- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:94.19-94.26
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-07
Seneca counters Ariston's rejection of precepts by arguing that just as medicine adds specific advice on regimen to its remedies, so philosophy requires concrete precepts alongside general dogmas to guide and remind the soul.
Deinde cuius curata suffusio est, is non protinus eum visum recepit, aliis quoque potest reddere; malitia liberatus et liberat. Non opus est exhortatione, ne consilio quidem, ut colorum proprietates oculus intellegat, a nigro album etiam nullo monente distinguet. Multis contra praeceptis eget animus, ut videat, quid agendum sit in vita; quamquam oculis quoque aegros medicus non tantum curat sed etiam monet. "
Next, he whose cataract has been cured does not only immediately recover his own sight, but can also restore it to others; one freed from malice also frees others. There is no need of exhortation, nor even of advice, so that the eye may understand the properties of colors; it will distinguish white from black even with no one advising. On the contrary, the mind requires many precepts in order to see what must be done in life; although the physician also not only cures but also advises those sick in their eyes.
Non est," inquit, "quod protinus inbecillam aciem committas inprobo lumini; a tenebris primum ad umbrosa procede, deinde plus aude et paulatim claram lucem pati adsuesce. Non est quod1 post cibum studeas, non est quod plenis oculis ac tumentibus imperes; adflatum et vim frigoris in os occurrentis evita"; alia eiusmodi, quae non minus quam medicamenta proficiunt. Adicit remediis medicina consilium.
’There is no reason,’ he says, ‘why you should immediately commit a weak sight to an intense light; proceed first from darkness to shady places, then dare more and gradually accustom yourself to endure clear light. There is no reason why you should study after food, no reason why you should overwork full and swollen eyes; avoid the blast and the force of cold meeting your face’; and other things of this kind, which benefit no less than medicines. Medicine adds advice to remedies.
" Error," inquit, "est causa peccandi. Hunc nobis praecepta non detrahunt nec expugnant opiniones de bonis ac malis falsas." Concedo per se efficacia praecepta non esse ad evertendam pravam animi persuasionem; sed non ideo nihil ne aliis quidem adiecta proficiunt.2 Primum memoriam renovant; deinde quae in universo confusius videbantur, in partes divisa diligentius considerantur. Aut isto modo licet et consolationes dicas supervacuas et exhortationes; atqui non sunt supervacuae, ergo ne monitiones quidem.
’Error,’ he says, ‘is the cause of sinning. Precepts do not take this away from us, nor do they vanquish false opinions about goods and evils.’ I admit that precepts by themselves are not effective for overturning a depraved conviction of the mind; but they do not therefore fail to benefit, even when added to other things. First, they renew the memory; second, those things which seemed rather confused in the whole, when divided into parts, are considered more diligently. Otherwise, in that way you might as well say that consolations and exhortations are superfluous; yet they are not superfluous, therefore neither are admonitions.
" Stultum est," inquit, "praecipere aegro, quid facere tamquam sanus debeat, cum restituenda sanitas sit, sine qua inrita sunt praecepta." Quid, quod3 habent aegri quaedam sanique communia, de quibus admonendi sunt? Tamquam ne avide cibos adpetant, ut lassitudinem vitent. Habent quaedam praecepta communia pauper et dives. "
’It is foolish,’ he says, ‘to prescribe to a sick person what he ought to do as if he were healthy, since health must be restored, without which precepts are void.’ What of the fact that the sick and the healthy have certain things in common, about which they must be admonished? Such as not to desire food greedily, and to avoid fatigue. The poor and the rich have certain common precepts.
Sana," inquit, "avaritiam, et nihil habebis quod admoneas aut pauperem aut divitem, si cupiditas utriusque consedit. "Quid, quod aliud est non concupiscere pecuniam, aliud uti pecunia scire? Cuius avari modum ignorant, etiam non avari usum.4 "Tolle," inquit, "errores; supervacua praecepta sunt." Falsum est. Puta enim avaritiam relaxatam, puta adstrictam esse luxuriam, temeritati frenos iniectos, ignaviae subditum calcar; etiam remotis vitiis quid et quemadmodum debeamus facere, discendum est.
’Cure,’ he says, ‘avarice, and you will have nothing to admonish either the poor or the rich, if the desire of both has subsided.’ What of the fact that it is one thing not to desire money, and another to know how to use money? The avaricious do not know its limit, and even the non-avaricious do not know its use. ‘Remove errors,’ he says; ‘precepts are superfluous.’ This is false. For suppose avarice is relaxed, suppose luxury is restrained, bridles are cast upon rashness, and a spur is applied to laziness; even when vices are removed, we must learn what we ought to do and how.
