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Thucydides · History of the Peloponnesian War §3.95.1-3.95.3

Demosthenes' Plan against Boeotia and Departure

Passage 344 of 917 · Greek

Summary

Demosthenes plans to march against Boeotia by land through Phocis after subduing Aetolia, and sets out, leaving behind the dissatisfied Acarnanians.

§3.95.1ὁ δὲ τῶν Μεσσηνίων χάριτι πεισθεὶς καὶ μάλιστα νομίσας ἄνευ τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως τοῖς ἠπειρώταις ξυμμάχοις μετὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν δύνασθαι ἂν κατὰ γῆν ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ Βοιωτοὺς διὰ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀζολῶν ἐς Κυτίνιον τὸ Δωρικόν, ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχων τὸν Παρνασσόν, ἕως καταβαίη ἐς Φωκέας, οἳ προθύμως ἐδόκουν κατὰ τὴν Ἀθηναίων αἰεί ποτε φιλίαν ξυστρατεύσειν ἢ κἂν βίᾳ προσαχθῆναι (καὶ Φωκεῦσιν ἤδη ὅμορος ἡ Βοιωτία ἐστίν), ἄρας οὖν ξύμπαντι τῷ στρατεύματι ἀπὸ τῆς Λευκάδος ἀκόντων τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων παρέπλευσεν ἐς Σόλλιον.
Demosthenes, persuaded out of favor to the Messenians and especially thinking that, even without the force from Athens, he would be able, with the continental allies and after winning over the Aetolians, to march by land against the Boeotians through the territory of the Ozolian Locrians to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Mount Parnassus on his right, until he should descend to the Phocians, who, it was thought, would eagerly join the campaign because of their constant friendship with the Athenians, or else could be brought over even by force (and Boeotia is already bordering on Phocis)—consequently, setting out with the whole army from Leucas against the will of the Acarnanians, he sailed along the coast to Sollium.
§3.95.2κοινώσας δὲ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τοῖς Ἀκαρνᾶσιν, ὡς οὐ προσεδέξαντο διὰ τῆς Λευκάδος τὴν οὐ περιτείχισιν, αὐτὸς τῇ λοιπῇ στρατιᾷ, Κεφαλλῆσι καὶ Μεσσηνίοις καὶ Ζακυνθίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίων τριακοσίοις τοῖς ἐπιβάταις τῶν σφετέρων νεῶν (αἱ γὰρ πέντε καὶ δέκα τῶν Κερκυραίων ἀπῆλθον νῆες), ἐστράτευσεν ἐπ’ Αἰτωλούς.
When he communicated his plan to the Acarnanians, since they did not accept it because of the failure to build a wall around Leucas, he himself with the rest of the army—the Cephallenians, the Messenians, the Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenian marines from his own ships (for the fifteen ships of the Corcyraeans had departed)—marched against the Aetolians.
§3.95.3ὡρμᾶτο δὲ ἐξ Οἰνεῶνος τῆς Λοκρίδος.
He set out from Oeneon in Locris.
οἱ δὲ Ὀζόλαι οὗτοι Λοκροὶ ξύμμαχοι ἦσαν, καὶ ἔδει αὐτοὺς πανστρατιᾷ ἀπαντῆσαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὴν μεσόγειαν· ὄντες γὰρ ὅμοροι τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς καὶ ὁμόσκευοι μεγάλη ὠφελία ἐδόκουν εἶναι ξυστρατεύοντες μάχης τε ἐμπειρίᾳ τῆς ἐκείνων καὶ χωρίων.
These Ozolian Locrians were allies, and they were to meet the Athenians in the interior with their whole force; for being neighbors of the Aetolians and armed in the same manner, they were expected to be of great assistance in the campaign because of their knowledge of the enemy's way of fighting and of the country.

Notes

  1. §3.95.1μετὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν — Meaning "after bringing the Aetolians over to his side" (i.e., having subdued them first). Demosthenes' ultimate goal was to march against Boeotia, and he planned to subjugate the Aetolians on the way and use them as allies (ξυμμάχοις).
  2. §3.95.2τὴν οὐ περιτείχισιν — The negative particle οὐ directly negates the noun περιτείχισις (walling off), forming a single noun phrase meaning "the non-walling-off" or "the failure to circumvallate." This explains the background of the Acarnanians' refusal to cooperate in Demosthenes' new campaign due to their disappointment over the abandonment of the siege of Leucas.
  3. §3.95.2τοῖς ἐπιβάταις — Referring to the "marines" or "epibatae" (hoplites serving on board). It indicates the 300 Athenian citizen hoplites, drawn ten from each of Demosthenes' thirty ships, distinct from the allied troops (Cephallenians, Messenians, etc.).
  4. §3.95.3μάχης τε ἐμπειρίᾳ τῆς ἐκείνων καὶ χωρίων — Regarding the genitives, τῆς ἐκείνων (their, i.e., the Aetolians') depends on μάχης (fighting), while χωρίων (places, country) depends on ἐμπειρίᾳ (experience), meaning "their experience of the Aetolians' way of fighting and of the country." It expresses the Ozolian Locrians' familiarity with both the tactics and the terrain.

Cite this passage

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War §3.95.1-3.95.3. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0003.tlg001.humanitext-grc2:3.95.1-3.95.3

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