§1.1259bἀλλὰ γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς· τό τε γὰρ ἄρρεν φύσει τοῦ θήλεος ἡγεμονικώτερον, εἰ μή που συνέστηκε παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ νεωτέρου καὶ ἀτελοῦς)—ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον (ἐξ ἴσου γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηδέν), ὅμως δέ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄρχῃ τὸ δʼ ἄρχηται, ζητεῖ διαφορὰν εἶναι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἄμασις εἶπε τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδανιπτῆρος λόγον· τὸ δʼ ἄρρεν ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.
But over the wife it is political rule, and over the children it is royal rule; for the male is by nature more qualified to lead than the female, unless perhaps constituted contrary to nature, and the older and complete is more so than the younger and incomplete. Now, in most political rules, the ruler and the ruled change places (for they wish to be equal in nature and to differ in nothing), but nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled, they seek to have a difference in outward forms, speeches, and honors, just as Amasis also spoke in his story about the foot-bath; but the male always stands in this relation to the female.
ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλική· τὸ γὰρ γεννῆσαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἄρχον καὶ κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἶδος ἀρχῆς.
On the other hand, the rule over children is royal; for the parent is ruler by virtue of affection and age, which is indeed a species of royal rule.
διὸ καλῶς Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπὼν
"
πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε
"
τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἁπάντων.
Therefore Homer rightly addressed Zeus when he said, 'Father of men and of gods,' calling him the king of all of them.
φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δʼ εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον.
For by nature the king ought to differ, but be of the same stock; and this is the relation of the elder to the younger, and of the parent to the child.
φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείων ἡ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀψύχων κτῆσιν, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τούτων ἢ περὶ τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, ὃν καλοῦμεν πλοῦτον, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἢ δούλων.
It is clear, then, that the concern of household management is more about human beings than about the acquisition of inanimate things, and more about the virtue of these than about that of the acquisition, which we call wealth, and more about free men than about slaves.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερον ἔστιν ἀρετή τις δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμιωτέρα τούτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕξεων, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας (ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφοτέρως·
First, then, concerning slaves, one might raise the question of whether there is any virtue in a slave beyond his instrumental and ministerial duties, some other more honorable virtue than these, such as temperance, courage, justice, and other such habits, or whether there is none besides his bodily services.
εἴτε γὰρ ἔστιν, τί διοίσουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων;
For there is a difficulty either way; for if there is, in what will they differ from free men?
εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, ὄντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων ἄτοπον).
And if there is not, since they are human beings and share in reason, it is absurd.
σχεδὸν δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός, πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, καὶ δεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἔστι καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὔ;
And almost the same question is sought concerning both wife and child: whether there are virtues of these also, and whether the wife ought to be temperate, brave, and just, and whether a child can be both licentious and temperate, or not?
καθόλου δὴ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἄρχοντος, πότερον ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἑτέρα.
Indeed, this must be examined generally concerning the ruled by nature and the ruler, whether their virtue is the same or different.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλοκαγαθίας, διὰ τί τὸν μὲν ἄρχειν δέοι ἂν τὸν δὲ ἄρχεσθαι καθάπαξ;
For if both must share in nobility and goodness, why should the one rule and the other be ruled once and for all?
οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οἷόν τε διαφέρειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν εἴδει διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οὐδέν.
For it is not possible for them to differ in degree (the more and the less); for being ruled and ruling differ in kind, but the more and the less differ not at all.
εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν δεῖ τὸν δὲ μή, θαυμαστόν.
But if the one must have it and the other not, it is wonderful.
εἴτε γὰρ ὁ ἄρχων μὴ ἔσται σώφρων καὶ δίκαιος, πῶς ἄρξει καλῶς;
For if the ruler is not temperate and just, how will he rule well?
εἴθʼ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, πῶς ἀρχθήσεται καλῶς;
Or if the ruled is not, how will he be ruled well?