§106.1Tardius rescribo ad epistulas tuas, non quia districtus occupationibus sum.
I am writing back to your letters rather late, not because I have been distracted by occupations.
Hanc excusationem cave audias; vaco et omnes vacant, qui volunt.
Mind that you do not listen to this excuse; I am at leisure, and all are at leisure who wish to be.
Neminem res secuntur.
Business does not pursue anyone.
Ipsi illas amplexantur et argumentum esse felicitatis occupationem putant.
They themselves embrace those things and think that being occupied is a proof of happiness.
Quid ergo fuit, quare non protinus rescriberem? Id, de quo quaerebas, veniebat in contextum operis mei.
What was it, then, why I did not write back immediately? That which you were asking about was coming into the context of my work.
§106.2Scis enim me moralem philosophiam velle conplecti et omnes ad eam pertinentis quaestiones explicare.
For you know that I want to embrace moral philosophy and to explain all the questions pertaining to it.
Itaque dubitavi utrum differrem te, donec suus isti rei veniret locus, an ius tibi extra ordinem dicerem; humanius visum est tam longe venientem non detinere.
And so I hesitated whether I should put you off until its proper place came for that matter, or whether I should give judgment for you out of order; it seemed more humane not to detain one coming from so far.
§106.3Itaque et hoc ex illa serie rerum cohaerentium excerpam et, si qua erunt eiusmodi, non quaerenti tibi ultro mittam.
Therefore, I shall extract this also from that series of coherent matters and, if there are any of this kind, I shall send them to you voluntarily even though you do not ask.
Quae sint haec interrogas? Quae scire magis iuvat quam prodest, sicut hoc, de quo quaeris: bonum an corpus sit?
What are these things, you ask? Things which it is more pleasing to know than useful, just like this which you ask about: whether the good is a body?
§106.4Bonum facit: prodest enim.
The good acts, for it benefits.
Quod facit, corpus est.
That which acts is a body.
Bonum agitat animum et quodammodo format et continet, quae propria sunt corporis.
The good agitates the soul and in a way shapes and contains it, which things are proper to a body.
Quae corporis bona sunt, corpora sunt; ergo et quae animi sunt.
What are the goods of the body are bodies; therefore also those which are of the soul.
§106.5Nam et hoc corpus est.
For this also is a body.
Bonum hominis necesse est corpus sit, cum ipse sit corporalis.
The good of man must of necessity be a body, since he himself is corporeal.
Mentior, nisi et quae aiunt illum et quae valitudinem eius vel custodiunt vel restituunt, corpora sunt; ergo et bonum eius corpus est.
I lie, unless both those things which nourish him and those which either preserve or restore his health are bodies; therefore his good also is a body.
Non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint—ut aliud quoque, de quo non quaeris, infulciam—tamquam ira, amor, tristitia,nisi dubitas, an vultum nobis mutent, an frontem adstringant, an faciem diffundant, an ruborem evocent, an fugent sanguinem.
I do not think you will doubt whether emotions are bodies—so that I may stuff in something else also, about which you do not ask—such as anger, love, sadness, unless you doubt whether they change our countenance, contract our brow, smooth our face, summon a blush, or put blood to flight.
Quid ergo? Tam manifestas notas corporis credis inprimi nisi a corpore?
What then? Do you believe that such manifest marks of the body are imprinted except by a body?
§106.6Si adfectus corpora sunt, et morbi animorum, ut avaritia, crudelitas, indurata vitia et in statum inemendabilem adducta; ergo et malitia et species eius omnes, malignitas, invidia, superbia; ergo et bona, primum quia contraria istis sunt, deinde quia eadem tibi indicia praestabunt.
If emotions are bodies, so are the diseases of minds, such as avarice, cruelty, hardened vices brought into an irremediable state; therefore also malice and all its forms, malignity, envy, pride; therefore also goods, first because they are contrary to those, and secondly because they will present the same proofs to you.
§106.7An non vides, quantum oculis det vigorem fortitudo? Quantam intentionem prudentia? Quantam modestiam et quietem reverentia? Quantam serenitatem laetitia? Quantum rigorem severitas? Quantam remissionem lenitas? Corpora ergo sunt, quae colorem habitumque corporum mutant, quae in illis regnum suum exercent.
Or do you not see how much vigor courage gives to the eyes? How much attention prudence? How much modesty and peace reverence? How much serenity joy? How much stiffness severity? How much relaxation mildness? They are bodies, therefore, which change the color and posture of bodies, and which exercise their reign over them.
Omnes autem, quas rettuli, virtutes bona sunt, et quicquid ex illis est.
But all the virtues which I have mentioned are goods, and whatever comes from them.
Numquid est dubium, an id, quo quid tangi potest, corpus sit?
Is there any doubt whether that by which something can be touched is a body?
§106.8"
Tangere enim et tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res,
"
ut ait Lucretius.
"For nothing can touch or be touched except a body," as Lucretius says.
Omnia autem ista, quae dixi, non mutarent corpus, nisi tangerent; ergo corpora sunt.
But all those things which I have said would not change the body unless they touched it; therefore they are bodies.
§106.9Etiam nunc cui tanta vis est, ut inpellat et cogat et retineat et inhibeat, corpus est.
Even now, that which has so much force that it impels, compels, retains, and inhibits is a body.
Quid ergo? Non timor retinet? Non audacia inpellit? Non fortitudo inmittit et impetum dat? Non moderatio refrenat ac revocat? Non gaudium extollit? Non tristitia adducit?
What then? Does not fear retain? Does not boldness impel? Does not courage send forth and give momentum? Does not moderation restrain and recall? Does not joy elate? Does not sadness contract?
§106.10Denique quidquid facimus, aut, malitiae aut virtutis gerimus imperio.
Finally, whatever we do, we perform under the command of either malice or virtue.
Quod imperat corpori, corpus est, quod vim corpori adfert, corpus.
That which commands the body is a body; that which brings force to the body is a body.
Bonum corporis corporalest, bonum hominis et corporis bonum est; itaque corporale est.
The good of the body is corporeal; the good of man is also the good of the body; therefore it is corporeal.
§106.11Quoniam, ut voluisti, morem gessi tibi, nunc ipse dicam mihi, quod dicturum esse te video: latrunculis ludimus.
Since, as you wished, I have humored you, now I myself shall say to myself what I see you are about to say: we are playing at draughts.
In supervacuis subtilitas teritur; non faciunt bonos ista, sed doctos.
Subtlety is worn away on superfluous things; those things do not make men good, but learned.
Apertior res est sapere, immo simpliciter satius est ad mentem bonam uti litteris, sed nos ut cetera in supervacuum diffundimus, ita philosophiam ipsam.
To be wise is a more open matter; indeed, it is simply better to use letters for a good mind, but just as we diffuse other things into what is superfluous, so we do the same with philosophy itself.
§106.12Quemadmodum omnium rerum, sic litterarum quoque intemperantia laboramus; non vitae sed scholae discimus.
Just as in all things, so we suffer from an intemperance of letters also; we learn not for life but for school.
VALE.
FAREWELL.