§3.102.1καθʼ ὃν δὴ καιρὸν Μάρκος συνθεωρήσας τὸ πολὺ μέρος τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἐπὶ τὰς προειρημένας χρείας κατὰ τῆς χώρας σκεδαννύμενον, λαβὼν τὸν ἀκμαιότατον καιρὸν τῆς ἡμέρας ἐξῆγε τὴν δύναμιν §3.102.2καὶ συνεγγίσας τῇ παρεμβολῇ τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὰ μὲν βαρέα τῶν ὅπλων ἐξέταξε, τοὺς δʼ ἱππεῖς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους κατὰ μέρη διελὼν ἐπαφῆκε τοῖς προνομεύουσι, παραγγείλας μηδένα ζωγρεῖν. §3.102.3Ἀννίβας δὲ τούτου συμβάντος εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐνεπεπτώκει μεγάλην· οὔτε γὰρ ἀντεξάγειν τοῖς παρατεταγμένοις ἀξιόχρεως ἦν οὔτε παραβοηθεῖν τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας διεσπαρμένοις. §3.102.4τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς προνομεύοντας ἐξαποσταλέντες πολλοὺς τῶν ἐσκεδασμένων ἀπέκτειναν· οἱ δὲ παρατεταγμένοι τέλος εἰς τοῦτʼ ἦλθον καταφρονήσεως ὥστε καὶ διασπᾶν τὸν χάρακα καὶ μόνον οὐ πολιορκεῖν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. §3.102.5ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας ἦν μὲν ἐν κακοῖς, ὅμως δὲ χειμαζόμενος ἔμενε, τοὺς πελάζοντας ἀποτριβόμενος καὶ μόλις διαφυλάττων τὴν παρεμβολήν, §3.102.6ἕως Ἀσδρούβας ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας συμπεφευγότας εἰς τὸν χάρακα τὸν περὶ τὸ Γερούνιον, ὄντας εἰς τετρακισχιλίους, ἧκε παραβοηθῶν. §3.102.7τότε δὲ μικρὸν ἀναθαρρήσας ἐπεξῆλθε καὶ βραχὺ πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας παρεμβαλὼν μόλις ἀπεστρέψατο τὸν ἐνεστῶτα κίνδυνον. §3.102.8Μάρκος δὲ πολλοὺς μὲν ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸν χάρακα συμπλοκῇ τῶν πολεμίων ἀποκτείνας, ἔτι δὲ πλείους ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας διεφθαρκώς, τότε μὲν ἐπανῆλθεν, μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἔχων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος. §3.102.9τῇ δʼ ἐπαύριον ἐκλιπόντων τὸν χάρακα τῶν Καρχηδονίων, ἐπέβη καὶ κατελάβετο τὴν ἐκείνων παρεμβολήν. §3.102.10ὁ γὰρ Ἀννίβας διαγωνιάσας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους μὴ καταλαβόμενοι νυκτὸς ἔρημον ὄντα τὸν ἐπὶ τῷ Γερουνίῳ χάρακα κύριοι γένωνται τῆς ἀποσκευῆς καὶ τῶν παραθέσεων, ἔκρινεν αὐτὸς ἀναχωρεῖν καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν στρατοπεδείαν. §3.102.11ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν οἱ μὲν Καρχηδόνιοι ταῖς προνομαῖς εὐλαβέστερον ἐχρῶντο καὶ φυλακτικώτερον, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τἀναντία θαρραλεώτερον καὶ προπετέστερον.
Exactly at this time, Marcus, having observed that the greater part of the enemy was scattered over the countryside for the aforementioned duties, having seized the most opportune moment of the day, led out his force. And having approached close to the camp of the Carthaginians, he drew up the heavy infantry, and dividing the cavalry and the light-armed troops into detachments, he sent them against those who were foraging, ordering them to take no one alive. When this happened, Hannibal fell into great difficulty; for he was neither strong enough to lead out his forces against those drawn up in battle array, nor to go to the aid of those scattered over the countryside. Of the Romans, those sent out against the foragers killed many of the scattered enemy; while those drawn up in battle array finally arrived at such a pitch of confidence that they even began to tear down the palisade and all but besieged the Carthaginians. Hannibal was indeed in sore straits, but nevertheless held his ground though hard pressed, warding off those who approached and with difficulty defending his camp, until Hasdrubal, having rallied those who had fled from the countryside to the palisade around Gerunium, being about four thousand in number, arrived to bring help. Then, recovering his courage a little, Hannibal sallied out and, drawing up his forces a short distance in front of his camp, with difficulty averted the threatening danger. Marcus, having killed many of the enemy in the clash around the palisade and having destroyed still more in the countryside, returned for the time being, having great hopes for the future. On the following day, as the Carthaginians had abandoned their palisade, he advanced and occupied their encampment. For Hannibal, fearing lest the Romans, occupying by night the deserted palisade at Gerunium, should become masters of the baggage and the provisions, decided to retreat himself and make his camp there again. From this time on, the Carthaginians conducted their foraging more cautiously and guardedly, while the Romans on the contrary did so more boldly and rashly.