Moral Letters to Lucilius

’If what you prescribe is doubtful,’ he says, ‘you will have to add proofs; therefore, those proofs, not the precepts, will be of benefit.’ What of the fact that even without proofs, the very authority of the adviser is of benefit? Just as the opinions of legal experts have weight, even if no reason is rendered. Moreover, the very things that are prescribed have much weight in themselves, especially if they are either woven into a poem or compressed in prose into a short maxim like that saying of Cato: ‘Buy not what you need, but what is essential; what you do not need is dear at a penny (asse),’ or such as those rendered by the oracle or similar to them: ‘Spare your time,’ ‘Know yourself.’

​Would you demand a reason when someone has said to you these verses? ‘Oblivion is the remedy for injuries.’ ‘Fortune favors the brave, the lazy man stands in his own way.’ Those sayings do not seek an advocate; they touch the feelings themselves and are of benefit as nature exerts her power.

​The minds bear the seeds of all honorable things, which are stimulated by admonition, in no other way than a spark, assisted by a gentle breath, unfolds its fire. Virtue is aroused when it is touched and nudged. Moreover, some things are indeed in the mind, but not ready at hand, which begin to be in readiness when they have been spoken. Some things lie scattered in different places, which an untrained mind cannot bring together. Therefore, they must be gathered into one and joined, so that they may have more weight and lift the mind more.

​Or if precepts help nothing, all education must be abolished, and we ought to be content with nature itself. Those who say this do not see that one mind is active and upright, another slow and dull, and certainly one is more talented than another. The power of natural talent is nourished and grows by precepts, and adds new convictions to those inborn, and corrects depraved things.

’If anyone,’ he says, ‘does not have upright decrees, what will admonitions benefit him when he is bound to vices?’ This, indeed, so that he may be freed from them; for the natural disposition in him is not extinct, but obscured and oppressed. Even thus it attempts to rise again and struggles against depraved things, but having found protection and assisted by precepts, it gains strength, provided, however, that a long-standing plague has not infected and killed it; for this even the discipline of philosophy, striving with all its force, will not restore. For what difference is there between the decrees of philosophy and precepts, except that the former are general precepts, while the latter are specific? Both prescribe, but the one in general, the other in detail.

’If anyone,’ he says, ‘has upright and honorable decrees, this person is admonished superfluously.’ Not at all; for this person too is indeed taught to do what he ought, but does not see these things clearly enough. For we are hindered from doing what is to be approved not only by feelings, but by inexperience in finding what each situation demands. We have at times a well-ordered mind, but inactive and untrained in finding the way of duties, which admonition points out.

’Expel,’ he says, ‘false opinions about goods and evils, and in their place put true ones, and admonition will have nothing to do.’ The mind is without doubt ordered by that method, but not only by that. For although it has been gathered by arguments what things are good and bad, nevertheless precepts have their part. Both prudence and justice consist of duties, and duties are arranged by precepts.

​Moreover, the very judgment about evils and goods is confirmed by the execution of duties, to which precepts lead. For both agree with each other; nor can the former precede without the latter following. And the latter follow their own order; whence it appears that the former precede.

’Precepts,’ he says, ‘are infinite.’ This is false. For concerning the greatest and necessary things they are not infinite. They have indeed subtle differences, which times, places, and persons demand, but to these also general precepts are given.’