§58.11Etiamnunc est aliquid superius quam corpus.
Even now, there is something higher than body.
Dicimus enim quaedam corporalia esse, quaedam incorporalia.
For we say that some things are corporeal, and some are incorporeal.
Quid ergo erit, ex quo haec deducantur? Illud, cui nomen modo parum proprium inposuimus," quod est. "Sic enim in species secabitur, ut dicamus: "quod est" aut corporale est aut incorporale.
What then will it be, from which these are derived? That to which we just now applied a not very proper name, 'that which is.' For it will be divided into species in such a way that we say: 'that which is' is either corporeal or incorporeal.
§58.12Hoc ergo est genus primum et antiquissimum et, ut ita dicam, generale.
This therefore is the first and oldest and, so to speak, most general genus.
Cetera genera quidem sunt, sed specialia.
Other things are indeed genera, but special ones.
Tamquam homo genus est.
Just as 'man' is a genus.
Habet enim in se nationum species: Graecos, Romanos, Parthos.
For it contains within itself the species of nations: Greeks, Romans, Parthians.
Colorum: albos, nigros, flavos.
Of colors: white, black, yellow.
Habet singulos: Catonem, Ciceronem, Lucretium.
It contains individuals: Cato, Cicero, Lucretius.
Ita qua multa continet, in genus cadit; qua sub alio est, in speciem.
Thus, in so far as (qua) it contains many things, it falls under genus; in so far as it is under another, under species.
Illud genus "quod est "generale, supra se nihil habet; initium rerum est; omnia sub illo sunt.
That most general genus, 'that which is,' has nothing above itself; it is the beginning of things; all things are under it.
§58.13Stoici volunt superponere huic etiamnunc aliud genus magis principale; de quo statim dicam, si prius illud genus, de quo locutus sum, merito primum poni docuero, cum sit rerum omnium capax.
The Stoics want to place still another, more primary genus above this; of which I shall speak immediately, if I first show that that genus of which I have spoken is deservedly placed first, since it is capable of containing all things.
" §58.14Quod est" in has species divido, ut sint corporalia aut incorporalia.
I divide 'that which is' into these species, so that they are either corporeal or incorporeal.
Nihil tertium est.
There is no third.
Corpus quomodo divido? Ut dicam: aut animantia sunt aut inanima.
How do I divide 'body'? So as to say: they are either animate or inanimate.
Rursus animantia quemadmodum divido? Ut dicam: quaedam animum habent, quaedam tantum animam.
Again, how do I divide animate things? So as to say: some have a mind, some only a soul/life.
Aut sic: quaedam inpetum habent, incedunt, transeunt, quaedam solo adfixa radicibus aluntur, crescunt.
Or thus: some have impulse, they walk, they move about; some, fixed to the ground by roots, are nourished and grow.
Rursus animalia in quas species seco? Aut mortalia sunt aut inmortalia.
Again, into what species do I cut 'animals'? They are either mortal or immortal.
§58.15Primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur "quid. "Quare videatur, subiciam: "In rerum," inquiunt, "natura quaedam sunt, quaedam non sunt.
The first genus seems to certain Stoics to be 'something.' I will subjoin why it so seems: 'In the nature of things,' they say, 'some things exist, some do not exist.
Et haec autem, quae non sunt, rerum natura conplectitur, quae animo succurrunt, tamquam Centauri, Gigantes et quicquid aliud falsa cogitatione formatum habere aliquam imaginem coepit, quamvis non habeat substantiam. " §58.16Nunc ad id, quod tibi promisi, revertor, quomodo quaecumque sunt, in sex modos Plato partiatur.
And yet nature comprises even these which do not exist, which occur to the mind, such as Centaurs, Giants, and whatever else, formed by false thought, has begun to have some image, although it has no substance.' Now I return to what I promised you, how Plato partitions whatever exists into six modes.
Primum illud "quod est" nec visu nec tactu nec ullo sensu conprenditur; cogitabile est.
First, that 'that which is' is comprehended neither by sight, nor by touch, nor by any sense; it is object of thought.
Quod generaliter est, tamquam homo generalis, sub oculos non venit; sed specialis venit, ut Cicero et Cato.
What exists generally, such as a general 'man', does not come before the eyes; but a special one does, such as Cicero and Cato.
Animal non videtur; cogitatur.
'Animal' is not seen; it is thought of.
Videtur autem species eius, equus et canis.
But its species, 'horse' and 'dog', are seen.
§58.17Secundum ex his, quae sunt, ponit Plato quod eminet et exsuperat omnia.
The second of these which exist, Plato places that which stands out and surpasses all things.
Hoc ait per excellentiam esse.
He says that this exists by way of excellence.
Poeta communiter dicitur, omnibus enim versus facientibus hoc nomen est, sed iam apud Graecos in unius notam cessit; Homerum intellegas, cum audieris poetam.
'Poet' is commonly said, for all who make verses have this name, but already among the Greeks it has passed into the designation of one person; you understand Homer when you hear 'the poet'.
Quid ergo hoc est? Deus scilicet, maior ac potentior cunctis.
What then is this? God, of course, greater and more powerful than all.
§58.18Tertium genus est eorum, quae proprie sunt; innumerabilia haec sunt, sed extra nostrum posita conspectum.
The third genus is of those things which properly exist; these are innumerable, but placed outside of our sight.
Quae sint, interrogas.
What are they, you ask?
Propria Platonis supellex est; ideas vocat, ex quibus omnia, quaecumque videmus, fiunt et ad quas cuncta formantur.
They are Plato's own equipment; he calls them 'ideas', from which all things, whatever we see, are made, and according to which all things are formed.
§58.19Hae inmortales, inmutabiles, inviolabiles sunt.
These are immortal, immutable, inviolable.
Quid sit idea, id est, quid Platoni esse videatur, audi: "Idea est eorum, quae natura fiunt, exemplar aeternum. "Adiciam definitioni interpretationem, quo tibi res apertior fiat: volo imaginem tuam facere.
Hear what an 'idea' is, that is, what it seems to Plato to be: 'An idea is the eternal exemplar of those things which are made by nature.' I will add an interpretation to the definition, so that the matter may become clearer to you: I want to make your portrait.
Exemplar picturae te habeo, ex quo capit aliquem habitum mens nostra, quem operi suo inponat.
I have you as the exemplar of the painting, from which our mind takes some form, which it may impose on its work.
Ita illa, quae me docet et instruit facies, a qua petitur imitatio, idea est.
Thus, that face which teaches and instructs me, from which the imitation is sought, is the 'idea'.
Talia ergo exemplaria infinita habet rerum natura, hominum, piscium, arborum, ad quae quodcumque fieri ab illa debet, exprimitur.
Therefore, the nature of things has infinite such exemplars, of men, of fish, of trees, according to which whatever must be made by it is expressed.