§7καὶ μὴν τεττάρων γε τῶν πρώτων ὄντων ἐν τῷ παντὶ σωμάτων, ἃ διὰ πλῆθος καὶ ἁπλότητα καὶ δύναμιν οἱ πλεῖστοι στοιχεῖα τῶν ἄλλων ὑποτίθενται καὶ ἀρχάς, πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι καὶ ποιότητας εἶναι τὰς πρώτας καὶ ἁπλᾶς τοσαύτας.
And indeed, since there are four primary bodies in the universe, which most people, on account of their quantity, simplicity, and power, assume to be elements and principles of the other things—namely, fire, water, air, and earth—it is necessary that the primary and simple qualities also be just as many.
τίνες οὖν εἰσιν αὗται πλὴν θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ ξηρότης καὶ ὑγρότης, αἷς τὰ στοιχεῖα πάσχειν ἅπαντα καὶ ποιεῖν πέφυκεν;
What then are these, except heat and cold, dryness and moisture, by which all the elements are by nature suited to be affected and to act?
ὡς δὲ τῶν ἐν γραμματικῇ στοιχείων βραχύτητὲς εἰσι καὶ μακρότητες, τῶν δʼ ἐν μουσικῇ βαρύτητες καὶ ὀξύτητες, οὐ θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων στέρησις, οὕτως ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς σώμασιν ἀντιστοιχίαν ὑποληπτέον ὑγρῶν πρὸς ξηρὰ καὶ ψυχρῶν πρὸς θερμά, τὸ κατὰ λόγον ἅμα καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα διαφυλάττοντας·
And just as of the elements in grammar there are short and long syllables, and of those in music, low and high pitches, neither of which is the privation of the other, so in physical bodies we must assume a correspondence of moist to dry and of cold to hot, preserving at the same time both reason and appearances.
ἢ, καθάπερ Ἀναξιμένης ὁ παλαιὸς ᾤετο, μήτε τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐν οὐσίᾳ μήτε τὸ θερμὸν ἀπολείπωμεν, ἀλλὰ πάθη κοινὰ τῆς ὕλης ἐπιγιγνόμενα ταῖς μεταβολαῖς·
Or, as the ancient Anaximenes thought, should we leave neither the cold nor the hot in substance, but as common affections of matter that supervene upon its changes?
τὸ γὰρ συστελλόμενον αὐτῆς καὶ πυκνούμενον ψυχρὸν εἶναί φησι· τὸ δʼ ἀραιὸν καὶ τὸ χαλαρόν, οὕτω πως ὀνομάσας καὶ τῷ ῥήματι, θερμόν.
For he says that that part of it which is contracted and condensed is cold, whereas that which is rare and loose—having named it thus somehow with this word—is hot.
ὅθεν οὐκ ἀπεικότως λέγεσθαι τὸ καὶ θερμὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος καὶ ψυχρὰ μεθιέναι ψύχεται γὰρ ἡ πνσὴ πιεσθεῖσα καὶ πυκνωθεῖσα τοῖς χείλεσιν, ἀνειμένου δὲ τοῦ στόματος ἐκπίπτουσα γίγνεται θερμὸν ὑπὸ μανότητος.
Whence, he says, it is not unreasonably said that man emits both hot and cold things from his mouth; for the breath is cooled when it is compressed and condensed by the lips, but when it escapes while the mouth is relaxed, it becomes hot due to rareness.
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀγνόημα ποιεῖται τἀνδρὸς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· ἀνειμένου γὰρ τοῦ στόματος ἐκπνεῖσθαι τὸ θερμὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ὅταν δὲ συστρέψαντες τὰ χείλη φυσήσωμεν, οὐ τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀέρα τὸν πρὸ τοῦ στόματος ὠθεῖσθαι ψυχρὸν ὄντα καὶ προσεμπίπτειν.
Aristotle, however, considers this to be an error of the man; for when the mouth is relaxed, the hot is exhaled from within ourselves, but when we blow having contracted our lips, it is not the breath from within us but the air in front of our mouth that is pushed, which is cold, and strikes against us.
§8εἰ δʼ ἀπολειπτέον οὐσίαν ψυχροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ, προάγωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ἑξῆς τὸν λόγον, ἥτις ἐστὶν οὐσία καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ φύσις ψυχρότητος, ζητοῦντες·
But if we must allow the substance of cold and hot, let us advance our discussion to what follows, seeking what the substance, principle, and nature of coldness is.
οἱ μὲν οὖν, τῶν σκαληνῶν καὶ τριγωνοειδῶν σχηματισμῶν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι κειμένων, τὸ ῥιγοῦν καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ὅσα συγγενῆ τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὑπὸ τραχύτητος ἐγγίγνεσθαι λέγοντες, εἰ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος διαμαρτάνουσι, τὴν γοῦν ἀρχὴν ὅθεν δεῖ λαμβάνουσι δεῖ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀφʼ ἑστίας τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας ἄρχεσθαι τὴν ζήτησιν.
Now those who, because scalene and triangular shapes are situated in bodies, say that shivering, trembling, shuddering, and all such related affections arise from roughness—even if they err in details, they at least take their starting point from where they ought; for the inquiry must begin, as if from the hearth, from the substance of the whole.
ᾧ καὶ μάλιστα δόξειεν ἂν ἰατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ καὶ αὐλητοῦ διαφέρειν ὁ φιλόσοφος.
In which respect especially the philosopher would seem to differ from the physician, the farmer, and the flute-player.
ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἐξαρκεῖ τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν αἰτίων θεωρῆσαι 1 τὸ γὰρ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ πάθους αἴτιον ἂν συνοφθῇ, πυρετοῦ μὲν ἔντασις ἢ παρέμπτωσις ἐρυσίβης δʼ ἣλιοι πυριφλεγεῖς ἐπʼ ὄμβρῳ βαρύτητος δὲ κλίσις αὐλῶν καὶ συναγωγὴ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἱκανόν ἐστι τῷ τεχνίτῃ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον.
For to those, it is sufficient to contemplate the lowest causes; for if the nearest cause of the affection is discerned—for a fever, tension or intrusion; for rust, burning suns after rain; and for low pitch, the inclination of the flutes and their drawing close to one another—this is enough for the craftsman for his own work.
τῷ δὲ φυσικῷ θεωρίας ἕνεκα μετιόντι τἀληθὲς ἡ τῶν ἐσχάτων γνῶσις οὐ τέλος ἐστὶν ἀλλʼ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἀνωτάτω πορείας.
But for the natural philosopher who pursues the truth for the sake of contemplation, the knowledge of the immediate causes is not the end, but the beginning of the journey toward the primary and highest things.
διὸ καὶ Πλάτων ὀρθῶς καὶ Δημόκριτος αἰτίαν θερμότητος καὶ βαρύτητος ζητοῦντες οὐ κατέπαυσαν ἐν γῇ καὶ πυρὶ τὸν λόγον ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τὰς νοητὰς ἀναφέροντες ἀρχὰς τὰ αἰσθητὰ μέχρι τῶν ἐλαχίστων ὥσπερ σπερμάτων προῆλθον.
Therefore also Plato and Democritus, in seeking the cause of heat and heaviness, did not stop their account at earth and fire, but, referring sensible things back to intelligible principles, went forward as far as the smallest, as if seeds.