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Aristotle · Metaphysics §2.1

The Search for Truth and Knowledge of Causes

Passage 18 of 159 · Greek

Summary

Aristotle points out that while the investigation of truth is easy as a whole, it is difficult in grasping its parts, emphasizing the value and inheritance of preceding views. He further argues that knowing the cause is knowing the truth, and that the principles of eternal things are the most true.

§2.1ἡ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας θεωρία τῇ μὲν χαλεπὴ τῇ δὲ ῥᾳδία.
The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy.
σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτʼ ἀξίως μηδένα δύνασθαι θιγεῖν αὐτῆς μήτε πάντας ἀποτυγχάνειν, ἀλλʼ ἕκαστον λέγειν τι περὶ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ καθʼ ἕνα μὲν ἢ μηθὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἐπιβάλλειν αὐτῇ, ἐκ πάντων δὲ συναθροιζομένων γίγνεσθαί τι μέγεθος·
An indication of this is that no one is able to attain it adequately, nor does everyone fail, but each says something about nature, and while individually they contribute nothing or little to it, from all of them put together a certain magnitude arises.
ὥστʼ εἴπερ ἔοικεν ἔχειν καθάπερ τυγχάνομεν παροιμιαζόμενοι, τίς ἂν θύρας ἁμάρτοι; ταύτῃ μὲν ἂν εἴη ῥᾳδία, τὸ δʼ ὅλον τι ἔχειν καὶ μέρος μὴ δύνασθαι δηλοῖ τὸ χαλεπὸν αὐτῆς.
So that if it seems to be as we say in the proverb, "Who could miss the door?" In this way it would be easy, but the fact that we can grasp a certain whole but are unable to grasp a part shows the difficulty of it.
ἴσως δὲ καὶ τῆς χαλεπότητος οὔσης κατὰ δύο τρόπους, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀλλʼ ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ αἴτιον αὐτῆς·
Perhaps, as the difficulty is of two kinds, its cause is not in the things but in us.
ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μεθʼ ἡμέραν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντων.
For as the eyes of bats are to the daylight, so is the intellect of our soul to the things which are by nature clearest of all.
οὐ μόνον δὲ χάριν ἔχειν δίκαιον τούτοις ὧν ἄν τις κοινώσαιτο ταῖς δόξαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιπολαιότερον ἀποφηναμένοις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι συνεβάλοντό τι· τὴν γὰρ ἕξιν προήσκησαν ἡμῶν·
And it is right to be grateful not only to those whose opinions we share, but also to those who have expressed views more superficially; for these too have contributed something, since they have trained our habit beforehand.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ Τιμόθεος μὴ ἐγένετο, πολλὴν ἂν μελοποιίαν οὐκ εἴχομεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ Φρῦνις, Τιμόθεος οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο.
For if Timotheus had not existed, we should not have much lyric poetry; and if Phrynis had not existed, Timotheus would not have arisen.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποφηναμένων· παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐνίων παρειλήφαμέν τινας δόξας, οἱ δὲ τοῦ γενέσθαι τούτους αἴτιοι γεγόνασιν.
It is the same way also with those who have expressed views about the truth; for from some we have inherited certain opinions, while others have been the causes of their arising.
ὀρθῶς δʼ ἔχει καὶ τὸ καλεῖσθαι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἀληθείας.
And it is right also that philosophy should be called the science of truth.
θεωρητικῆς μὲν γὰρ τέλος ἀλήθεια πρακτικῆς δʼ ἔργον· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ πῶς ἔχει σκοπῶσιν, οὐ τὸ ἀΐδιον ἀλλʼ ὃ πρός τι καὶ νῦν θεωροῦσιν οἱ πρακτικοί.
For the end of theoretical science is truth, but of practical science, action; for even if practical men examine how a thing is, they do not contemplate what is eternal, but what is relative and for the present.
οὐκ ἴσμεν δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἄνευ τῆς αἰτίας·
But we do not know the truth without the cause.
ἕκαστον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων καθʼ ὃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει τὸ συνώνυμον (οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμότατον· καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ αἴτιον τοῦτο τῆς θερμότητος)· ὥστε καὶ ἀληθέστατον τὸ τοῖς ὑστέροις αἴτιον τοῦ ἀληθέσιν εἶναι.
And each thing has in the highest degree itself that character which it also imparts to other things as their synonym (for instance, fire is the hottest, for this is the cause of heat in other things); so that that which is the cause of the truth of subsequent things is also most true.
διὸ τὰς τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἀρχὰς ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀληθεστάτας (οὐ γάρ ποτε ἀληθεῖς, οὐδʼ ἐκείναις αἴτιόν τί ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖναι τοῖς ἄλλοις), ὥσθʼ ἕκαστον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας.
Therefore, the principles of eternal things must always be most true; for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being for them, but they are the cause of being for other things, so that as each thing is in respect of being, so is it also in respect of truth.

Notes

  1. 993b1ἐπιβάλλειν αὐτῇ — Used intransitively with the dative `αὐτῇ` (referring to `τῆς φύσεως` 'nature' or `τῆς ἀληθείας` 'truth' in the context) to mean 'to hit upon' or 'to grasp.'
  2. 993b11ὧν ἄν τις κοινώσαιτο ταῖς δόξαις — A relative clause modifying the antecedent `τούτοις`. The middle voice `κοινόομαι` ('to share') takes the dative for the thing shared (`ταῖς δόξαις` 'opinions') and the genitive for the person with whom it is shared (the relative pronoun `ὧν`).
  3. 993b22καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ πῶς ἔχει σκοπῶσιν — The word `ἂν` here is not the potential particle `ἄν`, but a contraction of `εἰ ἄν` (i.e., `ἐάν`), which introduces a concessive condition ('even if they examine...') with the subjunctive verb `σκοπῶσιν`.
  4. 993b24ἕκαστον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων καθʼ ὃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει τὸ συνώνυμον — This sentence expresses the principle that 'that which causes a synonym (a common character) to belong to other things itself has that character in the highest degree.' `καθʼ ὃ` is a prepositional phrase with the relative pronoun meaning 'by virtue of which,' and `τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει τὸ συνώνυμον` means 'the synonym (the common attribute) belongs to the other things.'

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Metaphysics §2.1. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:2.1

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