§3#2δὲ δριμεῖς μὲν, ἀλλὰ ἀγυμνάστους ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις μαθήμασιν· συμφέρει γὰρ, οἶμαι, διδασκάλοις ἀλαζόσι τοιούτους ἔχειν μαθητὰς, ὡς ὅ τε συνετὸς φύσει καὶ προγεγυμνασμένος ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν εὐθέως αὐτῶν καταφρονῇ, καθάπερ κᾀγὼ πολλῶν διδασκάλων ἔτι μειράκιον ὢν ὑπερεφρόνησα, τολμώντων μὲν ἀποφαίνεσθαί τινα μαχόμενα τοῖς ἐπιστημονικῶς ἀποδεδειγμένοις ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ, γιγνωσκόντων δ’ αὐτῶν οὐδ’ εἴδωλον ἀποδείξεως.
and others, though sharp, yet untrained in the primary studies; for I think it is advantageous for arrogant teachers to have such pupils, so that anyone who is intelligent by nature and already trained in the studies immediately despises them, just as I, when still a youth, despised many teachers who dared to declare things in conflict with what is scientifically demonstrated in geometry, while they themselves knew not even a shadow of proof.
ἐὰν οὖν ἐξέλῃ ὁ μέλλων ἀλήθειαν ζητῆσαι ἀλαζονείαν, φιλαυτίαν, φιλοτιμίαν, φιλοδοξίαν, δοξοσοφίαν, φιλοχρηματίαν, ὁ δ’ ἀφίξεται πάντως ἐν αὐτῇ προγυμνασάμενος οὐ μησὶν, ἀλλὰ ἔτεσί ποθ’ ὕστερον, ζητήσας τὰ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τε καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν ἄγειν δυνάμενα δόγματα· τὸν δ’ ὑπό τινων παθῶν, ὧν εἶπον, οἰστρούμενον, πρὸς μὲν τὴν οὕτω μακρὰν ὁδὸν ὀκνῶ, ἐκείνους δὲ μισῶ ἐπίβουλόν τε καὶ διάβολον κατασκευάζοντας.
If, therefore, one who is going to seek the truth casts out arrogance, self-love, love of honor, love of glory, conceit, and love of gain, he will surely arrive at it, having trained himself beforehand not for months, but at some later time for years, seeking the doctrines capable of leading to happiness and misery; but as for him who is stung by any of the passions I mentioned, I hesitate to send him on so long a journey, and I hate those teachers who make them insidious and slanderous.
τούτοις γὰρ εἰώθασι προκαταλαμβάνειν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν μαθητὰς, ὡς μηδ’ ὑπομεῖναί ποτε τὸ παρασχεῖν τὰ ὦτα τοιούτοις λόγοις, ὁποίους ἐγὼ μέχρι δεῦρο προὐχειρισάμην.
For with these things they are accustomed to preoccupy their own pupils, so that they never even endure to lend their ears to such arguments as I have set forth up to this point.
ἑτοιμότατον δ’ ἐστὶ πείθεσθαι μειρακίοις ἀπαιδεύτοις διδάσκαλον τὸν ἐροῦντα σεμνῷ προσώπῳ, ῥᾴστην ὁδὸν ἐπὶ σοφίαν, ὑφηγήμενον παρὰ τοῖς Κυνικοῖς ὀνομαζομένοις.
And it is easiest for uneducated youths to be persuaded by a teacher who will say with a solemn face that the easiest way to wisdom is that which is guided among those called Cynics.
καὶ γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι σύντομον ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ὁδὸν εἶναί φασι τὸ σφέτερον ἐπιτήδευμα.
For indeed, these too say that their own pursuit is a short cut to virtue.
τινὲς δὲ αὐτῶν ἐλέγχοντες οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἀρετῆς ἐπ’ εὐδαιμονίαν, ὁδὸν εἶναι φάσκουσι τὴν Κυνικὴν φιλοσοφίαν.
And some of them, correcting this, say that the Cynic philosophy is not a path to virtue, but a path through virtue to happiness.
ἀλλ’ ἕτεροί γε ἀληθέστερον ἀποφαινόμενοι αὐτὴν σύντομον ἐπ’ ἀλαζονείας ὁδὸν εἶναί φασι, ἀμαθῆ τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων τόλμαν.
But others, declaring more truly, say that it is a short cut to arrogance, the ignorant boldness of such men.
ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ Κυνικοὶ πάντες, οὕς γε δὴ τεθέαμαι κατὰ τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ βίον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων εἶναι ἐπαγγελλομένων ἔνιοι φεύγειν ὁμολογοῦσι τὴν ἐν τῇ λογικῇ θεωρίᾳ γυμνασίαν· εἶθ’, ὅταν ἡμῶν ἀπαλλαγῶσιν, οὐκ ἀξιοῦσι διαλέγεσθαι τοῖς ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν ἀνθρώποις, αἰπόλοις, καὶ βουκόλοις, καὶ σκαπανεῦσι, καὶ θερισταῖς, ὅτι μὴ παρακολουθοῦσιν, ὥς φασι, τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἀγύμναστοι περὶ λόγους ὄντες, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ γεγυμνασμένοι ποτὲ κατὰ τὰ πρῶτα μαθήματα, καὶ οὐκ αἴφνης περὶ τέλους βίου, καὶ εὐδαιμονίας, καὶ κακοδαιμονίας ἀκούσαντες τοῦ διδασκάλου λόγους τινὰς ἀποδεικτικοὺς, ὡς ἐκεῖνος ἐνόμιζε, πεισθέντες δὲ δι’ ἀγυμνασίαν· αἵπερ αὐτοῖς, ὡς ἔφην, δι’ ὁμοιότητος τῶν ψευδῶν λόγων πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθεῖς αἰτίαι τῶν ψευδῶν δογμάτων· τὰς δ’ ὁμοιότητας οἱ μάλιστα τετριμμένοι καθ’ ἑκάστην ὅλην πραγματείαν ἀκριβῶς διαγινώσκουσιν.
