Humanitext Reader

Demosthenes · Letters §3.18-3.27

Precedents of Rewarding Benefactors and Lycurgus' Sons

Passage 8 of 14 · Greek

Summary

The author criticizes the imprisonment of Lycurgus' children as shameful and disadvantageous, citing past examples of rewarding benefactors' descendants and other historical cases of remission (Laches, Mnesiboulos) to argue against discouraging those who serve the people.

§3.18εἰ μὴ τοῦτο δεῖξαι δημοσίᾳ βούλεσθε, ὅτι βδελυρία καὶ ἀναίδεια καὶ προαίρεσις πονηρίας ἐν τῇ πόλει ἰσχύει καὶ διασωθῆναι πλείω προσδοκίαν ἔχει, κἄν τι συμβῇ χαλεπὸν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἀπόλυσις γίγνεται, ἐν δὲ προαιρέσει χρηστῇ καὶ βίῳ σώφρονι καὶ δημοτικῷ προελέσθαι ζῆν σφαλερόν, κἄν τι γένηται πταῖσμα, ἄφυκτον ἔσται.
Unless you wish to show this publicly: that wickedness, impudence, and a disposition for evil are powerful in the city and have a greater expectation of being saved, and if any trouble happens to such men, a release occurs, while to choose to live in a good disposition and a temperate and democratic life is dangerous, and if any slip occurs, it will be inescapable.
§3.19ἔτι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν μὴ δίκαιον εἶναι τὴν ἐναντίαν δόξαν ἔχειν ὧς περὶ ζῶντος εἴχετʼ ἐκείνου, καὶ τὸ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ἢ τῶν παρόντων πλείω ποιεῖσθαι λόγον δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐάσω· παρὰ γὰρ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι ταῦθʼ ὑπείληφα·
Furthermore, as for the fact that it is not just to hold the opposite opinion to that which you held of him when he was alive, and that it is just to make greater account of the deceased than of those who are present, and all such arguments, I shall pass them over; for I assume these things are agreed upon among all.
ὅσοις μέντοι πατρικὰς εὐεργεσίας ἀπεμνημονεύσατε τῶν ἄλλων, ἡδέως ἂν ἴδοιμʼ ὑμᾶς ἀναμνησθέντας, οἷον τοῖς Ἀριστείδου καὶ τοῖς Θρασυβούλου καὶ τοῖς Ἀρχίνου καὶ πολλῶν ἑτέρων ἀπογόνοις.
However, as for those of the others whose paternal benefactions you have remembered, I would gladly see you remember them, such as the descendants of Aristeides, of Thrasyboulos, of Archinos, and of many others.
§3.20οὐχ ὡς ἐπιτιμῶν δὲ ταῦτα παρήνεγκα.
I have not offered these suggestions as one finding fault.
τοσούτου γὰρ δέω τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὥστε συμφέρειν μάλιστα τῇ πόλει τὰ τοιαῦτα κρίνω· προκαλεῖσθε γὰρ πάντας ἐκ τούτων δημοτικοὺς εἶναι, ὁρῶντας ὅτι κἂν ἐν τῷ καθʼ ἑαυτοὺς βίῳ ταῖς προσηκούσαις αὐτῶν τιμαῖς ὁ φθόνος ἀντιστῇ, τοῖς γε παισὶν ὑπάρξει τὰ προσήκοντα παρʼ ὑμῶν κομίσασθαι.
For I am so far from doing this that I judge such decisions to be most advantageous to the city; for by these you encourage all to be democratic, seeing that even if in their own individual lives envy stands in the way of their fitting honors, at least it will be possible for their children to obtain what is fitting from you.
§3.21πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἄτοπον, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ αἰσχρόν, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τισί, καὶ παλαιῶν ὄντων τῶν χρόνων καθʼ οὓς ἐγένοντο χρήσιμοι, καὶ διʼ ὧν ἀκούετε τὰς εὐεργεσίας, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἑοράκαθʼ ὑπειληφότας, ὅμως τὴν δικαίαν εὔνοιαν διασῴζειν, Λυκούργῳ δʼ οὕτως ὑπογύου καὶ τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς τελευτῆς γεγονυίας, μηδʼ εἰς ἃ καὶ τοῖς ἀγνῶσιν καὶ ὑφʼ ὧν ἀδικοῖσθʼ ἕτοιμοι τὸν ἄλλον ἦτε χρόνον, §3.22εἰς ἔλεον καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν, μηδʼ εἰς ταῦθʼ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμοίους παρέχειν, καὶ ταῦτʼ εἰς τοὺς παῖδας αὐτοῦ γιγνομένης τῆς τιμωρίας, οὓς κἂν ἐχθρός, εἴπερ μέτριος εἴη καὶ λογισμὸν ἔχων, ἐλεήσαι;
How then is it not absurd, or rather even shameful, that while for some of the others, even though the times in which they were useful are ancient, and they are those whose benefactions you hear of, not assuming them from what you have seen, you nevertheless preserve your just goodwill, yet for Lycurgus, whose political activity and death occurred so recently, not even toward those things which you were ready at all other times to extend even to strangers and to those by whom you were wronged, namely, pity and humanity, you do not show yourselves similar even in these, and that too when the punishment is falling upon his children, whom even an enemy, if he were moderate and possessed of reason, would pity?
