§26.1ἔσχατον δὲ τῶν πολιτευμάτων αὐτοῦ τὴν Καρχηδόνος ἀνάστασιν οἴονται γεγονέναι, τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ τέλος ἐπιθέντος τοῦ νέου Σκηπίωνος, βουλῇ δὲ καὶ γνώμῃ μάλιστα τῇ Κάτωνος ἀραμένων τὸν πόλεμον ἐξ αἰτίας τοιᾶσδε.
And the last of his political acts is thought to have been the destruction of Carthage, though the younger Scipio put the finishing touch to the work, but they undertook the war chiefly by the advice and determination of Cato, for the following reason.
Κάτων ἐπέμφθη πρὸς Καρχηδονίους καὶ Μασσανάσσην τὸν Νομάδα πολεμοῦντας ἀλλήλοις, ἐπισκεψόμενος τὰς τῆς διαφορᾶς προφάσεις, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δήμου φίλος ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς, οἱ δʼ ἐγεγόνεισαν ἔνσπονδοι μετὰ τὴν ὑπὸ Σκηπίωνος ἧτταν, ἀφαιρέσει τε τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ βαρεῖ δασμῷ χρημάτων κολουθέντες. §26.2εὑρὼν δὲ τὴν πόλιν οὐχ, ὡς ᾤοντο Ῥωμαῖοι, κεκακωμένην καὶ ταπεινὰ πράττουσαν, ἀλλὰ πολλῇ μὲν εὐανδροῦσαν ἡλικίᾳ, μεγάλων δὲ πλούτων γέμουσαν, ὅπλων δὲ παντοδαπῶν καὶ παρασκευῆς πολεμιστηρίου μεστὴν καὶ μικρὸν οὐδὲν ἐπὶ τούτοις φρονοῦσαν, οὐ τὰ Νομάδων ᾤετο καὶ Μασσανάσσου πράγματα Ῥωμαίους ὥραν ἔχειν τίθεσθαι καὶ διαιτᾶν, ἀλλʼ εἰ μὴ καταλήψονται πόλιν ἄνωθεν ἐχθρὰν καὶ βαρύθυμον ηὐξημένην ἀπίστως, πάλιν ἐν τοῖς ἴσοις κινδύνοις ἔσεσθαι. §26.3ταχέως οὖν ὑποστρέψας ἐδίδασκε τὴν βουλήν, ὡς αἱ πρότερον ἧτται καὶ συμφοραὶ Καρχηδονίων οὐ τοσοῦτον τῆς δυνάμεως ὅσον τῆς ἀνοίας ἀπαρύσασαι, κινδυνεύουσιν αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἀσθενεστέρους, ἐμπειροτέρους δὲ πολεμεῖν ἀπεργάσασθαι, ἤδη δὲ καὶ προανακινεῖσθαι τοῖς Νομαδικοῖς τοὺς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀγῶνας, εἰρήνην δὲ καὶ σπονδὰς ὄνομα τοῦ πολέμου τῇ μελλήσει κεῖσθαι καιρὸν περιμένοντος.
Cato was sent to the Carthaginians and Masinissa the Numidian, who were warring against each other, to examine the grounds of their dispute; for the latter had been a friend of the Roman people from the beginning, while the former had become treaty-allies after their defeat by Scipio, having been humbled by the loss of their empire and a heavy tribute of money. But finding the city not, as the Romans supposed, in a bad plight and humbled, but rather abounding in a large population of military age, filled with great wealth, full of all kinds of arms and warlike preparations, and not at all low-spirited because of these things, he did not think that the Romans had time to arrange and arbitrate the affairs of the Numidians and Masinissa, but that unless they should first crush a city which was an enemy from of old and resentful, and which had grown incredibly, they would again be in the same dangers. Therefore, returning quickly, he informed the Senate that the former defeats and misfortunes of the Carthaginians had not so much drained away their power as their folly, and threatened to render them not weaker but more experienced in war, and that their struggles against the Numidians were already a preliminary exercise for their contests against the Romans, and that peace and treaties were only a name for a war that was waiting for an opportunity through its delay.