§2Ἆρ’ οὖν, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, οἱ χωρὶς τοῦ πεῖσαι πρότερον ἑαυτοὺς, ὅτι τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν μέθοδον ἴσασιν, ἐπιχειροῦντες εὑρέσει μεγίστων πραγμάτων, οὐ φανερῶς εἰσι προπετεῖς;
By the gods, then, are they not clearly hasty who, without first persuading themselves that they know the demonstrative method, attempt the discovery of the greatest things?
ἐμοὶ μὲν καὶ πάνυ δοκοῦσι·
To me indeed they completely seem to be.
παραπλήσιον γάρ τι ποιοῦσι τοῖς πρὸ τοῦ πεῖσαι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἱκανῶς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν γεγυμνάσθαι τελείωσιν τολμῶσιν ἀποφαίνεσθαί τι περὶ λογιστικῶν ἢ ἀριθμητικῶν θεωρημάτων.
For they do something very similar to those who, before sufficiently persuading themselves that they have been trained in numbers, dare to declare something definitive about calculating or arithmetical theorems.
ὥσπερ οὖν τούτους ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι σφάλλεσθαι πολλαχόθι, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ὅσοι πρὸ τοῦ γυμνάσασθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν μέθοδον ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀποδεικνύειν, ἀδύνατον αὐτοῖς μὴ σφαλθῆναι.
Just as, therefore, it is necessary for these people to err in many places, in the same way, for all those who attempt to demonstrate before being trained according to the demonstrative method, it is impossible for them not to err.
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἔνιοι τῶν ψευδολόγων πείθουσί τινας, εὔδηλον ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν αἱρέσεων.
For that some of the liars persuade some people is very clear from the multitude of sects.
ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἔπειθον, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μή τις ἦν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης, οὐδὲ ταῦτα δῆλον·
And that they would not have persuaded them, in truth, if there were not some similarity in them, this too is clear.
ὡς οὐ σμικράν γε χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι τὴν ὁμοιότητα, ῥᾷστα γὰρ ἂν ἐφωράθη τις, οὐ τῷ χρόνῳ βασανιζομένη πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἀξιολόγων τε καὶ πολλῶν.
And one must not think that this similarity is small; for it would have been most easily detected if it were not examined over time by many and reputable men.
ὅπερ οὖν Ἱπποκράτης ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν πραγμάτων εἶπε, τοῦτο φαίνεται κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ὑπάρχειν.
What Hippocrates, then, said about things in medicine, this appears to hold also in philosophy.
Ἱπποκράτης δ’ εἶπεν, τὰς ὁμοιότητας πλάνας καὶ ἀπορίας ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἰατροῖς, ὡς οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων ἰατρῶν ἐν ταῖς ὁμοιότησι σφαλλομένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀρίστων.
For Hippocrates said that similarities produce wanderings and difficulties even for good doctors, as not only ordinary doctors err in similarities, but indeed also the best.
ὥστ’ οὐκ ἀπεικός ἐστι, καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἀπορίας τε καὶ πλάνας γίγνεσθαι.
So it is not unlikely that for good philosophers too, difficulties and wanderings occur in things regarding philosophy.
περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας τῶν διδύμων οἱ συνήθεις μὲν ἑτοίμως διαγιγνώσκουσιν, οἱ δ’ ἀήθεις οὐ δύνανται, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὐδὲ τὰς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμοιότητας, ὅσοι μὴ πάνυ τρίβωνες λόγων ὑπάρχουσι, μηδ’ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας, ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν διδύμων ἀδελφῶν ὁμοδίαιτοί τε καὶ ἠθάδες, ἱκανοὶ διαγιγνώσκειν εἰσίν.
Concerning the similarities of twins, those who are familiar easily distinguish them, but those who are unfamiliar cannot; by the same token, regarding the similarities in arguments, all those who are not very experienced in arguments, nor every day, like those who live with and are familiar with twin brothers, are able to distinguish them.
ἓν μὲν δὴ πρῶτον τοῦθ’ ἁμάρτημά ἐστι μέγιστον τῶν προπετῶς ἀποφηναμένων τι περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν ἐκ φιλαυτίας, ἢ δοξοσοφίας, ἢ ἀλαζονείας, ἢ φιλοτιμίας φυόμενον·
This, then, is indeed the first and greatest error of those who hastily declare something concerning the goods and evils in human life, arising from self-love, or the conceit of wisdom, or arrogance, or ambition.
ἐνίους μὲν γὰρ ἀναπεπεικότας ἑαυτοὺς, ὡς ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσιν, ἐνίους δὲ τιμῆς ἕνεκεν ἣ προσχηματισμοῦ τοὺς πέλας μὲν ἀναπείθοντας, αὐτοὺς δ’ ὑπόπτως ἔχοντας ὑπὲρ ὧν λέγουσιν. ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἑκάτεροι δηλονότι, γιγνώσκοντες μὲν οἱ δεύτεροι, καὶ εἴη ἂν αὐτῶν ἐμπαθὲς τὸ κακόν· ἀγνοοῦντες δὲ οἱ πρότεροι, καὶ εἴη ἂν αὖ καὶ τούτων τὸ σφάλμα κατὰ τὸ καλούμενον ἰδίως ἁμάρτημα. καλῶς οὖν ποιήσουσιν οὗτοι τῶν Αἰσώπου πηρῶν ἀναμνησθέντες, ἐπιτρέψαντές τε εἶναι τὰς ἑαυτῶν δόξας ἑτέροις, οὐ μὰ Δία τοιούτοις, οἷοί περ αὐτοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, οὐ μόνον ἀγύμναστοι μεθόδων ἀποδεικτικῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων, ἐν οἷς ἡ ψυχὴ θήγεται, γεωμετρίας, ἀριθμητικῆς, λογιστικῆς, ἀρχιτεκτονίας, ἀστρονομίας.
