§2.1261bἅμα δὲ καὶ δίκαιον, εἴτʼ ἀγαθὸν εἴτε φαῦλον τὸ ἄρχειν.
And at the same time it is also just, whether ruling is something good or something bad, for all to share in it.
πάντας αὐτοῦ μετέχειν, τοῦτό γε μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἴκειν τό ἀνομοίους εἶναι ἔξω ἀρχῆς·
This at least imitates the equal yielding in turn, namely, their being unlike when they are outside of office.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχουσιν οἱ δʼ ἄρχονται κατὰ μέρος ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι.
For some rule and others are ruled in turn, just as if they had become other persons.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἀρχόντων ἕτεροι ἑτέρας ἄρχουσιν ἀρχάς.
Indeed, in the very same manner, among those who rule, different individuals rule in different offices.
φανερὸν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὡς οὔτε πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ λέγουσί τινες, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν ὡς μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅτι τὰς πόλεις ἀναιρεῖ· καίτοι τό γε ἑκάστου ἀγαθὸν σῴζει ἕκαστον.
It is clear, then, from these things that the city is not by nature one in the way that some people say, and that what is said to be the greatest good in cities—namely, this [extreme unity]—destroys cities; and yet the good of each thing preserves each thing.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατʼ ἄλλον τρόπον φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ λίαν ἑνοῦν ζητεῖν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄμεινον.
And it is also clear in another way that to seek to unify the city excessively is not better.
οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκέστερον ἑνός, πόλις δʼ οἰκίας, καὶ βούλεταί γʼ ἤδη τότε εἶναι πόλις ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίνῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλήθους·
For a household is more self-sufficient than an individual, and a city than a household, and a city wishes to be such precisely at that moment when the association of the multitude happens to be self-sufficient.
εἴπερ οὖν αἱρετώτερον τὸ αὐταρκέστερον, καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἓν τοῦ μᾶλλον αἱρετώτερον.
If, therefore, the more self-sufficient is more desirable, then what is less one is also more desirable than what is more so.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ εἰ τοῦτο ἄριστόν ἐστι, τὸ μίαν ὅτι μάλιστʼ εἶναι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσθαι φαίνεται κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πάντες ἅμα λέγωσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐμόν· τοῦτο γὰρ οἴεται ὁ Σωκράτης σημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ τὴν πόλιν τελέως εἶναι μίαν.
But indeed, even if this were best, namely that the association be as much as possible one, not even this appears to be demonstrated by his argument, if "all say 'mine' and 'not mine' at the same time"; for Socrates thinks this is the sign of the city being perfectly one.
τὸ γὰρ πάντες διττόν.
For "all" is double.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς ἕκαστος, τάχʼ ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ὃ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὁ Σωκράτης (ἕκαστος γὰρ υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ φήσει τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ γυναῖκα δὴ τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου δὴ τῶν συμβαινόντων ὡσαύτως)·
If, on the one hand, it means "each individually," perhaps what Socrates wishes to achieve would more likely come to pass (for each will call the same person his own son and the same woman his own wife, and similarly concerning property and each of the things that happen).
νῦν δʼ οὐχ οὕτως φήσουσιν οἱ κοιναῖς χρώμενοι ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, ἀλλὰ πάντες μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δʼ αὐτῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν πάντες μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δʼ αὐτῶν.
But on the other hand, now those who have women and children in common will not speak in this way, but all indeed, yet not as each of them individually, and similarly as to property, all indeed, but not as each of them individually.
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν παραλογισμός τίς ἐστι τὸ λέγειν πάντας, φανερόν (τὸ γὰρ πάντες καὶ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια, διὰ τὸ διττὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικοὺς ποιεῖ συλλογισμούς· διό ἐστι τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὡδὶ μὲν καλὸν ἀλλʼ οὐ δυνατόν, ὡδὶ δʼ οὐδὲν ὁμονοητικόν)·
It is clear, then, that saying "all" is a certain fallacy (for "all" and "both," and "odd and even," because of their double meaning, produce contentious syllogisms even in arguments; therefore, for all to say the same thing is in one way beautiful but impossible, and in another way not at all productive of harmony).
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἑτέραν ἔχει βλάβην τὸ λεγόμενον.
In addition to these things, what is said has another harm.
ἥκιστα γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει τὸ πλείστων κοινόν·
For what is common to the greatest number of people receives the least care.
τῶν γὰρ ἰδίων μάλιστα φροντίζουσιν, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν ἧττον, ἢ ὅσον ἑκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει·
For people care most for their own private things, and less for common things, or only so much as falls to each individually.
πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς ἑτέρου φροντίζοντος ὀλιγωροῦσι μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς οἰκετικαῖς διακονίαις οἱ πολλοὶ θεράποντες ἐνίοτε χεῖρον ὑπηρετοῦσι τῶν ἐλαττόνων.
For in addition to other things, they neglect them more on the assumption that someone else is caring for them, just as in household service, a large number of attendants sometimes serve worse than fewer.
γίνονται δʼ ἑκάστῳ χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν υἱοί, καὶ οὗτοι οὐχ ὡς ἑκάστου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυχόντος ὁ τυχὼν ὁμοίως ἐστὶν υἱός·
And each citizen gets a thousand sons, and these are not as the sons of each individually, but any chance person is equally the son of any chance person.