§6.34.1‘θαρσοῦντες οὖν τά τε αὐτοῦ παρασκευαζώμεθα καὶ ἐς τοὺς Σικελοὺς πέμποντες τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον βεβαιωσώμεθα, τοῖς δὲ φιλίαν καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πειρώμεθα ποιεῖσθαι, ἔς τε τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν πέμπωμεν πρέσβεις δηλοῦντες ὡς κοινὸς ὁ κίνδυνος, καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ὅπως ἢ ξυμμαχίαν ποιώμεθα ἡμῖν ἢ μὴ δέχωνται Ἀθηναίους.
“Therefore, let us with courage make our preparations here, and by sending to the Sicels, let us confirm the allegiance of some, and try to make friendship and alliance with others; let us also send ambassadors to the rest of Sicily to show that the danger is common to all, and to Italy, so that we may either make an alliance for ourselves or prevent them from receiving the Athenians.
§6.34.2δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι· οὐ γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ διὰ φόβου εἰσὶ μή ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν, ὥστε τάχ’ ἂν ἴσως νομίσαντες, εἰ τάδε προήσονται, κἂν σφεῖς ἐν πόνῳ εἶναι, ἐθελήσειαν ἡμῖν ἤτοι κρύφα γε ἢ φανερῶς ἢ ἐξ ἑνός γέ του τρόπου ἀμῦναι.
It seems to me also better to send to Carthage; for this is not unexpected by them, but they are always in fear lest the Athenians should some day come against their city, so that thinking perhaps that if they abandon these parts, they themselves will also be in trouble, they might wish to aid us either secretly or openly, or in some way or other.
δυνατοὶ δὲ εἰσὶ μάλιστα τῶν νῦν, βουληθέντες· χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἄργυρον πλεῖστον κέκτηνται, ὅθεν ὅ τε πόλεμος καὶ τἆλλα εὐπορεῖ.
And they are the most able of those of the present day, if they wish; for they possess the greatest amount of gold and silver, which is the source of abundance both for war and for all other things.
§6.34.3πέμπωμεν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ ἐς Κόρινθον δεόμενοι δεῦρο κατὰ τάχος βοηθεῖν καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον κινεῖν.
Let us send also to Lacedaemon and to Corinth, begging them to help us here with all speed, and to stir up the war there.
§6.34.4ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγώ τε νομίζω ἐπίκαιρον ὑμεῖς τε διὰ τὸ ξύνηθες ἥσυχον ἥκιστ’ ἂν ὀξέως πείθοισθε, ὅμως εἰρήσεται.
And that which I especially think to be timely, but which you, because of your habitual quietness, would least readily be persuaded to adopt, shall nevertheless be spoken.
Σικελιῶται γὰρ εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν ξύμπαντες, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι πλεῖστοι μεθ’ ἡμῶν, καθελκύσαντες ἅπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ναυτικὸν μετὰ δυοῖν μηνοῖν τροφῆς ἀπαντῆσαι Ἀθηναίοις ἐς Τάραντα καὶ ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν, καὶ δῆλον ποιῆσαι αὐτοῖς ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῆς Σικελίας πρότερον ἔσται ὁ ἀγὼν ἢ τοῦ ἐκείνους περαιωθῆναι τὸν Ἰόνιον, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκπλήξαιμεν καὶ ἐς λογισμὸν καταστήσαιμεν ὅτι ὁρμώμεθα μὲν ἐκ φιλίας χώρας φύλακες (ὑποδέχεται γὰρ ἡμᾶς Τάρας), τὸ δὲ πέλαγος αὐτοῖς πολὺ περαιοῦσθαι μετὰ πάσης τῆς παρασκευῆς, χαλεπὸν δὲ διὰ πλοῦ μῆκος ἐν τάξει μεῖναι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἂν εὐεπίθετος εἴη, βραδεῖά τε καὶ κατ’ ὀλίγον προσπίπτουσα.
For if we Siceliots—all of us if possible, or if not, as many as possible with us—should launch all our available navy with two months' provisions and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, and make it clear to them that the contest will not be for Sicily before they have crossed the Ionian Sea, we should most of all strike them with panic and bring them to the consideration that we are setting out as guardians from a friendly country (for Tarentum receives us), while they have to cross a vast sea with all their equipment, and that it is difficult owing to the length of the voyage to keep in order, so that their fleet would be easy for us to attack, falling upon us slowly and in small detachments.
§6.34.5εἰ δ’ αὖ τῷ ταχυναυτοῦντι ἁθροωτέρῳ κουφίσαντες προσβάλοιεν, εἰ μὲν κώπαις χρήσαιντο, ἐπιθοίμεθ’ ἂν κεκμηκόσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ δοκοίη, ἔστι καὶ ὑποχωρῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐς Τάραντα·
If, on the other hand, they should lighten their ships and attack us with their faster vessels in a body, then, if they use oars, we could attack them when they are exhausted; or if that should not seem best, it is also possible for us to retreat to Tarentum.
