§1.7.29καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν οὗ πάντες μετέχουσι μεῖζον· ἀτιμία γὰρ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν· ὁτὲ δὲ οὗ μηδεὶς ἢ οὗ ὀλίγοι· σπανιώτερον γάρ.
And sometimes what all participate in is greater, for it is a disgrace not to participate; and sometimes what no one or few participate in, for it is scarcer.
§1.7.30καὶ τὰ ἐπαινετώτερα· καλλίω γάρ. καὶ ὧν αἱ τιμαὶ μείζους, ὡσαύτως· ἡ γὰρ τιμὴ ὥσπερ ἀξία τίς ἐστιν. καὶ ὧν αἱ ζημίαι μείζους.
And things that are more praiseworthy, for they are more honorable; and similarly, those of which the honors are greater, for honor is a kind of worth; and those of which the penalties are greater.
§1.7.31καὶ τὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων ἢ φαινομένων μεγάλων μείζω.
And things that are greater than what are agreed or appear to be great.
καὶ διαιρούμενα δὲ εἰς τὰ μέρη τὰ αὐτὰ μείζω φαίνεται. πλεῖον γὰρ ὑπερέχειν φαίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησι πεῖσαι τὸν Μελέαγρον ἀναστῆναι
"
ὅσσα κάκʼ ἀνθρώποισι πέλει τῶν ἄστυ ἁλώῃ· λαοὶ μὲν φθινύθουσι, πόλιν δέ τε πῦρ ἀμαθύνει,
τέκνα δέ τʼ ἄλλοι ἄγουσιν.
And the same things, when divided into their parts, appear greater; for they appear to excel in more points; whence the poet says that [his wife] persuaded Meleager to rise up [by enumerating]: "All the evils that befall men whose city is taken: the people perish, and fire turns the city to ashes, and others carry off the children.
"
καὶ τὸ συντιθέναι δὲ καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν, ὥσπερ Ἐπίχαρμος, διά τε τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ διαιρέσει (ἡ γὰρ σύνθεσις ὑπεροχὴν δείκνυσι πολλήν) καὶ ὅτι ἀρχὴ φαίνεται μεγάλων καὶ αἴτιον.
"And also compounding and accumulating, as Epicharmus does, is greater, both for the same reason as division (for compounding shows a great superiority) and because it appears to be the starting point and cause of great things.
§1.7.32ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ σπανιώτερον μεῖζον, καὶ οἱ καιροὶ καὶ αἱ ἡλικίαι καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ποιοῦσι μεγάλα· εἰ γὰρ παρὰ δύναμιν καὶ παρὰ ἡλικίαν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ὁμοίους, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἢ τότε, ἕξει μέγεθος καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ Ὀλυμπιονίκῃ· "
πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφʼ ὤμοισιν ἔχων τραχεῖαν ἄσιλλαν
ἰχθῦς ἐξ Ἄργους εἰς Τεγέαν ἔφερον,
"
καὶ ὁ Ἰφικράτης αὑτὸν ἐνεκωμίαζε λέγων ἐξ ὧν ὑπῆρξεν ταῦτα.
And since what is harder and scarcer is greater, occasions, ages, places, times, and capacities also make things great; for if a deed is beyond one's capacity, or beyond one's age, or beyond one's peers, and if it is done in this way, or here, or then, it will possess greatness, whether of beautiful, good, and just things, or of their opposites; whence also the epigraph for the Olympic victor: "Formerly, bearing a rough yoke on my shoulders, I used to carry fish from Argos to Tegea, "and Iphicrates used to praise himself by saying from what starting point these things belonged to him.
§1.7.33καὶ τὸ αὐτοφυὲς τοῦ ἐπικτήτου· χαλεπώτερον γάρ. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησιν
"
αὐτοδίδακτος δʼ εἰμί. "
And what is natural rather than what is acquired; for it is harder; whence the poet also says: "Self-taught am I.