Just as, therefore, all the Cynics whom I have indeed seen in my own life, so also some of those professing to be philosophers confess that they flee the training in logical theory; then, when they depart from us, they do not deign to converse with the people they meet, with goatherds, cowherds, ditchers, and reapers, because, as they say, they do not follow what is said, being untrained in arguments, as if they themselves had once been trained in the primary studies, and had not suddenly, concerning the end of life, happiness, and misery, heard certain demonstrative arguments, as the teacher thought, from him, and been persuaded through lack of training; which very things, as I said, because of the similarity of false arguments to true ones, are the causes of false doctrines for them; but those who are most practiced in each whole subject accurately discern the similarities.
ἀναγκαῖον δ’ ἐστὶ τὸν ἐξαίφνης προελθόντα κρίσει λόγου ἀδυνατεῖν διαγνῶναί τε καὶ διακρῖναι τοὺς ψευδεῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν.
And it is necessary that he who has suddenly come to the judgment of argument is unable to discern and distinguish the false from the true.
ἐναργὲς δὲ τοῦτο τεκμήριόν ἐστι, τὰ καλούμενα σοφίσματα, λόγοι τινὲς ὄντες ψευδεῖς εἰς ὁμοιότητα τῶν ἀληθῶν πεπανουργευμένοι.
And a clear proof of this is the so-called sophisms, which are certain false arguments craftily fashioned into a similarity to true ones.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ψεῦδος αὐτῶν πρόδηλον φαίνεται διὰ τοῦ συμπεράσματος οὐκ ὄντος ἀληθοῦς.
Now, their falsehood appears obvious because the conclusion is not true.
ἐπειδὴ δ’ οἱ ψευδεῖς λόγοι πάντως ἤτοι τῶν λημμάτων ἔχουσί τι ψεῦδος, ἢ τὸ συμπέρασμα κακῶς ἐπιφερόμενον, οὐ φαίνεται δὲ προχείρως ταῦτα κατὰ τὰ σοφίσματα, διὰ τοῦτο δύσοπτα τοῖς ἀγυμνάστοις περὶ λόγους.
But since false arguments altogether contain some falsehood either in the premises or in the conclusion being badly inferred, and these do not appear readily in sophisms, for this reason they are hard to see for those untrained in arguments.
ὅπου τοίνυν ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ ψεῦδος τὸν λόγον εἶναι, διὰ τὸ φαίνεσθαι πᾶσιν ἐναργῶς τὸ συμπέρασμα αὐτοῦ ψεῦδος, ὅμως ἡ λύσις ἀπορεῖται τοῖς ἀγυμνάστοις, ἀσφαλὲς μὲν αὐτοῖς εἴη πάντας ὑποπτεύειν λόγους, συγκατατίθεσθαι δὲ μηδενὶ πρότερον, ἄχρι περ ἂν ἀκριβῶς ἑαυτοὺς πείσωσιν, ἱκανοὺς εἶναι γιγνώσκειν τὰς ὁμοιότητας τῶν ψευδῶν λόγων πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθεῖς, πείσωσι δὲ προβάλλειν ἐπιτρέποντες τοῖς βουλομένοις τῇ πείρᾳ γνῶναι τὴν δι’ αὐτῶν.
Where, then, we agree that the argument is false, because its conclusion appears clearly false to all, yet the solution is difficult for the untrained, it would be safe for them to suspect all arguments, and to assent to none beforehand, until they accurately convince themselves that they are capable of knowing the similarities of false arguments to true ones, and convince themselves by permitting those who wish to know by experience to propose the proof through them.
ἆρ’ οὖν ἄλλο τι συμβουλεύουσιν, ἢ γυμνάζειν ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν τῇ τῶν σοφισμάτων λύσει τοὺς μαθητάς;
Do they then advise anything else, or do they expect their pupils to train themselves in the solution of sophisms?
οὐδαμῶς οὐδὲν ἄλλο τῆς λύσεως οὔσης, ὡς ἔφην, ἐν τῷ φράσαι τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ψευδοῦς.
By no means anything else, since the solution is, as I said, in stating the similarity of the false to the true argument.
ἀναγκαῖον οὖν ἐστιν προμεμαθηκέναι πρὸ τῆς τῶν ἀληθῶν λόγων φύσεως, ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις γυμνασάμενος, ὡς ἀκριβῶς τε ἅμα καὶ ταχέως γιγνώσκειν αὐτῶν τὸ εἶδος, οὐ χαλεπῶς ἂν, ἔφην, διαγινώσκοι τοὺς ψευδεῖς.
It is therefore necessary to have learned beforehand the nature of true arguments, for he who has trained himself in them, so as to know their form accurately and at the same time quickly, would not, I said, find it difficult to discern the false ones.