οἱ δὲ μετ’ ὀλίγων ἐφοδίων ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίᾳ περαιωθέντες ἀποροῖεν ἂν κατὰ χωρία ἐρῆμα, καὶ ἢ μένοντες πολιορκοῖντο ἂν ἢ πειρώμενοι παραπλεῖν τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἀπολείποιεν ἂν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων οὐκ ἂν βέβαια ἔχοντες, εἰ ὑποδέξοιντο, ἀθυμοῖεν.
But they, having crossed with few provisions as if for a naval battle, would be at a loss in desert places; and either they would be blockaded if they remained, or in trying to sail along the coast they would leave the rest of their equipment behind, and being disheartened because they would not have the cities secure to receive them, they would be discouraged.
§6.34.6ὥστ’ ἔγωγε τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ ἡγοῦμαι ἀποκλῃομένους αὐτοὺς οὐδ’ ἂν ἀπᾶραι ἀπὸ Κερκύρας, ἀλλ’ ἢ διαβουλευσαμένους καὶ κατασκοπαῖς χρωμένους, ὁπόσοι τ’ ἐσμὲν καὶ ἐν ᾧ χωρίῳ, ἐξωσθῆναι ἂν τῇ ὥρᾳ ἐς χειμῶνα, ἢ καταπλαγέντας τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ καταλῦσαι ἂν τὸν πλοῦν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ ἐμπειροτάτου τῶν στρατηγῶν, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκούω, ἄκοντος ἡγουμένου καὶ ἀσμένου ἂν πρόφασιν λαβόντος, εἴ τι ἀξιόχρεων ἀφ’ ἡμῶν ὀφθείη.
Therefore, by this calculation I think that, being shut out, they would not even start from Corcyra, but would either, while deliberating and using scouts to find out how many we are and in what place, be driven by the season into winter, or, struck with panic at the unexpectedness, would abandon the voyage; especially since the most experienced of their generals, as I hear, is commanding against his will, and would gladly take any sufficient pretext from us, if any noteworthy force of ours should be seen.
§6.34.7ἀγγελλοίμεθα δ’ ἂν εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον· τῶν δ’ ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ αἱ γνῶμαι ἵστανται, καὶ τοὺς προεπιχειροῦντας ἢ τοῖς γε ἐπιχειροῦσι προδηλοῦντας ὅτι ἀμυνοῦνται μᾶλλον πεφόβηνται, ἰσοκινδύνους ἡγούμενοι.
And we should be reported, I am sure, with exaggeration; and the minds of men adapt themselves to what is reported, and they fear more those who attack first, or at least show beforehand to those who attack that they will defend themselves, thinking them to be equal to the danger.
§6.34.8ὅπερ ἂν νῦν Ἀθηναῖοι πάθοιεν.
This is what the Athenians would now experience.
ἐπέρχονται γὰρ ἡμῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀμυνουμένοις, δικαίως κατεγνωκότες ὅτι αὐτοὺς οὐ μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐφθείρομεν· εἰ δ’ ἴδοιεν παρὰ γνώμην τολμήσαντας, τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ μᾶλλον ἂν καταπλαγεῖεν ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς δυνάμει.
For they are coming against us on the assumption that we shall not defend ourselves, having justly judged us because we did not destroy them in cooperation with the Lacedaemonians; but if they should see us daring contrary to their expectation, they would be more struck with panic by the unexpectedness than by our actual power.
§6.34.9‘πείθεσθε οὖν μάλιστα μὲν ταῦτα τολμήσαντες, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι τάχιστα τἆλλα ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἑτοιμάζειν, καὶ παραστῆναι παντὶ τὸ μὲν καταφρονεῖν τοὺς ἐπιόντας ἐν τῶν ἔργων τῇ ἀλκῇ δείκνυσθαι, τὸ δ’ ἤδη τὰς μετὰ φόβου παρασκευὰς ἀσφαλεστάτας νομίσαντας ὡς ἐπὶ κινδύνου πράσσειν χρησιμώτατον ἂν ξυμβῆναι.
‘Therefore, obey me, if possible by daring this; but if not, prepare with all speed other things for the war, and let it be established in the mind of everyone that contempt for the invaders is shown in the bravery of deeds, but that for the present, to act as if in danger, regarding preparations made with fear as the safest, will prove most useful.
οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες καὶ ἐπέρχονται καὶ ἐν πλῷ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι ἤδη εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσον οὔπω πάρεισιν. ’
For the men are both coming against us and are, I am sure, already on their voyage, and are all but here.’”