§1.82.1‘οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀναισθήτως αὐτοὺς κελεύω τούς τε ξυμμάχους ἡμῶν ἐᾶν βλάπτειν καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας μὴ καταφωρᾶν, ἀλλὰ ὅπλα μὲν μήπω κινεῖν, πέμπειν δὲ καὶ αἰτιᾶσθαι μήτε πόλεμον ἄγαν δηλοῦντας μήθ’ ὡς ἐπιτρέψομεν, κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερ’ αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι ξυμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, εἴ ποθέν τινα ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα (ἀνεπίφθονον δέ, ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἕλληνας μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι), καὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἅμα ἐκποριζώμεθα. §1.82.2καὶ ἢν μὲν ἐσακούωσί τι πρεσβευομένων ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἄριστα· ἢν δὲ μή, διελθόντων ἐτῶν δύο καὶ τριῶν ἄμεινον ἤδη, ἢν δοκῇ, πεφραγμένοι ἴμεν ἐπ’ αὐτούς. §1.82.3καὶ ἴσως ὁρῶντες ἡμῶν ἤδη τήν τε παρασκευὴν καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῇ ὁμοῖα ὑποσημαίνοντας μᾶλλον ἂν εἴκοιεν, καὶ γῆν ἔτι ἄτμητον ἔχοντες καὶ περὶ παρόντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ οὔπω ἐφθαρμένων βουλευόμενοι. §1.82.4μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι νομίσητε τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν ἢ ὅμηρον ἔχειν καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἐξείργασται· ἧς φείδεσθαι χρὴ ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον, καὶ μὴ ἐς ἀπόνοιαν καταστήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἀληπτοτέρους ἔχειν. §1.82.5εἰ γὰρ ἀπαράσκευοι τοῖς τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐγκλήμασιν ἐπειχθέντες τεμοῦμεν αὐτήν, ὁρᾶτε ὅπως μὴ αἴσχιον καὶ ἀπορώτερον τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πράξομεν. §1.82.6ἐγκλήματα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν οἷόν τε καταλῦσαι· πόλεμον δὲ ξύμπαντας ἀραμένους ἕνεκα τῶν ἰδίων, ὃν οὐχ ὑπάρχει εἰδέναι καθ’ ὅτι χωρήσει, οὐ ῥᾴδιον εὐπρεπῶς θέσθαι.
'I do not, however, bid you to senselessly allow them to harm our allies and to not detect them plotting, but rather not to move arms yet, but to send envoys and remonstrate, neither showing war too clearly nor showing that we will submit, and meanwhile to prepare our own affairs as well by the acquisition of allies, both Greeks and barbarians, in the hope that we may obtain from some source some resource either of navy or of money (and indeed, it is not open to censure for all who, like us, are plotted against by the Athenians, to save themselves by taking to themselves not only Greeks but also barbarians), and at the same time let us provide our own resources. And if they listen to our envoys at all, that is best; but if not, after the passage of two or three years, being already better prepared, let us, if it seems good, go against them. And perhaps, seeing both our preparation already and our words indicating things in harmony with it, they would more likely yield, especially since they would still have their land unravaged and would be deliberating about goods that are present and not yet destroyed. For you must not think of their land as anything else than a hostage, and no less so, the better it is cultivated; which we must spare as much as possible, and not, by driving them to despair, render them more difficult to capture. For if, unprepared, we are hurried on by the complaints of our allies and ravage it, see to it that we do not make the situation more shameful and difficult for the Peloponnese. For while it is possible to settle the complaints of both states and individuals, a war which all together have undertaken for the sake of private interests, of which it is impossible to know how it will turn out, is not easy to settle honorably.'