§7.1334bἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γίνεσθαι ταῦτα μᾶλλον διὰ τινὸς ἀρετῆς·
For they do not differ from others in this, namely in not regarding the same things as the greatest of goods as others do, but in regarding these as arising rather through some virtue.
ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν. καὶ ὅτι διʼ αὑτήν, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων· πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον.
But since these are greater goods and the enjoyment of them is (regarded by them as greater) than that of the virtues, and that (virtue) is for its own sake, is manifest from these things; but how and through what means this will be, this indeed must be considered.
τυγχάνομεν δὴ διῃρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους καὶ λόγου δεῖ.
Now we happen to have distinguished before that there is need of nature, habit, and reason.
τούτων δὲ ποίους μέν τινας εἶναι χρὴ τὴν φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν.
And of these, what sort of people they should be in their nature has been defined before; but it remains to consider whether they should be educated by reason first or by habits.
ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑποθέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίως ἦχθαι.
For these must harmonize with each other in the best harmony; for it is possible for reason to have missed the best hypothesis, and to have been led similarly through habits.
φανερὸν δὴ τοῦτό γε πρῶτον μέν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς ἐστι καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τέλους, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὥστε πρὸς τούτους τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐθῶν δεῖ παρασκευάζειν μελέτην·
This at least is manifest first, just as in other things, that generation is from a beginning, and the end from some beginning is of another end; and reason and intellect are for us the end of nature, so that with a view to these we must prepare generation and the practice of habits.
ἔπειτα ὥσπερ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα δύʼ ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρῶμεν δύο μέρη, τό τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, καὶ τὰς ἕξεις τὰς τούτων δύο τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστιν ὄρεξις τὸ δὲ νοῦς, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.
Next, just as soul and body are two, so also we see two parts of the soul, the irrational and the one having reason, and their habits are two in number, of which one is desire and the other is intellect. And just as the body is prior in generation to the soul, so also is the irrational part to the one having reason.
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούλησις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς παιδίοις, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προϊοῦσιν ἐγγίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν.
And this is also manifest; for spiritedness, wish, and further, appetite are present in children immediately upon birth, but reasoning and intellect naturally arise as they advance.
διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέραν ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔπειτα τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, ἕνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.
Therefore, first indeed, the care of the body must be prior to that of the soul, and second, that of desire; however, the care of desire must be for the sake of the intellect, and that of the body for the sake of the soul.
εἴπερ οὖν ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅπως βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα γένηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὄντας χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν.
If, therefore, the legislator must see from the beginning how the bodies of those who are reared may become the best, first indeed he must care about the union, when and in what condition people should make the marriage intercourse with one another.
δεῖ δʼ ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον, ἵνα συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ μὴ διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυνάμεις τοῦ μὲν ἔτι δυναμένου γεννᾶν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης, ἢ ταύτης μὲν τοῦ δʼ ἀνδρὸς μή (ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ διαφοράς)· ἔπειτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν τέκνων διαδοχήν, δεῖ γὰρ οὔτε λίαν ὑπολείπεσθαι ταῖς ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἡ δὲ παρὰ τῶν πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις),
And he must legislate this association looking both to themselves and to their span of life, so that they may decline in their ages together at the same time, and their powers may not be discordant—the one still being able to generate while the other is not, or the latter being able while the husband is not (for these things produce both factions and differences with one another); and next also with a view to the succession of the children, for the children must not be left too far behind the fathers in their ages (for to the older ones the gratitude from children is useless, and the help from fathers is useless to the children),