§5.90.1ΜΗΛ.
ἧι μὲν δὴ νομίζομέν γε, χρήσιμον (ἀνάγκη γάρ, ἐπειδη) ὑμεῖς οὕτω παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ξυμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέθεσθἐ μὴ καταλύειν ὑμᾶς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῷ αἰεὶ ἐν κινδύνῳ γιγνομένῳ εἶναι τὰ εἰκότα καὶ δίκαια, καί τι καὶ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς πείσαντά τινα ὠφεληθῆναι.
MELIANS 'As we see it, then, it is useful—for we are forced to speak of utility since you have thus laid down that we should discuss interest rather than justice—that you should not destroy the common good, but that for anyone who is from time to time in danger, what is reasonable and just should be available, and that he should be able to benefit if he can win belief even by falling short of strict proof.
καὶ πρὸς ὑμῶν οὐχ ἧσσον τοῦτο, ὅσῳ καὶ ἐπὶ μεγίστῃ τιμωρίᾳ σφαλέντες ἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις παράδειγμα γένοισθε.
And this is no less to your own interest, inasmuch as, if you should fall, you would become an example to others by receiving the greatest vengeance.'