Humanitext Reader

Plato · Crito §47

Following the Advice of the Expert Rather than the Many

Passage 3 of 9 · Greek

Summary

Socrates uses the analogy of an athlete who must follow the advice of a single expert (a trainer or doctor) rather than the opinion of the general public, arguing that in matters of justice and virtue we must also follow the one expert rather than the majority, since living with a ruined body or a ruined soul is not worth living.

§47ΣΩ. —σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σὲ παρακρούοι ἡ παροῦσα συμφορά·
Socrates: —For you, so far as human prospects go, are outside the danger of dying tomorrow, and the present misfortune would not lead you astray.
σκόπει δή—οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν ἀλλὰ τὰς μέν, τὰς δʼ οὔ, οὐδὲ πάντων ἀλλὰ τῶν μέν, τῶν δʼ οὔ;
Consider then—does it not seem to you to be adequately said that we ought not to respect all the opinions of men, but some and not others, nor those of all men, but those of some and not of others?
τί φῄς;
What do you say?
ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;
Is this not well said?
ΚΡ. καλῶς.
Crito: It is well said.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μή;
Socrates: Therefore we should respect the good opinions, but not the bad ones?
ΚΡ. ναί.
Crito: Yes.
ΣΩ. χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;
Socrates: And are not the good ones those of the wise, and the bad ones those of the foolish?
ΚΡ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Crito: How could they not be?
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο;
Socrates: Come then, how was this sort of thing said in turn?
γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἑνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὤν;
Does a man who is practicing gymnastics and making this his business pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of that one alone who happens to be a physician or a trainer?
ΚΡ. ἑνὸς μόνου.
Crito: Of that one alone.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.
Socrates: Then he ought to fear the blames and welcome the praises of that one alone, but not those of the many.
ΚΡ. δῆλα δή.
Crito: Clearly so.
ΣΩ. ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ᾗ ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ δοκῇ, τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαΐοντι, μᾶλλον ἢ ᾗ σύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις.
Socrates: Then he must act and train and eat and drink in such a way as seems fit to the one, the director and expert, rather than as seems fit to all the others together.
ΚΡ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
Crito: That is so.
ΣΩ. εἶεν.
Socrates: Very well.
ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαϊόντων, ἆρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;
But if he disobeys the one and dishonors his opinion and his praises, while respecting those of the many who know nothing, will he not suffer some harm?
ΚΡ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Crito: How could he not?
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;
Socrates: And what is this harm, where does it tend, and to which part of the disobedient man does it extend?
ΚΡ. δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσι.
Crito: Clearly to his body; for it ruins this.
ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις.
Socrates: You are right.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα, ὦ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διΐωμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλὴ ἡμῖν ἐστιν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἕπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὴν ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἑνός, εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαΐων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ σύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους;
And is it not so with other things, Crito, not to go through them all, and especially concerning the just and unjust, the shameful and beautiful, the good and bad, about which our consultation is now? Ought we to follow the opinion of the many and fear it, or that of the one, if there is an expert, whom we ought to respect and fear more than all the others together?
ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο.
If we do not follow him, we shall ruin and mutilate that part of us which was made better by what is just and ruined by what is unjust.
ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο;
Or is there no such thing?
ΚΡ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Crito: I think there is, Socrates.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ, ἆρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστιν διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ;
Socrates: Come then, if we destroy that which is made better by what is healthy but ruined by what is diseased, by not obeying the opinion of the experts, is life worth living for us when it is ruined?
ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο σῶμα· ἢ οὐχί;
And this, I suppose, is the body, is it not?
ΚΡ. ναί.
Crito: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστιν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;
Socrates: Is life then worth living for us with a diseased and ruined body?
ΚΡ. οὐδαμῶς.
Crito: By no means.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μετʼ ἐκείνου ἄρʼ ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν;
Socrates: But is life worth living for us when that part is ruined which injustice mutilates and justice benefits?
ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἥ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν;
Or do we hold that part of us, whatever it is, which has to do with injustice and justice, to be of less value than the body?

Notes

  1. 47aὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια — An adverbial accusative of limitation (or relation) meaning "as far as human affairs/prospects go." It qualifies Crito's position as a bystander who is not under the immediate threat of execution tomorrow and therefore should have unbiased judgment.
  2. 47dὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο — The phrases `τῷ δικαίῳ` and `τῷ ἀδίκῳ` are substantivized neuter adjectives ("that which is just" / "that which is unjust," meaning justice and injustice) functioning as datives of instrument or cause ("by justice" / "by injustice").
  3. 47eβιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστιν — An impersonal construction consisting of the verbal adjective `βιωτός` ("worth living," from `βιόω`) and the dative of agent or reference `ἡμῖν` ("for us"), meaning "is life worth living for us?"

Cite this passage

Plato, Crito §47. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg003.humanitext-grc2:47

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