§3Quae enim in manifesto, scimus omnes, eaque ipsa qualiter in manifesto sint perspiciendum est.
For those things which are in public, we all know, and we must discern in what manner they themselves are in public.
Nam etsi quaedam videntur voluntatem dei sapere, dum ab eo remittuntur, non statim omne quod permittitur ex mera et tota voluntate procedit eius qui permittit.
For even if some things seem to taste of the will of God while they are permitted by Him, not immediately does everything which is permitted proceed from the pure and total will of Him who permits.
Ex indulgentia est quodcumque permittitur.
Whatever is permitted is from indulgence.
Quae etsi sine voluntate non est, quia tamen aliquam habet causam in illo cui indulgetur, quasi de invita venit voluntate, passa causam sui quae cogit voluntatem.
And although this is not without the will, because nevertheless it has some cause in him to whom indulgence is granted, it comes as it were from an unwilling will, having suffered its own cause which forces the will.
Vide, qualis sit voluntas cuius alter est causa.
See what kind of will it is of which another is the cause.
Secunda item species consideranda est purae voluntatis.
In like manner, the second kind of pure will must be considered.
Vult nos deus agere quaedam placita sibi, in quibus non indulgentia patrocinatur, sed disciplina dominatur.
God wants us to do certain things pleasing to Him, in which not indulgence advocates, but discipline dominates.
Si tamen alia istis praeposuit, utique quae magis vult, dubiumne est ea nobis sectanda esse quae mavult, cum quae minus vult, quia alia magis vult, perinde habenda sunt atque si nolit? Nam ostendens quid magis velit, minorem voluntatem maiore delevit.
Yet if He has placed other things before these, which indeed He wills more, is it doubtful that we ought to pursue those things which He prefers, since those things which He wills less, because He wills others more, are to be regarded just as if He did not want them?
Quantoque notitiae tuae utramque proposuit, tanto definiit id te sectari debere quod declaravit se magis velle.
For by showing what He wants more, He has wiped out the lesser will with the greater.
Ergo si ideo declaravit, ut id secteris quod magis vult, sine dubio, nisi ita facis, contra voluntatem eius sapis, sapiendo contra potiorem eius voluntatem, magisque offendis quam promereris, quod vult quidem faciende et quod mavult respuendo.
And by how much more He has set both before your knowledge, by so much the more He has defined that you ought to pursue what He declared Himself to want more. Therefore, if He declared it for this reason, that you might pursue what He wants more, without doubt, unless you do so, you think against His will, by thinking against His preferable will, and you offend more than you deserve well, indeed by doing what He wants and rejecting what He prefers.
Ex parte delinquis; ex parte, si non delinquis, non tamen promereris.
In part you sin; in part, if you do not sin, you nevertheless do not deserve well.
Non porro et promereri nolle delinquere est? Secundum igitur matrimonium, si est ex illa dei voluntate quae indulgentia vocatur, negabimus meram voluntatem cui indulgentia est causa, si ex ea cui potior alia praeponitur continentiae magis appetendae didcerimus non potiorem a potiore rescindi.
Is it not, furthermore, a sin to be unwilling to deserve well? Therefore, if second marriage is from that will of God which is called indulgence, we shall deny that it is a pure will of which indulgence is the cause, if from that to which another preferable thing is placed before (namely, of continence to be more desired) we have learned that the less preferable is rescinded by the preferable.
Haec praestrinxerim, ut iam apostoli voces decurram.
I would touch upon these things, so that I may now run through the words of the apostle.
Inprimis autem non videbor inreligiosus, si quod ipse profitetur animadvertam, omnem illum indulgentiam nuptiarum de suo, id est de humano sensu, non de divino praescripto induxisse.
First of all, however, I shall not seem irreligious if I notice what he himself professes, that he introduced all that indulgence of marriage from his own, that is, from a human sense, and not from a divine command.
Nam et cum de viduis et innuptis definiit, uti nubant, si continere non possunt, quia melius sit nubere quam uri, conversus ad alteram speciem, Nuptis autem denuntio, inquit, non quidem ego, sed dominus. Ita ostendit ex translatione personae suae in dominum id quod supra dixerat non ex domini persona, sed ex sua pronuntiasse, Melius est nubere quam uri. Quae vox licet ad eos pertineat qui inupti vel vidui a fide deprehenduntur, quia tamen omnes eam ad nubendi licentiam amplectuntur, velim pertractare quale bonum ostendat quod melius est poena, quod non potest videri bonum nisi pessimo comparatum, ut ideo bonum sit nubere, quia deterius sit ardere.
For both when he defined concerning widows and the unmarried, that they should marry if they cannot contain themselves, because "it is better to marry than to burn," having turned to the other class, he says: "But to the married I charge, not indeed I, but the Lord." Thus he shows by the transfer of his person to the Lord that what he had said above he pronounced not from the Lord's person, but from his own: "It is better to marry than to burn." Although this saying belongs to those who are found by faith as unmarried or widows, yet because all embrace it as a license for marrying, I would like to examine what kind of good that shows which is better than a punishment, which cannot seem good unless compared with the worst, so that to marry is good for this reason, because to burn is worse.
Bonum ita est, si perseveret nomen obtinens sine comparatione, non dico mali, sed etiam boni alterius, ut, etsi bono alii comparatur et alio adumbratur, nihilominus remaneat in boni nomine.
It is a good in this way, if it remains holding its name without comparison, I do not say with evil, but even with another good, so that, even if it is compared with another good and shadowed by another, it nevertheless remains in the name of good.
Ceterum si per mali condicionem cogitur bonum dici, non tam bonum est quam genus mali inferioris, quod a superiore malo obscuratum ad nomen boni impellitur.
Otherwise, if it is forced to be called good through the condition of evil, it is not so much a good as a kind of lesser evil, which, obscured by a greater evil, is driven to the name of good.
Aufer denique condicionem comparationis, ut non dicas, Melius est nubere quam uri, et quaero an dicere audeas, Melius est nubere, non adiciens quid sit id quod melius est.
Take away indeed the condition of comparison, so that you do not say, "It is better to marry than to burn," and I ask whether you dare to say, "It is better to marry," not adding what it is that is better.
Ergo quod non melius, utique nec bonum, quia abstulisti et removisti condicionem comparationis, quae dum melius illud facit, ita bonum haberi cogit.
Therefore, what is not better is indeed not good, because you have taken away and removed the condition of comparison, which, while it makes that "better," thus forces it to be held as good.
Melius est nubere quam uri sic accipiendum est, quomodo melius est uno oculo quam duobus carere: si tamen a comparatione discedas, non erit melius unum oculum habere, quia nec bonum.
"It is better to marry than to burn" is to be accepted in the same way as it is better to lack one eye than two; yet if you depart from comparison, it will not be better to have one eye, because it is not even good.
Nemo igitur captet ex hoc capitulo defensionem, quod proprie ad innuptos et viduos spectat, quibus nulla adhuc coniunctio numeratur.
Let no one therefore snatch a defense from this chapter, which properly looks to the unmarried and widows, to whom no union is yet counted.
Quamquam ostenderim etiam illis intellegendam esse permissi condicionem.
Although I have shown that even to them the condition of what is permitted must be understood.