Humanitext Reader

Plutarch · A Philosopher Ought to Converse Especially with Men in Power §2

The Two Forms of Reason, Friendship, and Association with Leaders

Passage 2 of 3 · Greek

Summary

The author argues for the legitimacy of philosophers associating with political leaders by demonstrating that both internal and uttered discourse aim at friendship, while clarifying the proper attitude of a wise man toward reputation and power.

§2Τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὅτι δύο λόγοι εἰσίν, ὁ μὲν ἐνδιάθετος ἡγεμόνος Ἑρμοῦ δῶρον ὁ δʼ ἐν προφορᾷ διάκτορος καὶ ὀργανικός, ἕωλόν ἐστι καὶ ὑποπιπτέτω τῷ " τουτὶ μὲν ᾔδειν πρὶν Θέογνιν γεγονέναι. " ἐκεῖνο δʼ οὐκ ἂν ἐνοχλήσειεν, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου λόγου καὶ τοῦ προφορικοῦ φιλία τέλος ἐστί, τοῦ μὲν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τοῦ δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον.
To say that there are two kinds of discourse, the one internal, a gift of Hermes the leader, and the other in utterance, a messenger and instrumental, is stale and should fall under the saying, 'I knew this before Theognis was born.' But this other point would not be troublesome: that friendship is the end of both internal and uttered discourse—of the former toward oneself, and of the latter toward another.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἀρετὴν διὰ φιλοσοφίας τελευτῶν σύμφωνον ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἄμεμπτον ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ μεστὸν εἰρήνης καὶ φιλοφροσύνης τῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀεὶ παρέχεται τὸν ἄνθρωπον " οὐ στάσις οὐδέ τε δῆρις ἀναίσιμος ἐν μελέεσσιν " οὐ πάθος; λόγῳ δυσπειθὲς οὐχ ὁρμῆς μάχη πρὸς ὁρμὴν οὐ λογισμοῦ πρὸς λογισμὸν ἀντίβασις οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐν μεθορίῳ τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος καὶ τοῦ μετανοοῦντος τὸ τραχὺ καὶ ταραχῶδες καὶ τὸ ἡδόμενον, ἀλλʼ εὐμενῆ πάντα καὶ φίλα καὶ ποιοῦντα πλείστων τυγχάνειν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἑαυτῷ χαίρειν ἕκαστον.
For the discourse that terminates in virtue through philosophy renders a person always harmonious with himself, blameless in his own eyes, and full of peace and friendliness toward himself, 'no discord nor destructive strife among his members,' nor passion resistant to reason, nor conflict of impulse against impulse, nor clash of calculation against calculation, nor—as on the borderland between desire and regret—the harsh and turbulent aspect of pleasure, but all things are gentle and friendly, causing each one to obtain the greatest goods and to rejoice in himself.
τοῦ δὲ προφορικοῦ τὴν Μοῦσαν ὁ Πίνδαρος οὐ φιλοκερδῆ φησὶν οὐδʼ ἐργάτιν εἶναι πρότερον, οἶμαι δὲ μηδὲ νῦν, ἀλλʼ ἀμουσίᾳ καὶ ἀπειροκαλίᾳ τὸν κοινὸν Ἑρμῆν ἐμπολαῖον καὶ ἔμμισθον γενέσθαι.
But Pindar says that the Muse of uttered discourse was not covetous nor a hireling of old, and I believe she is not so even now; but through lack of culture and bad taste, the common Hermes has become mercenary and hired.
οὐ γὰρ ἡ μὲν Ἀφροδίτη ταῖς τοῦ Προποίτου θυγατράσιν ἐμήνιεν ὅτι " πρῶται μίσεα μηχανήσαντο καταχέειν νεανίσκων, " ἡ δʼ Οὐρανία καὶ Καλλιόπη καὶ ἡ Κλειὼ χαίρουσι τοῖς ἐπʼ ἀργυρίῳ λυμαινομένοις τὸν λόγον.
For it was not because Aphrodite was angry with the daughters of Propoetus because 'they were the first to devise the pouring out of the hatreds of young men,' that Urania, Calliope, and Clio rejoice in those who ruin discourse for silver.
ἀλλʼ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τὰ τῶν Μουσῶν ἔργα καὶ δῶρα μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης φιλοτήσια εἶναι, καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔνδοξον, ὅ τινες τοῦ λόγου ποιοῦνται τέλος, ὡς ἀρχὴ καὶ σπέρμα φιλίας ἠγαπήθη· μᾶλλον δʼ ὅλως οἵ γε πολλοὶ κατʼ εὔνοιαν τὴν δόξαν τίθενται, νομίζοντες ἡμᾶς μὴ μόνον ἐπαινεῖν οὓς φιλοῦμεν.
Rather, it seems to me that the works and gifts of the Muses are even more friendly than those of Aphrodite; for even reputation, which some make the end of discourse, is cherished as the beginning and seed of friendship; or rather, the multitude generally associate reputation with goodwill, believing that we do not praise only those whom we love.
