§7.1διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον τῆς τραγῳδίας ἐστίν.
These things having been defined, let us speak next of what kind the arrangement of the incidents ought to be, since this is both the first and the greatest part of tragedy.
§7.2κεῖται δὴ ἡμῖν τὴν τραγῳδίαν τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως εἶναι μίμησιν ἐχούσης τι μέγεθος· ἔστιν γὰρ ὅλον καὶ μηδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος.
Now, it is laid down for us that tragedy is an imitation of a complete and whole action which has some magnitude; for there can be a whole which has no magnitude.
§7.3ὅλον δέ ἐστιν τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν.
A whole is that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end.
§7.4ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστιν ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετ’ ἄλλο ἐστίν, μετ’ ἐκεῖνο δ’ ἕτερον πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι·
A beginning is that which itself does not of necessity follow something else, but after which another thing naturally is or comes to be.
§7.5τελευτὴ δὲ τοὐναντίον ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μετ’ ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο οὐδέν·
End, on the contrary, is that which itself naturally follows something else, either of necessity or for the most part, but after which there is nothing else.
§7.6μέσον δὲ ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ μετ’ ἄλλο καὶ μετ’ ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον.
A middle is that which itself both follows something else and has another thing following it.
§7.7δεῖ ἄρα τοὺς συνεστῶτας εὖ μύθους μήθ’ ὁπόθεν ἔτυχεν ἄρχεσθαι μήθ’ ὅπου ἔτυχε τελευτᾶν, ἀλλὰ κεχρῆσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἰδέαις.
It is necessary, therefore, that well-constructed plots should neither begin from just anywhere nor end just anywhere, but should make use of the aforementioned forms.
§7.8ἔτι δ’ ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῷον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν,
Furthermore, since a beautiful thing, whether a living creature or any object composed of certain parts, must not only have these parts arranged in order but also possess a magnitude that is not accidental; for beauty consists in magnitude and order.
§7.9διὸ οὔτε πάμμικρον ἄν τι γένοιτο καλὸν ζῷον (συγχεῖται γὰρ ἡ θεωρία ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀναισθήτου χρόνου γινομένη) οὔτε παμμέγεθες (οὐ γὰρ ἅμα ἡ θεωρία γίνεται ἀλλ’ οἴχεται τοῖς θεωροῦσι τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῆς θεωρίας) οἷον εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἴη ζῷον·
Hence, neither could an extremely small animal become beautiful (for the viewing of it becomes confused, occurring in an almost imperceptible time), nor could an extremely large one (for the viewing of it does not occur all at once, but its unity and wholeness are lost to the viewers from their vision), as if, for example, there were an animal ten thousand stades long.
§7.10ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μῆκος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐμνημόνευτον εἶναι.
So that, just as in the case of bodies and animals they must possess a magnitude, and this must be easily seen as a whole, so also in the case of plots they must possess a length, and this must be easily remembered.
§7.11τοῦ δὲ μήκους ὅρος ὁ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐ τῆς τέχνης ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ ἔδει ἑκατὸν τραγῳδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, πρὸς κλεψύδρας ἂν ἠγωνίζοντο, † ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτέ φασιν †.
But of this length, the limit which relates to the contests and perception does not belong to the art; for if it were necessary to compete with a hundred tragedies, they would compete by the water-clocks, as they say was once done at other times.
§7.12ὁ δὲ κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὅρος, ἀεὶ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ σύνδηλος εἶναι καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος·
But the limit according to the very nature of the thing is that the larger is always more beautiful in respect of its magnitude, up to the point of being perfectly clear as a whole.
ὡς δὲ ἁπλῶς διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν, ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων συμβαίνει εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν, ἱκανὸς ὅρος ἐστὶν τοῦ μεγέθους.
To define it simply, whatever magnitude allows a change to occur from misfortune to good fortune or from good fortune to misfortune through incidents happening in succession according to probability or necessity is a sufficient limit of magnitude.