" Nihil," inquit, "efficient monitiones admotae gravibus vitiis." Ne medicina quidem morbos insanabiles vincit, tamen adhibetur aliis in remedium, aliis in levamentum. Ne ipsa quidem universae philosophiae vis, licet totas in hoc vires suas advocet, duram iam et veterem animis extrahet pestem. Sed non ideo nihil sanat, quia non omnia. "
’Admonitions applied to grave vices,’ he says, ‘will accomplish nothing.’ Not even medicine conquers incurable diseases, yet it is applied to some as a remedy, to others as a relief. Not even the very power of universal philosophy, though it summon all its forces for this purpose, will extract a hard and old plague from minds. But it does not therefore cure nothing, because it does not cure all.
Quid prodest," inquit, "aperta monstrare? "Plurimum; interdum enim scimus nec adtendimus. Non docet admonitio, sed advertit, sed excitat, sed memoriam continet nec patitur elabi. Pleraque ante oculos posita transimus. Admonere genus adhortandi est. Saepe animus etiam aperta dissimulat; ingerenda est itaque illi notitia rerum notissimarum. Illa hoc loco in Vatinium Calvi repetenda sententia est: "factum esse ambitum scitis, et hoc vos scire omnes sciunt.5"
’What does it profit,’ he says, ‘to show what is obvious?’ Very much; for sometimes we know and do not attend. Admonition does not teach, but directs attention, but arouses, but retains memory and does not allow it to slip away. We pass over many things placed before our eyes. Admonishing is a kind of exhorting. Often the mind ignores even obvious things; therefore, the knowledge of most well-known things must be pressed upon it. That saying of Calvus against Vatinius ought to be repeated in this place: ‘You know that bribery was committed, and everyone knows that you know this.’
Scis amicitias sancte colendas esse, sed non facis. Scis inprobum esse, qui ab uxore pudicitiam exigit, ipse alienarum corruptor uxorum; scis ut illi nil eum adultero, sic tibi nil esse debere cum paelice, et non facis. Itaque subinde ad memoriam reducendus es; non enim reposita illa esse oportet, sed in promptu. Quaecumque salutaria sunt, saepe agitari debent, saepe versari, ut non tantum nota sint nobis, sed etiam parata. Adice nunc, quod aperta quoque apertiora fieri solent.
You know that friendships ought to be sacredly cultivated, but you do not do it. You know that he is wicked who demands chastity from his wife, while being himself a corrupter of others’ wives; you know that just as she ought to have nothing to do with an adulterer, so you ought to have nothing to do with a mistress, and you do not do it. Therefore, you must be reminded constantly; for those things ought not to be stored away, but ready at hand. Whatever things are wholesome ought to be often discussed, often turned over, so that they may not only be known to us, but also ready. Add now that obvious things also are accustomed to become more obvious.
- 94.20Non est quod
An idiomatic phrase followed by the subjunctive (committas, studeas, imperes) meaning 'there is no reason why...' or 'you should not...'. Here it functions to deliver specific medical and regimen-related advice.
- 94.21non ideo nihil ne aliis quidem adiecta proficiunt
The double negative (non... nihil) expresses a positive meaning ('they do benefit somewhat'). aliis refers to 'other things' (i.e., dogmas), and adiecta (neuter plural nominative participle agreeing with the subject praecepta) means 'when added to other things.' The whole clause translates to: 'but they do not therefore fail to benefit, even when added to other things.'
- 94.22Quid, quod
An idiomatic phrase used to introduce a counterargument or an additional fact, meaning 'What of the fact that...?' or 'Moreover, is it not the case that...?'. It originates from the ellipsis of quid dicam de eo, quod....
- 94.23Cuius avari modum ignorant, etiam non avari usum
The relative pronoun cuius (genitive) refers back to the preceding pecunia. Taking avari (the avaricious) as the subject, the sentence contrasts modum (limit) and usum (use) as objects of ignorant: 'The avaricious do not know the limit of money, and even the non-avaricious do not know its use.'
- 94.25factum esse ambitum scitis, et hoc vos scire omnes sciunt
A quotation from a speech by the poet Calvus prosecuting his rival Vatinius for bribery (ambitus). The accusative and infinitive clauses (factum esse ambitum and hoc vos scire) function as objects of scitis and sciunt respectively. It is cited to illustrate the importance of pointing out what is already publicly known (the function of admonition).
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-25) · Revision history (1, latest 2026-09-22)
- 2026-09-22 AI review — source 1
