§7#2καὶ γὰρ, ὅπως χρὴ μεταβαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶς γινωσκομένων ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν ἀδήλων, οὐδέποθ’ ὑπέμειναν ἀσκηθῆναί τε καὶ μαθεῖν ἐπὶ πραγμάτων, μαρτυρῆσαι μὲν τοῖς εὑροῦσιν αὐτὰ δυναμένων, ἐλέγξαι δὲ τοὺς οὐχ εὑρόντας.
For indeed, they never submitted to be trained and to learn on the basis of facts how one must transition from things clearly known to those that are unclear, [facts] which are able to bear witness to those who have found them, but to refute those who have not.
Ἵνα δ’, ἔφη, καὶ γελάσητε, καὶ γνῶτε τὸν τῦφον αὐτῶν ὁπηλίκος ἐστὶν, διελθεῖν ὑμῖν ἕν τι καὶ δύο βούλομαι, περὶ ὧν ἀποφαίνονται προπετῶς οἱ τὰς ὀφρῦς ἀνεσπακότες οὗτοι.
"And in order," he said, "that you may both laugh and know how great their vanity is, I wish to recount to you one or two things about which these men with raised eyebrows make rash declarations.
καὶ πρῶτόν γε τοῦτο λέγω μάλιστ’, ἐπειδὴ τῶν Περιπατητικῶν τις ἀφῖκται τῶν φιλοσόφων, ἕνα τε τὸν κόσμον τοῦτον εἶναι πεπλησμένον, ἔξωθέν τε αὐτοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἔνδον·
And I say this first especially, since one of the Peripatetic philosophers has arrived, [who holds] that this world is one and full, and that outside of it there is no void, just as there is none inside.
διαφέρει γε μὴν, ἔφην, τῷδε τῷ φιλοσόφῳ διττὴν διαφορὰν ἑκάτερος τούτων· ἐδείκνυον δὲ τόν τε Στωϊκὸν καὶ τὸν Ἐπικούρειον.
Yet indeed," I said, "each of these differs from this philosopher by a double difference"; and I pointed to the Stoic and the Epicurean.
ὁ δὲ Στωϊκὸς οὐκ ἔνδον τι κενὸν εἶναι, ἔξωθεν τοῦ κόσμου ὑπάρχειν αὐτό·
The Stoic [holds] that there is no void inside, but that it exists outside the cosmos.
ταῦτα δ’ ἄμφω συγχωρῶν ὁ Ἐπικούρειος, ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ διαφέρεται πρὸς αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἕνα ὁμολογεῖ κόσμον εἶναι τόνδε, καθάπερ ὁ Στωϊκὸς οἴεται, κατά γε τοῦτο τοῖς Περιπατητικοῖς ὁμόδοξος, ἀλλ’, ὥσπερ γε καὶ τὸ κενὸν ἄπειρον τῷ μεγέθει φησὶν ὑπάρχειν, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ κόσμους ἀπείρους εἶναι τῷ πλήθει.
Agreeing to both of these, the Epicurean differs from him in something else; for he does not agree that this world is one, as the Stoic thinks (who in this respect is of the same opinion as the Peripatetics), but, just as he says that the void is infinite in magnitude, so also the worlds in it are infinite in number.
ἐγὼ δ’ ἤκουσα μὲν, ἃ λέγουσιν οἱ τρεῖς, συναγορεύειν βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἰδίοις ὀνείροις· ἀκριβῶς δ’ οἶδα μηδένα λόγον ἀποδεικτικῶς ἔχοντας αὐτοὺς, ἀλλ’ ἐνδεχομένως τε καὶ εἰκότως, ἐνίοτε δὲ μηδὲ τοιούτους γνώσεσθαι, ὅτι μὲν ψεύδονται παρακαλέσαντες εἰπεῖν τινα ἀπόδειξιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἰς ταὐτὸ τοῦτο προκείμενον.
And I heard what the three of them say, wishing to advocate for their own dreams; but I know accurately that they have no argument in a demonstrative way, but rather in a plausible and probable way, and sometimes not even such; you will know that they lie if you challenge each of them to state some proof regarding this very subject set before us.
οὕτως οὖν ἔλεγον, ἅπερ ἴσμεν ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις αὐτῶν γεγραμμένα· πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς παροῦσι σαφῶς ἐφαίνετο μηδεὶς ἀναγκαστικὸν λόγον εἰπὼν, μηδ’ ἀποδείξεως γραμμικῆς ἐχόμενον, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἐπιχειρημάτων συγκείμενον, οἷς οἱ ῥήτορες χρῶνται.
Thus indeed they spoke, which very things we know to be written in their books; and to all those present it clearly appeared that no one had spoken a compelling argument, nor one adhering to geometrical proof, but rather composed of rhetorical arguments, which the orators use.
ἀλλά γε περὶ πλουσίων ὁ λόγος.
But indeed this talk is about the rich.
ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς οὖν αὐτοὺς ἔλθωμεν, ὅσοι μὴ πλουτοῦμεν, ἐρωτήσωμέν τε καὶ πάλιν ἕνα τῶν σοφῶν, εἰ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀναγορεύειν ἐγνωκότας μόνους τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων καταγινω σκομένων ἰδιωτῶν τε καὶ φιλοσόφων.
Let us then return to ourselves, as many of us as are not rich, and let us ask again one of the wise men, if it is just for them to proclaim that they alone have known the truth, while being condemned by all others, both laymen and philosophers.
τὸ γάρ τοι δεινότατον, ἔφην, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν, ὅτι τῶν φιλοσόφων ἕκαστος ἂν ἔξωθεν τῆς οἰκείας ποίμνης ὑπ’ οὐδενὸς ἐπαινεῖται.
"For the most terrible thing," I said, "is this: that each of the philosophers, outside of his own flock, is praised by no one.
τίνα τοίνυν εἰκός ἐστιν ἄλλον δὴ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ἅπαντας ὑπομένοντας κριτὴν, πλὴν αὐτῶν τῶν φαινομένων, ὑπομένοντάς τε καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν λογικῶν τεχνῶν ἁπασῶν ἀριθμητικοὺς, λογιστικοὺς, γεωμέτρας, ἀστρονόμους, ἀρχιτέκτονας, νομικοὺς, ῥήτορας, γραμματικοὺς, μουσικούς;
Whom, then, is it reasonable for all the philosophers to accept as judge other than the phenomena themselves, and also to accept those from all the rational arts, namely, arithmeticians, calculators, geometers, astronomers, architects, lawyers, rhetoricians, grammarians, and musicians?
ἢ ὁ ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ κρινόμενός τε καὶ στεφανούμενος, ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων κριτῶν εἰ ὑπομείνειε δοκιμάζεσθαι, μηδεμιᾶς ψήφου μεταλαμβάνεται. τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτημάτων πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀρκείσθω.
Or is it that he who is judged and crowned by himself, if he should submit to be examined by other judges, receives no vote?" Let so much indeed suffice for the present concerning their errors.