§85.9Deinde, si ratio proficit, ne incipient quidem adfectus; si invita ratione coeperint, invita perseverabunt.
Next, if reason makes progress, passions will not even begin; if they begin against the will of reason, they will persist against its will.
Facilius est enim initia illorum prohibere quam impetum regere.
For it is easier to prevent their beginnings than to rule their force.
Falsa est itaque ista mediocritas et inutilis, eodem loco habenda, quo si quis diceret modice insaniendum, modice aegrotandum.
Therefore, that moderation of yours is false and useless, to be held in the same place as if someone should say that one ought to be moderately insane, moderately sick.
§85.10Sola virtus habet, non recipiunt animi mala temperamentum.
Virtue alone possesses (self-control), the evils of the soul do not admit moderation.
Facilius sustuleris illa quam rexeris.
You will remove them more easily than you will rule them.
Numquid dubium est, quin vitia mentis humanae inveterata et dura, quae morbos vocamus, inmoderata sint, ut avaritia, ut crudelitas, ut inpotentia? Ergo inmoderati sunt et adfectus.
Is there any doubt that the long-standing and hard vices of the human mind, which we call diseases, are immoderate, such as avarice, cruelty, and lack of self-control? Therefore, passions are also immoderate.
§85.11Ab his enim ad illa transitur.
For from these there is a transition to those.
Deinde si das aliquid iuris tristitiae, timori, cupiditati, ceteris motibus pravis, non erunt in nostra potestate.
Next, if you grant any right to sadness, fear, desire, and other perverse movements, they will not be in our power.
Quare?Quia extra nos sunt, quibus inritantur.
Why? Because the things by which they are irritated are outside us.
Itaque crescent, prout magnas habuerint minoresve causas, quibus concitentur.
Therefore they will grow, according as they have great or smaller causes by which they are excited.
Maior erit timor, si plus, quo exterreatur, aut propius aspexerit, acrior cupiditas, quo illam amplioris rei spes evocaverit.
Fear will be greater if it looks at more things by which it may be terrified, or looks at them more closely; desire will be sharper, in proportion as the hope of a grander thing has evoked it.
§85.12Si in nostra potestate non est, an sint adfectus, ne illud quidem est, quanti sint; si ipsis permisisti incipere, cum causis suis crescent tantique erunt, quanti fient.
If it is not in our power whether passions exist, neither is it in our power how great they are; if you have permitted them to begin, they will grow with their causes and will be as great as they become.
Adice nunc, quod ista, quamvis exigua sint, in maius excedunt.
Add now that these things, however small they are, exceed into something greater.
Numquam perniciosa servant modum.
Harmful things never keep a limit.
Quamvis levia initia morborum serpunt et aegra corpora minima interdum mergit accessio.
However light the beginnings of diseases are, they creep in, and sometimes the smallest increase sinks the sick bodies.
§85.13Illud vero cuius dementiae est, credere, quarum rerum extra nostrum arbitrium posita principia sunt, earum nostri esse arbitrii terminos? Quomodo ad id timendum satis valeo, ad quod prohibendum parum valui, cum facilius sit excludere quam admissa conprimere?
Indeed, of what madness is it to believe that, of those things whose principles are placed outside our judgment, the boundaries are of our judgment? How am I sufficiently strong for fearing that, for preventing which I was too little strong, since it is easier to exclude than to suppress what has been admitted?
§85.14Quidam ita distinxerunt, ut dicerent: "Temperans ac prudens positione quidem mentis et habitu tranquillus est, eventu non est.
Certain people have distinguished in this way, so as to say: "The temperate and prudent man is indeed tranquil in the positioning of his mind and in his habit, but he is not so in the outcome.
Nam, quantum ad habitum mentis suae, non perturbatum nec contristatur nec timet, sed multae extrinsecus causae incidunt, quae illi perturbationem adferant. " §85.15Tale est, quod volunt dicere: iracundum quidem illum non esse, irasci tamen aliquando; et timidum quidem non esse, timere tamen aliquando; id est, vitio timoris carere, adfectu non carere.
For, as far as the habit of his mind is concerned, he is not perturbed, nor does he grieve, nor does he fear, but many causes fall upon him from without, which bring perturbation to him." This is what they wish to say: that he is indeed not angry, yet he is angry sometimes; and he is indeed not timid, yet he fears sometimes; that is, he lacks the vice of fear, but does not lack the passion.
Quod si recipitur, usu frequenti timor transibit in vitium, et ira in animum admissa habitum illum ira parentis animi retexet.
But if this is accepted, by frequent use fear will pass into a vice, and anger admitted into the mind will unravel that habit of the mind that produces anger.
§85.16Praeterea si non contemnit venientes extrinsecus causas et aliquid timet, cum fortiter eundum erit adversus tela, ignes, pro patria, legibus, libertate, cunctanter exibit et animo recedente.
Moreover, if he does not despise causes coming from without and fears something, when he must go bravely against weapons, fires, for his country, laws, and liberty, he will go forth hesitantly and with a receding mind.
§85.17Non cadit autem in sapientem haec diversitas mentis.
But this diversity of mind does not fall upon a wise man.
Illud praeterea iudico observandum, ne duo, quae separatim probanda sunt, misceamus.
Moreover, I judge that this must be observed, lest we mix two things which are to be proved separately.
Per se enim colligitur unum bonum esse, quod honestum, per se rursus, ad vitam beatam satis esse virtutem.
For by itself it is gathered that the only good is what is honorable, and by itself again, that virtue is sufficient for a happy life.
Si unum bonum est, quod honestum, omnes concedunt ad beate vivendum sufficere virtutem; e contrario non remittetur, si beatum sola virtus facit, unum bonum esse, quod honestum est.
If the only good is what is honorable, all concede that virtue suffices for living happily; conversely, it will not be denied, if virtue alone makes one happy, that the only good is what is honorable.
§85.18Xenocrates et Speusippus putant beatum vel sola virtute fieri posse, non tamen unum bonum esse, quod honestum est.
Xenocrates and Speusippus think that one can become happy even by virtue alone, yet not that the only good is what is honorable.
Epicurus quoque iudicat eum qui virtutem habeat, beatum esse, sed ipsam virtutem non satis esse ad beatam vitam, quia beatum efficiat voluptas, quae ex virtute est, non ipsa virtus.
Epicurus also judges that he who has virtue is happy, but that virtue itself is not sufficient for a happy life, because pleasure, which is from virtue, makes one happy, not virtue itself.
Inepta distinctio.
An absurd distinction.
Idem enim negat umquam virtutem esse sine voluptate; ita si ei iuncta semper est atque inseparabilis, et sola satis est.
For the same man denies that virtue is ever without pleasure; so if it is always joined to it and inseparable, even alone it is sufficient.
Habet enim secum voluptatem, sine qua non est, etiam cum sola est.
For it has with itself pleasure, without which it is not, even when it is alone.