§79ΦΑΙΔ. οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἅψαιο κἂν ἴδοις κἂν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἴσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ποτ’ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἀιδῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατά; παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀιδές; θῶμεν, ἔφη. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀιδὲς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν. φέρε δή, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή; οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη. ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοιότερον τῷ εἴδει φαμὲν ἂν εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ. τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή;
Phaedo: ““Then, while you could touch and see these things, and perceive them with the other senses, those things which are always in the same state you could not grasp by any other means than by the reasoning of the mind, but such things are unseen and not visible?”” ““What you say is entirely true,” he said.” ““Shall we then assume, if you wish,” he said, “two kinds of existences, the one visible, the other unseen?”” ““Let us assume it,” he said.” ““And that the unseen is always in the same state, while the visible is never in the same state?”” ““Let us assume this too,” he said.” “““Come then,” he said, “is there anything else of ourselves than that the one part is body, and the other soul?”” ““Nothing else,” he said.” ““To which kind, then, do we say the body is more similar and more akin?”” ““This indeed is clear to everyone,” he said, “that it is to the visible.”” ““And what about the soul?
ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀιδές; οὐχ ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἐλέγομεν· ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ οἴει; τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
Is it visible or unseen?”” ““Not by humans, at least, Socrates,” he said.” ““But surely we were speaking of what is visible and what is not in relation to the nature of humans; or do you think in relation to some other?”” ““In relation to that of humans.”” ““What then do we say about the soul?
τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀόρατον εἶναι; οὐχ ὁρατόν. ἀιδὲς ἄρα; ναί. ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ σώματός ἐστιν τῷ ἀιδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ. πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι’ ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως — τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι’ αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι — τότε μὲν ἕλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ εἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη; πάνυ γε. ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ’ ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται; παντάπασιν, ἔφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. ποτέρῳ οὖν αὖ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχὴ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον; πᾶς ἄν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦ δ’ ὅς, συγχωρῆσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι ψυχὴ τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μή. τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα; τῷ ἑτέρῳ.
That it is visible or invisible?”” ““Not visible.”” ““Unseen, then?”” ““Yes.”” ““Therefore, the soul is more similar to the unseen than the body is, and the body to the visible.”” “““By all means, Socrates.”” ““Then, were we not also saying this long ago, that when the soul makes use of the body to examine something, either through seeing or through hearing or through some other sense—for this is what examining through the body means, to examine through a sense—then it is dragged by the body towards the things that are never in the same state, and it wanders itself and is troubled and dizzy, just as if it were drunk, because it is touching such things?”” ““Certainly.”” “““But when it examines by itself, it departs thither to that which is pure, always existing, immortal, and in the same state, and as being akin to it, it always comes to be with it, whenever it becomes by itself and it is permitted to it, and it ceases from its wandering and, because it is touching such things, it always remains in the same state and in the same way in relation to those things; and is this state of it called wisdom?”” ““You speak entirely well and truly, Socrates,” he said.” ““To which kind, then, does the soul seem to you, both from the previous and the present arguments, to be more similar and more akin?”” ““I think, Socrates,” he said, “that anyone, even the most dull-witted, would agree from this method of inquiry that the soul is in every way and entirely more similar to that which is always in the same state than to that which is not.”” ““And the body?”” ““To the other.””