ἀλλʼ οὗτοι μέν, ὡς ὁ Ἰξίων διώκων τὴν Ἥραν ὤλισθεν εἰς τὴν νεφέλην, οὕτως ἀντὶ τῆς φιλίας εἴδωλον ἀπατηλὸν καὶ πανηγυρικὸν καὶ περιφερόμενον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν.
But these people, just as Ixion in pursuing Hera slipped into the cloud, thus grasp a deceptive, public, and fleeting image instead of friendship.
ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων, ἂν ἐν πολιτείαις καὶ πράξεσιν ἀναστρέφηται, δεήσεται δόξης τοσαύτης, ὅση δύναμιν περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐκ τοῦ πιστεύεσθαι δίδωσιν οὔτε γὰρ ἡδὺ μὴ βουλομένους οὔτε ῥᾴδιον ὠφελεῖν, βούλεσθαι δὲ ποιεῖ τὸ πιστεύειν ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν τοῖς βλέπουσιν ἢ τοῖς μὴ βλεπομένοις, οὕτως;
But a sensible man, if he conducts himself in political affairs and actions, will need only so much reputation as gives him power for his actions through being trusted; for it is neither pleasant nor easy to benefit those who do not wish it, and being trusted makes them wish it.
ἡ δόξα τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις ἢ τοῖς μὴ παρορωμένοις.
For just as light is a greater good to those who see than to those who are seen, so reputation is to those who perceive than to those who are not overlooked.
ὁ δʼ ἀπηλλαγμένος τοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν καὶ συνὼν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ ἀπραγμοσύνῃ τιθέμενος τὴν μὲν ἐν ὄχλοις καὶ θεάτροις πάνδημον καὶ ἀναπεπταμένην δόξαν οὕτως ὡς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ὁ Ἱππόλυτος ἄπωθεν ἁγνὸς ὢν ἀσπάζεται, τῆς δὲ γε τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καὶ ἐλλογίμων οὐδʼ αὐτὸς καταφρονεῖ πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ δόξαν ἡγεμονικὴν καὶ δύναμιν ἐν φιλίαις οὐ διώκει, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ φεύγει ταῦτα μετρίῳ προσόντʼ ἤθει οὐδὲ γὰρ τοὺς καλοὺς τῶν νέων διώκει καὶ ὡραίους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς εὐαγώγους καὶ κοσμίους καὶ φιλομαθεῖς·
But he who is free from public affairs and lives with himself, placing his good in quietness and inactivity, greets the vulgar and widespread reputation in crowds and theaters, just as Hippolytus greeted Aphrodite, 'from afar, being pure,' but he does not despise the reputation that comes from respectable and notable men. He does not pursue wealth, ruling reputation, and power in friendships, nor yet does he flee them when they belong to a moderate character.
οὐδʼ οἷς ὥρα καὶ χάρις συνέπεται καὶ ἄνθος δεδίττεται τὸν φιλόσοφον οὐδʼ ἀποσοβεῖ καὶ ἀπελαύνει τῶν ἀξίων ἐπιμελείας τὸ κάλλος.
For he does not pursue the beautiful and young, but those who are easily guided, orderly, and fond of learning; nor does the bloom, grace, and flower that accompanies some terrify the philosopher, nor does beauty frighten him away and drive him from those worthy of care.
οὕτως οὖν ἀξίας ἡγεμονικῆς καὶ δυνάμεως ἀνδρὶ μετρίῳ καὶ ἀστείῳ προσούσης, οὐκ ἀφέξεται τοῦ φιλεῖν καὶ ἀγαπᾶν οὐδὲ φοβήσεται τὸ αὐλικὸς ἀκοῦσαι καὶ θεραπευτικός· " οἱ γὰρ Κύπριν φεύγοντες ἀνθρώπων ἄγαν νοσοῦσʼ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄγαν θηρωμένοις· " καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἔνδοξον οὕτως καὶ ἡγεμονικὴν φιλίαν ἔχοντες.
So, when ruling worth and power belong to a moderate and refined man, he will not refrain from loving and cherishing him, nor will he fear to be called a courtier and seeker of favor; 'for those among men who flee Cypris too much are as sick as those who pursue her too much,' and those who have this attitude toward a famous and ruling friendship.
· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀπράγμων φιλόσοφος οὐ φεύξεται τοὺς τοιούτους, ὁ δὲ πολιτικὸς καὶ περιέξεται αὐτῶν, ἄκουσιν οὐκ ἐνοχλῶν οὐδʼ ἐπισταθμεύων τὰ ὦτα διαλέξεσιν ἀκαίροις καὶ σοφιστικαῖς, βουλομένοις δὲ χαίρων καὶ διαλεγόμενος καὶ σχολάζων καὶ συνὼν προθύμως.
Therefore, the inactive philosopher will not flee such men, and the political philosopher will even embrace them, not troublesome to those who do not wish it, nor occupying their ears with untimely and sophistical discussions, but gladly conversing, sharing leisure, and associating eagerly with those who wish it.