For some have persuaded themselves that they hold correct opinions, while others, for the sake of honor or pretense, persuade their neighbors while they themselves are suspicious of what they say.
ἔνιοι δ’ αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ῥήτορος, οὐδὲ, τὸ προχειρότατον δὴ τοῦτο, γραμματικοῦ διδασκαλίας τυχόντες, ἀλλ’ οὕτως ἀγύμναστοι περὶ λόγους ὄντες, ὡς μὴ παρακολουθεῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὑφ’ ἡμῶν λεγομένοις.
Both, clearly, err: the second group knowingly, and their interest would be of a passionate kind; the first group ignorantly, and the mistake of these would again be according to what is properly called "error." These people would do well, therefore, to remember Aesop's bags, and to entrust the judgment of their own opinions to others—by Zeus, not to such as they themselves happen to be, who are not only untrained in demonstrative methods, but also in the other disciplines in which the soul is sharpened: geometry, arithmetic, calculation, architecture, and astronomy.
ἅπερ ἐγὼ κατανοήσας, ὅταν τινὰ λόγον εἴπω, ἀξιῶ παρ’ αὐτῶν ἀκοῦσαι τὰ ῥηθέντα· φαίνονται γὰρ ὄντως, καθάπερ οἱ ὄνοι τῆς λύρας, οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ μηδ’ ὅλως οἷς εἶπον ἠκολουθηκότες, ἀλλ’ ὅμως καὶ αὐτοὶ θράσους ἢ τόλμης εἰς τοσοῦτον ἥκουσιν, ὡς μήτε καταγελώμενοι πρὸς τῶν τὰ γράμματα μεμαθηκότων ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι διελθεῖν ἃ ἤκουσα, αἰδεῖσθαι·
And some of them have not even received the teaching of a rhetorician, nor indeed, which is most readily available, of a grammarian, but are so untrained in arguments as not to follow what is said by us when they hear it.
νομίζειν δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἑαυτοὺς ἐγνῶσθαι, τοὺς δὲ πεπαιδευμένους μάτην ἀπολωλεκέναι τὸν χρόνον·
Which I, having understood, whenever I speak some discourse, demand to hear from them what has been said; for they truly appear, just like asses listening to a lyre, so they too have not followed at all what I said, but nevertheless they too have come to such a point of boldness or daring that, when laughed at by those who have learned letters for not being able to repeat what they heard, they are not ashamed, but think that they themselves have known the truth, while the educated have lost their time in vain.
ἀλλ’ οὐ τούτους ἐλπίζων ὠφελήσειν ἐς τόνδε τὸν λόγον ἧκον.
But it is not in the hope of helping these that I have come to this discourse.
οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ βουληθεῖεν, οἵ γε πλείους αὐτῶν ὠφεληθῆναι ἄν τι δυνήσονται, μηδὲ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐπιτήδειον αὐτὴν πρὸς παίδευσιν ἔχοντες.
For not even if they wished would the majority of them be able to be helped in any way, not even having an age suitable for education.
ὅστις δὲ φύσει συνετός ἐστι, καὶ μέχρι τούτου γοῦν ἐγυμνάσατο κατὰ τὴν πρώτην παιδείαν, ὅσα περ ἂν ἀκούσῃ, μάλιστα μὲν ἀπὸ στόματος αὐτίκα δύνασθαι λέγειν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, γράψαι γε δύνασθαι, βοήθειαν ἕξει τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, εἴ γε ὅλως ἀληθείας ὀρεχθῇ.
But whoever is naturally intelligent, and has at least trained himself up to this point in his primary education so as to be able to say immediately from memory whatever he hears, or if not, to be able to write it down, will have this discourse as a help, if indeed he desires truth at all.
τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐκείνῳ σύμπαν ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ χρὴ πεφυκέναι μὲν πρῶτον, εἶτα δεῖται παιδείας τετράφθαι χρηστόν·
For this is everything towards truth for that person, and first one must have the natural capacity, and then he needs to have been turned to good education.
τῷ δὲ μήτε φύντι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασι μοχθηροῖς τε καὶ ἀσελγέσι τραφέντι, παντάπασιν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ὀρεχθῆναί ποτ’ ἀληθείας, ἢ ἐξ αὑτοῦ λαβόντι τὴν τοιαύτην ὁρμὴν, ἢ ὑπ’ ἄλλου προτραπέντι.
But for him who neither has the natural capacity for truth and has been brought up in bad and licentious practices, it is completely impossible ever to desire truth, whether taking such an impulse from himself or being urged by another.
οὐκοῦν οὐδ’ ἐγώ ποτ’ ἐπηγγειλάμην ὠφελήσειν ποτὲ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ’, ὡς ἔφην, ὃς ἂν ἀληθείας ἐστὶ φίλος, ἐκείνῳ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι, καθ’ ὅσον οἷός τ’ εἰμὶ, πειράσομαι, ζητήσας μὲν αὐτὴν ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ βίῳ, πεπεικὼς δ’ ἐμαυτὸν, ἣν ἐρῶ νῦν εἶναι μόνην.
Therefore, neither did I ever promise that I would ever benefit such a person, but, as I said, to whoever is a friend of truth, I will try, as far as I am able, to show him the path, having sought it indeed throughout my whole life, and having persuaded myself that the path which I will now tell is the only one.