§1.4λέγωμεν δʼ ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν.
Let us resume our discussion, since every knowledge and pursuit aims at some good, and state what it is that we say politics aims at, and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action.
ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δʼ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν·
As far as its name is concerned, there is general agreement by almost the majority; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement call it happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy.
περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστιν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν.
But they dispute about what happiness is, and the general run of men do not give the same account as the wise.
οἳ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμήν, ἄλλοι δʼ ἄλλο—πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον· συνειδότες δʼ ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν.
For the former take it to be some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honor, while others take it to be something else—and often even the same person changes his mind; when he falls ill, he calls it health, and when he is poor, wealth; and being conscious of their own ignorance, they admire those who say something grand and beyond their comprehension.
ἔνιοι δʼ ᾤοντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθʼ αὑτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τούτοις πᾶσιν αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθά.
Some, however, used to think that besides these many goods there is another which exists by itself, and is the cause of all these being good.
ἁπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον.
Now, to examine all these opinions is perhaps rather pointless, but it is sufficient to examine those that are most prevalent or seem to have some rational basis.
μὴ λανθανέτω δʼ ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.
But let us not fail to notice that there is a difference between arguments from first principles and those to first principles.
εὖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν.
For Plato, too, was right in raising this question and inquiring whether the path is from first principles or to first principles, as in the racecourse from the starting stewards to the turning post or back again.
ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δʼ ἁπλῶς.
For we must begin from what is known, and this has two senses: what is known to us, and what is known without qualification.
ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων.
Perhaps, then, we at least must begin from what is known to us.
διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς.
Therefore, anyone who is to listen adequately to lectures about noble and just things, and generally about political matters, must have been brought up well in his habits.
ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως.
For the starting point is the "fact," and if this is sufficiently apparent, there will be no need of the "reason why." And such a person either has first principles or can easily acquire them.
ᾧ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου· "
οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
ἐσθλὸς δʼ αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται. ὃς δέ κε μήτʼ αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτʼ ἄλλου ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δʼ αὖτʼ ἀχρήιος ἀνήρ. "
But he who has neither of these, let him hear the words of Hesiod: "He is best of all who understands everything by himself; good, too, is he who listens to one who speaks well; but he who neither understands by himself nor, listening to another, lays it to heart, is a useless man.
§1.5ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν.
"But let us speak from where we digressed.
τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν·
For it is not without reason that people seem, from their lives, to conceive of the good and happiness.
διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν.
The general run of men and the most vulgar conceive it as pleasure; and for this reason they love the life of enjoyment.
τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὅ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός.
For there are three especially prominent types of life: the one just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative.
οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλῳ.
Now, the general run of men appear to be completely slavish in choosing a life of brute beasts, but they receive a hearing because many of those in high places share the passions of Sardanapalus.
οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμήν· τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος.
But people of superior refinement and active disposition identify it with honor; for this is pretty much the end of the political life.
φαίνεται δʼ ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τἀγαθὸν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα.
But it seems to be more superficial than what we are seeking; for it is thought to depend on those who bestow honor rather than on him who receives it, whereas we intuitively feel that the good is something proper to a man and hard to be taken from him.
ἔτι δʼ ἐοίκασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρʼ οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπʼ ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατά γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων.
Further, they seem to pursue honor in order to assure themselves that they are good; at all events, they seek to be honored by wise men, and among those who know them, and on the ground of virtue; it is clear, then, that according to them, virtue is better.
τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι.
And perhaps one might rather suppose this to be the end of the political life.
φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα·
But even this seems somewhat incomplete; for it is thought possible to possess virtue while asleep or while being inactive throughout life, and besides, to suffer the greatest evils and misfortunes.
τὸν δʼ οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων.
No one would call a man who lives in this way happy, unless he were defending a thesis at all costs.
καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις· ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν.
But enough of these matters; for they have been adequately discussed in our popular works.
τρίτος δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ποιησόμεθα.
The third type of life is the contemplative, concerning which we shall make our investigation in what follows.
ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν.
The life of money-making is a kind of forced one, and wealth is clearly not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else.
διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· διʼ αὑτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται.
Therefore, one might rather suppose the previously mentioned ends to be the ends; for they are loved for their own sakes.
φαίνεται δʼ οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται.
But not even they appear to be so; and yet many arguments have been advanced in their favor.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω.
Let us, then, dismiss these matters.