§7.28.1ἥ τε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων παρακομιδὴ ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας, πρότερον ἐκ τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ κατὰ γῆν διὰ τῆς Δεκελείας θάσσων οὖσα, περὶ Σούνιον κατὰ θάλασσαν πολυτελὴς ἐγίγνετο· τῶν τε πάντων ὁμοίως ἐπακτῶν ἐδεῖτο ἡ πόλις, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ πόλις εἶναι φρούριον κατέστη.
And the transport of provisions from Euboea, which had previously been quicker by land from Oropus through Decelea, was now made by sea around Sunium and became very expensive; and the city stood in need of all imported things alike, and instead of being a city, it became a fortress.
§7.28.2πρὸς γὰρ τῇ ἐπάλξει τὴν μὲν ἡμέραν κατὰ διαδοχὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι φυλάσσοντες, τὴν δὲ νύκτα καὶ ξύμπαντες πλὴν τῶν ἱππέων, οἱ μὲν ἐφ’ ὅπλοις † ποιούμενοι †, οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους, καὶ θέρους καὶ χειμῶνος ἐταλαιπωροῦντο.
For at the battlement, by day the Athenians kept guard in succession, and by night all of them except the cavalry, some under arms, others upon the wall, were kept hard at work both in summer and winter.
§7.28.3μάλιστα δ’ αὐτοὺς ἐπίεζεν ὅτι δύο πολέμους ἅμα εἶχον, καὶ ἐς φιλονικίαν καθέστασαν τοιαύτην ἣν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἠπίστησεν ἄν τις ἀκούσας.
What pressed hardest upon them was that they had two wars at the same time, and had fallen into such a spirit of rivalry as no one, before it happened, would have believed if he heard of it.
τὸ γὰρ αὐτοὺς πολιορκουμένους ἐπιτειχισμῷ ὑπὸ Πελοποννησίων μηδ’ ὣς ἀποστῆναι ἐκ Σικελίας, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖ Συρακούσας τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀντιπολιορκεῖν, πόλιν οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω αὐτήν γε καθ’ αὑτὴν τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τὸν παράλογον τοσοῦτον ποιῆσαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τόλμης, ὅσον κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτόν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τριῶν γε ἐτῶν οὐδεὶς πλείω χρόνον ἐνόμιζον περιοίσειν αὐτούς, εἰ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐσβάλοιεν ἐς τὴν χώραν, ὥστε ἔτει ἑπτακαιδεκάτῳ μετὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐσβολὴν ἦλθον ἐς Σικελίαν ἤδη τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ πάντα τετρυχωμένοι, καὶ πόλεμον οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω προσανείλοντο τοῦ πρότερον ὑπάρχοντος ἐκ Πελοποννήσου.
For that they, while besieged themselves by the fortification constructed by the Peloponnesians, should not even so withdraw from Sicily, but should on their part counter-siege Syracuse there in the same manner—a city not at all smaller in itself than that of the Athenians—and should display to the Greeks such an unexpected proof of their power and daring, whereas at the beginning of the war some thought they would hold out for one year, others for two, and no one for more than three years if the Peloponnesians should invade their country, so that in the seventeenth year after the first invasion they went to Sicily, though already exhausted in every way by the war, and took upon themselves another war not less than the one previously existing from the Peloponnesus.
§7.28.4δι’ ἃ καὶ τότε ὑπό τε τῆς Δεκελείας πολλὰ βλαπτούσης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναλωμάτων μεγάλων προσπιπτόντων ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο τοῖς χρήμασιν.
For these reasons, both because Decelea was doing them great damage and because other great expenses were falling upon them, they became powerless in their finances.
καὶ τὴν εἰκοστὴν ὑπὸ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀντὶ τοῦ φόρου τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἐποίησαν, πλείω νομίζοντες ἂν σφίσι χρήματα οὕτω προσιέναι.
And around this time, they imposed on their subjects a tax of one-twentieth on goods carried by sea, instead of the tribute, thinking that more money would come in to them this way.
αἱ μὲν γὰρ δαπάναι οὐχ ὁμοίως καὶ πρίν, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μείζους καθέστασαν, ὅσῳ καὶ μείζων ὁ πόλεμος ἦν· αἱ δὲ πρόσοδοι ἀπώλλυντο.
For their expenses were not the same as before, but were much greater, just as the war was also greater; while their revenues were failing.