§6.49.1Λάμαχος δὲ ἄντικρυς ἔφη χρῆναι πλεῖν ἐπὶ Συρακούσας καὶ πρὸς τῇ πόλει ὡς τάχιστα τὴν μάχην ποιεῖσθαι, ἕως ἔτι ἀπαράσκευοί τε εἰσὶ καὶ μάλιστα ἐκπεπληγμένοι.
But Lamachus said that they ought to sail directly against Syracuse and to deliver battle close to the city as quickly as possible, while the enemy were still unprepared and in the greatest state of consternation.
§6.49.2τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον πᾶν στράτευμα δεινότατον εἶναι· ἢν δὲ χρονίσῃ πρὶν ἐς ὄψιν ἐλθεῖν, τῇ γνώμῃ ἀναθαρσοῦντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ τῇ ὄψει καταφρονεῖν μᾶλλον.
For every army, he said, is most formidable at first; but if it delays before coming into sight, men recover their confidence in spirit and are more inclined to look down upon it when they actually see it.
αἰφνίδιοι δὲ ἢν προσπέσωσιν, ἕως ἔτι περιδεεῖς προσδέχονται, μάλιστ’ ἂν σφεῖς περιγενέσθαι καὶ κατὰ πάντα ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκφοβῆσαι, τῇ τε ὄψει (πλεῖστοι γὰρ ἂν νῦν φανῆναι) καὶ τῇ προσδοκίᾳ ὧν πείσονται, μάλιστα δ’ ἂν τῷ αὐτίκα κινδύνῳ τῆς μάχης.
If, however, they should fall upon them suddenly, while they are still waiting in extreme fear, they would be most likely to prevail and would terrify them in every way—both by their appearance (for they would now appear in the greatest numbers) and by the expectation of what they would suffer, but most of all by the immediate danger of the battle.
§6.49.3εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς πολλοὺς ἀποληφθῆναι ἔξω διὰ τὸ ἀπιστεῖν σφᾶς μὴ ἥξειν, καὶ ἐσκομιζομένων αὐτῶν τὴν στρατιὰν οὐκ ἀπορήσειν χρημάτων, ἢν πρὸς τῇ πόλει κρατοῦσα καθέζηται.
And it was likely, he added, that many would be caught outside in the fields because of their disbelief that the Athenians would come; and while they were carrying in their property, the army, if it sat down victoriously near the city, would not lack money.
§6.49.4τούς τε ἄλλους Σικελιώτας οὕτως ἤδη μᾶλλον καὶ ἐκείνοις οὐ ξυμμαχήσειν καὶ σφίσι προσιέναι καὶ οὐ διαμελλήσειν περισκοποῦντας ὁπότεροι κρατήσουσιν.
The other Siceliots, moreover, would now be more likely not to ally themselves with the Syracusans but to come over to them, and they would not delay while looking around to see which side would win.
ναύσταθμον δὲ ἐπαναχωρήσαντας καὶ ἐφορμηθέντας Μέγαρα ἔφη χρῆναι ποιεῖσθαι, ἃ ἦν ἐρῆμα, ἀπέχοντα Συρακουσῶν οὔτε πλοῦν πολὺν οὔτε ὁδόν.
And he said that they ought to make Megara their naval base, returning and anchoring there, which was deserted and was not a long voyage or march from Syracuse.