§1εἰσί τινες οἳ μέγα φρονοῦσιν, ἢν ὑπόθεσιν ἄτοπον καὶ παράδοξον ποιησάμενοι περὶ ταύτης ἀνεκτῶς εἰπεῖν δυνηθῶσι· καὶ καταγεγηράκασιν οἱ μὲν οὐ φάσκοντες οἷόν τʼ εἶναι ψευδῆ λέγειν οὐδʼ ἀντιλέγειν οὐδὲ δύω λόγω περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἀντειπεῖν, οἱ δὲ διεξιόντες ὡς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταὐτόν ἐστι, καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχομεν, μία δʼ ἐπιστήμη καθʼ ἁπάντων ἐστίν· ἄλλοι δὲ περὶ τὰς ἔριδας διατρίβουσι τὰς οὐδὲν μὲν ὠφελούσας, πράγματα δὲ παρέχειν τοῖς πλησιάζουσι δυναμένας. §2ἐγὼ δʼ εἰ μὲν ἑώρων νεωστὶ τὴν περιεργίαν ταύτην ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγγεγενημένην καὶ τούτους ἐπὶ τῇ καινότητι τῶν εὑρημένων φιλοτιμουμένους, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως ἐθαύμαζον αὐτῶν· νῦν δὲ τίς ἐστιν οὕτως ὀψιμαθής, ὅστις οὐκ οἶδε Πρωταγόραν καὶ τοὺς κατʼ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον γενομένους σοφιστάς, ὅτι καὶ τοιαῦτα καὶ πολὺ τούτων πραγματωδέστερα συγγράμματα κατέλιπον ἡμῖν; §3πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις ὑπερβάλοιτο Γοργίαν τὸν τολμήσαντα λέγειν ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἔστιν, ἢ Ζήνωνα τὸν ταὐτὰ δυνατὰ καὶ πάλιν ἀδύνατα πειρώμενον ἀποφαίνειν, ἢ Μέλισσον ὃς ἀπείρων τὸ πλῆθος πεφυκότων τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ παντὸς ἐπεχείρησεν ἀποδείξεις εὑρίσκειν; §4ἄλλʼ ὅμως οὕτω φανερῶς ἐκείνων ἐπιδειξάντων ὅτι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι, περὶ ὧν ἄν τις πρόθηται, ψευδῆ μηχανήσασθαι λόγον, ἔτι περὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον διατρίβουσιν· οὓς ἐχρῆν ἀφεμένους ταύτης τῆς τερθρείας, τῆς ἐν μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἐξελέγχειν προσποιουμένης, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔργοις πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον ἐξεληλεγμένης, τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐν αἷς πολιτευόμεθα, §5τοὺς συνόντας παιδεύειν, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τὴν τούτων γυμνάζειν, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι πολὺ κρεῖττόν ἐστι περὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπιεικῶς δοξάζειν ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ μικρὸν προέχειν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις μᾶλλον ἢ πολὺ διαφέρειν ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸν βίον ὠφελοῦσιν. §6ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδενὸς αὐτοῖς ἄλλου μέλει πλὴν τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι παρὰ τῶν νεωτέρων.
There are some who pride themselves highly if, having set up an absurd and paradoxical hypothesis, they are able to speak of it tolerably well; and some have grown old asserting that it is not possible to speak falsely, nor to contradict, nor to speak two opposing arguments about the same things, while others argue that courage, wisdom, and justice are the same thing, and that we possess none of them by nature, but there is a single knowledge of them all; and still others spend their time on disputations which are of no benefit, but are capable of causing trouble to those who associate with them. If I saw that this excessive subtlety in speeches had newly arisen and that these men were prideful because of the novelty of their inventions, I would not marvel at them in the same way; but as it is, who is so late a learner that he does not know that Protagoras and the sophists of that time left us such writings, and indeed others far more troublesome than these? For how could anyone surpass Gorgias, who dared to say that nothing of what exists is, or Zeno, who tried to show that the same things are possible and again impossible, or Melissus, who, although things are by nature infinite in number, attempted to find proofs that the whole is one? Nevertheless, although those men demonstrated so clearly that it is easy to devise a false speech about whatever subject one might propose, these people still waste time on this topic; who, instead of this sophistry, which pretends to refute in words but has long since been refuted in deeds, ought to have pursued the truth, and concerning the actions in which we conduct our public life, to educate their associates, and to train them in the experience of these things, keeping in mind that it is much better to have a reasonable opinion about useful things than to have accurate knowledge about useless things, and to excel a little in great matters rather than to be far superior in small things that are of no benefit to life. But the truth is, they care for nothing else except making money from the younger men.