§3.23θαυμάζω τοίνυν καὶ τοῦτʼ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἀγνοεῖ, ὡς οὐδὲ τοῦτο συμφέρει τῇ πολιτείᾳ φανερὸν γιγνόμενον, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλην τινὰ κτησαμένοις φιλίαν καὶ κατορθοῦσιν ἐν πᾶσιν πλεονεκτεῖν ὑπάρχει, κἂν ἀτυχήσωσίν τι, ῥᾳδίους εἶναι τὰς λύσεις, τοῖς δʼ εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἀναρτήσασιν ἑαυτοὺς οὐ μόνον κατὰ τἄλλʼ ἔλαττον ἔχειν ὑπάρξει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς συμφορὰς βεβαίους τούτοις μόνοις τῶν ἄλλων μένειν.
Now I wonder also at this, if any of you is ignorant that it is not advantageous to the state for this to become apparent: namely, that to those who have acquired some other friendship and are successful, it is possible to have the advantage in all things, and if they meet with any misfortune, their release is easy; whereas for those who have attached themselves to the people, not only will it be their lot to be worse off in other respects, but also that misfortunes remain secure for these alone of all others.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι τοῦθʼ οὕτως γίγνεται ῥᾴδιον δεῖξαι.
Yet indeed, that this is so is easy to show.
§3.24τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὑμῶν Λάχητι τῷ Μελανώπου ἁλῶναι μὲν ὁμοίως ἐν δικαστηρίῳ συμβὰν ὡς καὶ νῦν τοῖς Λυκούργου παισίν, ἀφεθῆναι δὲ πᾶν τὸ ὄφλημʼ ἐπιστείλαντος Ἀλεξάνδρου;
For who of you does not know that, although it happened to Laches, the son of Melanopos, to be convicted in court in the same way as now has happened to the children of Lycurgus, yet his entire debt was remitted when Alexander sent word?
καὶ πάλιν Μνησιβούλῳ τῷ Ἀχαρνεῖ ἁλῶναι μὲν ὁμοίως καταγνόντος αὐτοῦ τοῦ δικαστηρίου ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν Λυκούργου παίδων, ἀφεῖσθαι δὲ καλῶς ποιοῦντι;
And again, that although it happened to Mnesiboulos of Acharnae to be convicted when the court itself pronounced judgment against him, just as against the children of Lycurgus, yet he was released because he acted honorably?
§3.25ἄξιος γὰρ ἁνήρ.
For the man was worthy.
καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐπὶ τούτοις τοὺς νόμους ἔφη καταλύεσθαι τῶν νῦν βοώντων.
And no one among those who are now shouting said that the laws were being subverted because of these things.
εἰκότως· οὐδὲ γὰρ κατελύοντο, εἴπερ ἅπαντες οἱ νόμοι τῶν δικαίων εἵνεκα καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν χρηστῶν ἀνθρώπων τίθενται, καὶ μήτʼ ἀϊδίους τοῖς ἀτυχήσασι καθιστάναι τὰς συμφορὰς συμφέρει, μήτʼ ἀχαρίστους ὄντας φαίνεσθαι.
Naturally so; for they were not being subverted, if indeed all laws are established for the sake of justice and the safety of good men, and it is advantageous neither to make misfortunes everlasting for the unfortunate, nor to appear ungrateful.
§3.26ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε ταῦθʼ οὕτως, ὥσπερ ἂν φήσαιμεν, ἔχειν συμφέρει, οὐ μόνον τοὺς νόμους οὐ κατελύετε, ἡνίκʼ ἐκείνους ἀφίετε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐσῴζετε τῶν τοὺς νόμους θεμένων ἀνθρώπων, Λάχητα μὲν πρὸς χάριν δεηθέντος Ἀλεξάνδρου ἀφέντες, Μνησίβουλον δὲ τῇ τοῦ βίου σωφροσύνῃ σῴσαντες.
But indeed, if it is advantageous for these things to be so, as we would say, you not only did not subvert the laws when you released those men, but you also preserved the intentions of the men who established the laws—by releasing Laches as a favor to Alexander who petitioned, and saving Mnesiboulos because of the temperance of his life.
§3.27μὴ τοίνυν τὸ κτήσασθαί τινʼ ἔξωθεν φιλίαν λυσιτελέστερον δείκνυτʼ ἢ τὸ τῷ δήμῳ παρακαταθέσθαι ἑαυτόν, μηδὲ τὸ τῶν ἀγνώτων εἶναι κρεῖττον ἢ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑμῖν τὰ συμφέροντα πολιτευόμενον γιγνώσκεσθαι.
Therefore, do not show that acquiring some friendship from outside is more profitable than entrusting oneself to the people, nor that being unknown is better than being recognized for conducting politics that are advantageous to you, the multitude.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσιν ἀρέσκειν τὸν συμβουλεύοντα καὶ τὰ κοινὰ πράττοντʼ ἀδύνατον· ἐὰν δʼ ἐπʼ εὐνοίᾳ ταὐτὰ τῷ δήμῳ τις φρονῇ, δίκαιός ἐστιν σῴζεσθαι.
For it is impossible for one who advises and manages public affairs to please everyone; but if someone is minded toward the same things as the people with goodwill, it is just for him to be saved.
εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ θεραπεύειν ἑτέρους μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν δῆμον ἅπαντας διδάξετε, καὶ φεύγειν τὸ τῶν ὑμῖν συμφερόντων ποιοῦντά τι γνωσθῆναι.
Otherwise, you will teach everyone to court others rather than the people, and to avoid being known as doing anything advantageous to you.

