonged to all alike and always.
ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
HERMOGENES: You speak the truth.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε πᾶσι πάντα ἐστὶν ὁμοίως ἅμα καὶ ἀεί, μήτε ἑκάστῳ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι αὐτὰ αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντά τινα βέβαιόν ἐστι τὰ πράγματα, οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ ὑφʼ ἡμῶν ἑλκόμενα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαντάσματι, ἀλλὰ καθʼ αὑτὰ πρὸς τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ᾗπερ πέφυκεν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, if neither all things belong to all people in the same way at the same time and always, nor does each thing belong to each privately, it is clear then that things themselves have a certain stable essence of their own, not being dragged up and down in relation to us or by us through our imagination, but existing by themselves, in relation to their own essence, as they are by nature.
ΕΡΜ. δοκεῖ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω.
HERMOGENES: It seems so to me, Socrates.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν αὐτὰ μὲν ἂν εἴη οὕτω πεφυκότα, αἱ δὲ πράξεις αὐτῶν οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον;
SOCRATES: Would then the things themselves be naturally constituted in this way, but their actions not in the same manner?
ἢ οὐ καὶ αὗται ἕν τι εἶδος τῶν ὄντων εἰσίν, αἱ πράξεις;
Or are actions also themselves one class of the things that are?
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε καὶ αὗται.
HERMOGENES: Certainly, they are too.