ἔστι δʼ ἡ περὶ τὰς ἔριδας φιλοσοφία δυναμένη τοῦτο ποιεῖν· οἱ γὰρ μήτε τῶν ἰδίων πω μήτε τῶν κοινῶν φροντίζοντες τούτοις μάλιστα χαίρουσι τῶν λόγων οἳ μηδὲ πρὸς ἓν χρήσιμοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες. §7τοῖς μὲν οὖν τηλικούτοις πολλὴ συγγνώμη ταύτην ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν· ἐπὶ γὰρ ἁπάντων τῶν πραγμάτων πρὸς τὰς περιττότητας καὶ τὰς θαυματοποιίας οὕτω διακείμενοι διατελοῦσι· τοῖς δὲ παιδεύειν προσποιουμένοις ἄξιον ἐπιτιμᾶν, ὅτι κατηγοροῦσι μὲν τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις συμβολαίοις ἐξαπατώντων καὶ μὴ δικαίως τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένων, αὐτοὶ δʼ ἐκείνων δεινότερα ποιοῦσιν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλους τινὰς ἐζημίωσαν, οὗτοι δὲ τοὺς συνόντας μάλιστα βλάπτουσιν. §8τοσοῦτον δʼ ἐπιδεδωκέναι πεποιήκασι τὸ ψευδολογεῖν ὥστʼ ἤδη τινές, ὁρῶντες τούτους ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ὠφελουμένους, τολμῶσι γράφειν ὡς ἔστιν ὁ τῶν πτωχευόντων καὶ φευγόντων βίος ζηλωτότερος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ποιοῦνται τεκμήριον, ὡς εἰ περὶ πονηρῶν πραγμάτων ἔχουσί τι λέγειν, περί γε τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ῥᾳδίως εὐπορήσουσιν. §9ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ πάντων εἶναι καταγελαστότατον τὸ διὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων ζητεῖν πείθειν ὡς περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐπιστήμην ἔχουσιν, ἐξὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷς ἐπαγγέλλονται τὴν ἐπίδειξιν ποιεῖσθαι· τοὺς γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦντας τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ φάσκοντας εἶναι σοφιστὰς οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἠμελημένοις ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλʼ ἐν οἷς ἅπαντές εἰσιν ἀνταγωνισταί, προσήκει διαφέρειν καὶ κρείττους εἶναι τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. §10νῦν δὲ παραπλήσιον ποιοῦσιν. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις προσποιοῖτο κράτιστος εἶναι τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἐνταῦθα καταβαίνων, οὗ μηδεὶς ἂν ἄλλος ἀξιώσειεν.
And it is this philosophy concerning disputations which is able to achieve this; for those who as yet care neither for private nor for public affairs rejoice most in those speeches which happen to be useful for not even a single thing. Now, for those of such an age, there is much allowance for having this disposition; for in all things they are always thus inclined toward subtleties and wonders; but those who pretend to educate deserve blame, because they accuse those who deceive in private contracts and make unjust use of speeches, yet they themselves do things more terrible than those; for while the former harm only certain other people, the latter do the greatest harm to their own associates. And they have made the practice of speaking falsely progress to such an extent that some, seeing these men benefit from such things, now dare to write that the life of beggars and exiles is more to be envied than that of other men, and they take this as a proof: that if they have something to say about bad subjects, they will easily find plenty to say about beautiful and good things. But to me it seems most ridiculous of all to seek to persuade through these speeches that they possess knowledge about political affairs, when it is possible for them to make a demonstration in the very subjects which they profess; for those who dispute about wisdom and claim to be sophists ought to excel and be better than laymen, not in subjects neglected by others, but in those where everyone is a competitor. But as it is, they do something similar; it is as if someone were to pretend to be the best of athletes by entering a place where no one else would deign to go.
τίς γὰρ ἂν τῶν εὖ φρονούντων συμφορὰς ἐπαινεῖν ἐπιχειρήσειεν;
For who among those of sound mind would attempt to praise misfortunes?
ἀλλὰ δῆλον, ὅτι διʼ ἀσθένειαν ἐνταῦθα καταφεύγουσιν.
But it is clear that they flee there because of weakness.