§1.7.34καὶ τὸ μεγάλου μέγιστον μέρος, οἷον Περικλῆς τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λέγων, τὴν νεότητα ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀνῃρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰ ἐξαιρεθείη.
"And the greatest part of a great thing; as Pericles said in his funeral oration, that the youth had been taken away from the city as if the spring were taken out of the year.
§1.7.35καὶ τὰ ἐν χρείᾳ μείζονι χρήσιμα, οἷον τὰ ἐν γήρᾳ καὶ νόσοις.
And what is useful in greater need, for example in old age and illnesses.
καὶ δυοῖν τὸ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ τέλους.
And of two things, that which is nearer to the end.
καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ τοῦ ἁπλῶς.
And what is useful to oneself rather than what is useful absolutely.
καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ ἀδυνάτου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, τὸ δʼ οὔ.
And the possible rather than the impossible; for the former is possible for oneself, but the latter is not.
καὶ τὰ ἐν τέλει τοῦ βίου· τέλη γὰρ μᾶλλον τὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει.
And things at the end of life; for things near the end are more of the nature of ends.
§1.7.36καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν· ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν, ὃ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἕλοιτο·
And things that tend toward truth rather than toward opinion; and the definition of what is for opinion is that which, if one were going to be unnoticed, one would not choose.
διὸ καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν τοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν δόξειεν ἂν αἱρετώτερον εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κἂν λανθάνῃ αἱρήσεται, ποιεῖν δʼ εὖ λανθάνων οὐ δοκεῖ ἂν ἑλέσθαι.
Hence also receiving benefits would seem to be more desirable than conferring them; for one would choose the former even if it went unnoticed, but to confer benefits while remaining unnoticed is not something one would seem to choose.
§1.7.37καὶ ὅσα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν βούλονται· πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γὰρ μᾶλλον· διὸ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φασὶ μικρὸν εἶναι, ὅτι δοκεῖν ἢ εἶναι αἱρετώτερον· τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν οὔ.
And all things that people wish to be rather than to seem; for they tend more toward truth; wherefore also they say that justice is a small thing, because to seem is more desirable than to be; but of health this is not so.
§1.7.38καὶ τὸ πρὸς πολλὰ χρησιμώτερον, οἷον τὸ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ καλά· διὸ ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια μέγιστα δοκεῖ εἶναι· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἔχει ταῦτα.
And what is more useful for many things, for example for living and living well and pleasure and doing honorable deeds; hence wealth and health seem to be the greatest things; for they possess all these.
§1.7.39καὶ τὸ ἀλυπότερον καὶ μεθʼ ἡδονῆς· πλείω γὰρ ἑνός, ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ καὶ ἡ ἀλυπία.
And what is freer from pain and accompanied by pleasure; for they are more than one, because both pleasure and freedom from pain are present.
καὶ δυοῖν ὃ τῷ αὐτῷ προστιθέμενον μεῖζον τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ.
And of two things, that which, when added to the same thing, makes the whole greater.
§1.7.40καὶ ἃ μὴ λανθάνει παρόντα ἢ ἃ λανθάνει· πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γὰρ τείνει ταῦτα· διὸ τὸ πλουτεῖν φανείη ἂν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ δοκεῖν.
And things that are not unnoticed when present, rather than those that are unnoticed; for these tend toward truth; hence to be rich would appear to be a greater good than to seem so.
§1.7.41καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μόνον ὂν τοῖς δὲ μετʼ ἄλλων· διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἴση ζημία, ἄν τις τὸν ἑτερόφθαλμον τυφλώσῃ καὶ τὸν δύʼ ἔχοντα· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἀφῄρηται.
And what is dear, and for some being the only thing, for others being among other things; hence it is not an equal loss if one blinds a one-eyed person and someone having two eyes; for a unique thing has been taken away.
ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰς πίστεις φέρειν ἐν τῷ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, σχεδὸν εἴρηται.
From what sources, then, one must bring proofs in exhorting and dissuading has been nearly stated.