Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Politics §1.1253a

Human as a Political Animal and the Priority of the Polis

Passage 2 of 155 · Greek

Summary

Aristotle argues that human is by nature a "political animal" due to the unique possession of speech (logos) and moral perception. He asserts that the city-state is naturally prior to the individual and warns that humans without law and justice become the worst of all animals.

§1.1253aἡ δʼ αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον.
and self-sufficiency is both an end and the best.
ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἤτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν, ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος· ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὑφʼ Ὁμήρου λοιδορηθεὶς " ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος· " ἅμα γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, ἅτε περ ἄζυξ ὢν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς.
From these things, then, it is clear that the city-state is one of the things that exist by nature, and that human is by nature a political animal, and that one who is without a city-state by nature and not by fortune is either a degraded being or greater than a human; just as the one reviled by Homer as "clanless, lawless, hearthless"; for one who is of this nature is at the same time an eager lover of war, being like an isolated piece in a game of checkers.
διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου μᾶλλον, δῆλον.
And why human is a political animal more than any bee and any herding animal is clear.
οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων·
For, as we say, nature makes nothing in in vain; and human alone of the animals possesses speech (logos).
ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζῴοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις), ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον·
Now voice is a sign of pain and pleasure, which is why it belongs to other animals as well (for their nature has gone as far as this, to have a perception of pain and pleasure and to signify these to one another); but speech (logos) is for making clear what is beneficial and what is harmful, and so also what is just and what is unjust.
τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.
For this is peculiar to humans in comparison with other animals, that they alone have perception of good and bad, and just and unjust, and the rest; and community in these things makes a household and a city-state.
καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστιν.
And the city-state is prior by nature to the household and to each of us.
τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χείρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν λιθίνην (διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη), πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλʼ ὁμώνυμα.
For the whole must of necessity be prior to the part; for if the whole is destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except homonymously, as if one were to speak of a stone hand (for a destroyed hand will be of that sort); but all things are defined by their function and capacity, so that when they are no longer such, they should not be said to be the same things, but homonymous.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος, δῆλον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθείς, ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἕξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος διʼ αὐτάρκειαν οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.
It is clear, then, that the city-state is prior by nature to each individual; for if each individual when separated is not self-sufficient, he will be related to the whole in the same way as other parts are; but one who is unable to share in community, or has no need of it because of self-sufficiency, is no part of a city-state, so that he is either a beast or a god.
φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν· ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος.
Therefore, the impulse toward such a community is by nature in all people; and the one who first established it is the cause of the greatest goods.
ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθὲν βέλτιστον τῶν ζῴων ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ χωρισθεὶς νόμου καὶ δίκης χείριστον πάντων.
For just as human, when perfected, is the best of animals, so also, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all.
χαλεπωτάτη γὰρ ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὅπλα· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τἀναντία ἔστι χρῆσθαι μάλιστα.
For injustice is most formidable when armed; and human is born possessing weapons for intelligence and virtue, which can be used most of all for opposite ends.
διὸ ἀνοσιώτατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἐδωδὴν χείριστον.
Therefore, without virtue, he is the most unholy and savage thing, and the worst in regard to sex and food.
ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.
But justice is something political; for the administration of justice is the order of the political community, and justice is the determination of what is just.

Notes

  1. 1253aἤτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν, ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος — The disjunctive particles ἤτοι ... ἤ introduce the alternative 'either A or B', where the final ἢ ἄνθρωπος is dependent on the comparative adjective κρείττων. Thus, it translates to 'greater than a human'. This syntactical structure establishes a strict dichotomy—either sub-human (beast) or super-human (god)—which directly anticipates the formulation in 1253a29 (ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός).
  2. 1253aὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ — The dative phrase φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ (for intelligence and virtue) can be construed in two ways: either adverbially with the intransitive verb φύεται ('is born with...'), or as a dative of purpose/destination qualifying ὅπλα ('possessing weapons for...'). Since Aristotle immediately adds that these weapons (οἷς) can be used for opposite ends, the weapons themselves (i.e., logos and intellectual capacities) are natural instruments intended for achieving virtue and wisdom, making the latter interpretation (dative of purpose qualifying ὅπλα) more persuasive.
  3. 1253aπολιτικόν — Although the subject ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη (justice) is feminine, the predicate adjective πολιτικόν is neuter singular. This reflects an Aristotelian stylistic preference where an abstract concept is defined as a general 'thing' (treated as a substantive neuter noun). It implies that 'justice is something that essentially belongs to the political community'.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Politics §1.1253a. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.humanitext-grc2:1.1253a

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