Notes

  1. 777cτουτὶ μὲν ᾔδειν πρὶν Θέογνιν γεγονέναι — The phrase 'I knew this before Theognis was born' is an ancient proverbial expression used to refer to self-evident, long-standing facts or common knowledge. It is quoted here rhetorically to indicate that the distinction between internal and uttered discourse is fundamental and so well-known to philosophers that it needs no further elaboration.
  2. 777cὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἀρετὴν διὰ φιλοσοφίας τελευτῶν — A participle phrase modifying the omitted subject (the discourse, logos) of the main verb παρέχεται. The nominative present participle of τελευτάω ('to terminate, end, result') forms the subject: 'the discourse which terminates in virtue through philosophy.'
  3. 777fὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν τοῖς βλέπουσιν ἢ τοῖς μὴ βλεπομένοις, οὕτως ἡ δόξα τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις ἢ τοῖς μὴ παρορωμένοις — A complex sentence containing a double antithesis. It contrasts active agents with passive patients: 'those who see' (τοῖς βλέπουσιν) versus 'those who are not seen/invisible' (τοῖς μὴ βλεπομένοις), and 'those who perceive/feel' (τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις) versus 'those who are not overlooked/noticed' (τοῖς μὴ παρορωμένοις). The proportional comparison states that just as light is more beneficial to the seer than to the object seen, so reputation is more useful to the perceiver (the active philosopher who uses it to do good) than to the one who is merely noticed.
  4. 778aοὐδʼ οἷς ὥρα καὶ χάρις συνέπεται καὶ ἄνθος δεδίττεται τὸν φιλόσοφον — The subject is ὥρα καὶ χάρις... ('bloom, grace, and flower'), modified by the dative relative pronoun οἷς ('those whom they accompany'). The verb δεδίττεται here functions transitively ('frighten, terrify'), taking the accusative τὸν φιλόσοφον ('the philosopher') as its direct object: 'nor does the bloom and grace that accompanies some terrify the philosopher.'

Cite this passage

Plutarch, A Philosopher Ought to Converse Especially with Men in Power §2. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0007.tlg115.humanitext-grc2:2

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