Notes

  1. §3.18εἰ μὴ τοῦτο δεῖξαι δημοσίᾳ βούλεσθε — The conditional clause with εἰ μὴ ("unless you wish...") introduces a sarcastic exception or qualification to the statement in the preceding section ("I cannot comprehend...").
  2. §3.19τὸ μὲν μὴ δίκαιον εἶναι τὴν ἐναντίαν δόξαν ἔχειν — These articular infinitive clauses introduced by τό function as the direct objects of the verb ἐάσω ("I shall pass over"), forming a lengthy hyperbaton where multiple parallel phrases are suspended before the main verb.
  3. §3.20τοσούτου γὰρ δέω τοῦτο ποιεῖν — The idiomatic expression τοσούτου δέω followed by an infinitive and ὥστε means "I am so far from doing [this] that..." and functions as a strong negative emphasizing the opposite of the action.
  4. §3.21πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἄτοπον — A complex sentence spanning §3.21 and §3.22. The main predicate πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἄτοπον... governs two contrasted infinitive structures: διασῴζειν (preserving goodwill) and μηδʼ ... παρέχειν (failing to show yourselves similar), the latter having ὑμᾶς αὐτούς as its subject accusative.
  5. §3.24ἀφεῖσθαι δὲ καλῶς ποιοῦντι — The dative participle καλῶς ποιοῦντι ("acting honorably") agrees with the implied dative reference (Mnesiboulos) and serves as the causal or circumstantial modifier for the passive infinitive ἀφεῖσθαι.

Cite this passage

Demosthenes, Letters §3.18-3.27. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0014.tlg063.humanitext-grc2:3.18-3.27

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