← Seneca the Younger

Moral Letters to Lucilius

§87.18-87.25

True Good in the Soul and Proof that Good Cannot Come from Evil

Seneca argues that wealth and absence of pain are not true goods since they can belong to the worst men or even animals, emphasizing that the seat of the supreme good is the pure mind. He further demonstrates that good cannot come from evil, such as temple-robbery, and that crimes carry their own immediate and greatest punishment within themselves.

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§87.18

​Fiscus tanti est, quantum habet; immo in accessionem eius venit, quod habet. Quis pleno sacculo ullum pretium ponit nisi quod pecuniae in eo conditae numerus effecit? Idem evenit magnorum dominis patrimoniorum: accessiones illorum et appendices sunt. Quare ergo sapiens magnus est? Quia magnum animum habet. Verum est ergo quod contemptissimo cuique contingit, bonum non esse.

​A cash-box is worth as much as it holds; indeed, it becomes an accession to what it holds. Who places any value on a full purse except that which the number of money deposited in it has made? The same happens to the owners of great patrimonies: they are accessions and appendages to them. Why then is the wise man great? Because he has a great mind. It is true, therefore, that what falls to the lot of any most contemptible person is not a good.

§87.19

​Itaque in dolentiam1 numquam bonum dicam; habet illam cicada, habet pulex. Ne quietem quidem et molestia vacare bonum dicam; quid est otiosius verme? Quaeris, quae res sapientem faciat? Quae deum. Des oportet illi divinum aliquid, caeleste, magnificum. Non in omnes bonum cadit nec quemlibet possessorem patitur.

​Therefore, I shall never call freedom from pain a good; a cicada has it, a flea has it. I shall not even call quiet and being free from trouble a good; what is more idle than a worm? You ask what thing makes a wise man? That which makes a god. You must give him something divine, heavenly, magnificent. Good does not fall to the lot of all, nor does it tolerate just any possessor.

§87.20

​Vide "Et quid quaeque ferat regio et quid quaeque recuset: Hic segetes, illic veniunt felicius uvae. Arborei fetus alibi atque iniussa virescunt Gramina. Nonne vides, croceos ut Tmolus odores, India mittat ebur, molles sua tura Sabaei? At Chalybes nudi ferrum."

​See: “And what each region bears and what each refuses: Here grain, there grapes grow more happily. Elsewhere the fruits of trees and unbidden grasses Grow green. Do you not see how Tmolus sends saffron odors, India ivory, the soft Sabaeans their own frankincense? But the naked Chalybes iron.”

§87.21

​Ista in regiones discripta sunt, ut necessarium mortalibus esset inter ipsos commercium, si invicem alius aliquid ab alio peteret. Summum illud bonum habet et ipsum suam sedem. Non nascitur, ubi ebur, nec ubi ferrum. Quis sit summi boni locus quaeris? Animus. Hic nisi purus ac sanctus est, deum non capit.

​These things have been distributed among regions so that commerce among mortals would be necessary, if they should mutually seek something from one another. That supreme good itself also has its own seat. It is not born where ivory is, nor where iron is. Do you ask what is the place of the supreme good? The mind. Unless this is pure and holy, it does not receive god.

§87.22

" Bonum ex malo non fit. Divitiae fiunt autem ex avaritia. Divitiae ergo non sunt bonum." "Non est," inquit, "verum, bonum ex malo non nasci. Ex sacrilegio enim2 et furto pecunia nascitur. Itaque malum quidem est sacrilegio enim et furtum, sed ideo, quia plura mala facit quam bona. Dat enim lucrum, sed cum metu, sollicitudine, tormentis et animi et corporis."

”Good does not come from evil. But riches come from avarice. Therefore, riches are not a good.” “It is not true,” he says, “that good is not born from evil. For money is born from temple-robbery and theft. Therefore, temple-robbery and theft are indeed an evil, but for this reason, because they produce more evils than goods. For they give profit, but with fear, anxiety, and torments of both mind and body.”

§87.23

​Quisquis hoc dicit, necesse est recipiat sacrilegium, sicut malum sit, quia multa mala facit, ita bonum quoque ex aliqua parte esse, quia aliquid boni facit. Quo quid fieri portentuosius potest? Quamquam sacrilegium, furtum, adulterium inter bona haberi prorsus persuasimus. Quam multi furto non erubescunt, quam multi adulterio gloriantur! Nam sacrilegia minuta puniuntur, magna in triumphis feruntur.

​Whoever says this must admit that temple-robbery, just as it is an evil because it produces many evils, is also in some part a good because it produces something of good. What can be more monstrous than this? Although we have thoroughly persuaded ourselves that temple-robbery, theft, and adultery are to be held among goods. How many do not blush at theft, how many boast of adultery! For minor temple-robberies are punished, great ones are carried in triumphs.

§87.24

​Adice nunc, quod sacrilegium, si omnino ex aliqua parte bonum est, etiam honestum erit et recte factum vocabitur: nostra enim actio est.3 Quod nullius mortalium cogitatio recipit. Ergo bona nasci ex malo non possunt. Nam si, ut dicitis, ob hoc unum sacrilegium malum est, quia multum mali adfert, si remiseris illi supplicia, si securitatem spoponderis, ex toto bonum erit. Atqui maximum scelerum supplicium in ipsis est.

​Add now that temple-robbery, if it is at all a good in some part, will also be honorable and will be called a right action: for it is our action. Which the thought of no mortal accepts. Therefore, goods cannot be born from evil. For if, as you say, temple-robbery is an evil for this one reason, because it brings much evil, if you remit its punishments, if you promise security, it will be entirely a good. And yet the greatest punishment of crimes is in themselves.

§87.25

​Erras, inquam, si illa ad carnificem aut carcerem differs; statim puniuntur, cum facta sunt, immo dum fiunt. Non nascitur itaque ex malo bonum, non magis quam ficus ex olea. Ad semen nata respondent, bona degenerare non possunt. Quemadmodum ex turpi honestum non nascitur, ita ne ex malo quidem bonum. Nam idem est honestum et bonum.

​You err, I say, if you defer those to the executioner or the prison; they are punished immediately when they are done, indeed while they are being done. Therefore, good is not born from evil, no more than a fig from an olive. Born things correspond to their seed; goods cannot degenerate. Just as the honorable is not born from the shameful, so neither is good from evil. For the honorable and the good are the same.

Syntax notes3 items
  1. 87.19dolentiam

    in dolentiam (or indolentiam) is the accusative of indolentia (absence of pain), a Stoic conceptual term corresponding to the Greek ἀπονία, combining the negative prefix in- and dolentia (pain). Rather than dividing it into the preposition in and the accusative dolentiam, it should be read as a single noun indolentiam, serving as the object of dicam ("I shall never call the absence of pain a good").

  2. 87.22sacrilegio enim

    The reading sacrilegio enim et furtum in the transmitted text is widely regarded as a scribal error for sacrilegium et furtum (temple-robbery and theft). The word enim is likely an erroneous intrusion from the preceding sentence, and sacrilegio must be understood as the nominative sacrilegium to stand in apposition with furtum as the subject of malum.

  3. 87.24nostra enim actio est

    nostra enim actio est ("for it is our action") relies on the Stoic ethical premise that any intentional human action (actio) must possess a moral quality (either honestum or turpe). The argument points out the absurdity that if temple-robbery (sacrilegium) is in any part a "good" (bonum), then because it is a human action, it must also be morally "honorable" (honestum) and a "right action" (recte factum).

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-25) · Revision history (1, latest 2026-09-21)
  • 2026-09-21 AI review — translation 1
urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:87.18-87.25