Moral Letters to Lucilius

​Every animal, until it dies, is what it began to be; a man, until he dies, is a man, a horse a horse, a dog a dog. It cannot pass into something else. Justice, that is, the mind disposed in a certain way, is an animal. Let us believe it; next, courage, that is, the mind disposed in a certain way, is an animal. Which mind? That which just now was justice? It is held in the former animal, and it is not permitted for it to pass into another animal; it must persevere in that in which it first began to be.

​Moreover, one mind cannot belong to two animals, much less to more. If justice, courage, temperance, and the other virtues are animals, how will they have one mind? They ought to have individual minds, or they are not animals.

​One body cannot belong to several animals. This they themselves also admit. What is the body of justice? ‘The mind.’ What? What is the body of courage? ‘The same mind.’ And yet, one body cannot belong to two animals.

’But the same mind,’ he says, ‘assumes the disposition of justice, of courage, and of temperance.’ This could happen if, at the time when justice existed, courage did not exist, and at the time when courage existed, temperance did not exist; but in fact, all virtues exist together. Thus, how will they be individual animals, when there is only one mind, which cannot make more than one animal?

​Finally, no animal is a part of another animal. But justice is a part of the mind; therefore it is not an animal. I seem to myself to be wasting my effort on an admitted matter; for one ought to be indignant about this rather than argue about it. No animal is equal to another. Look around at the bodies of all: there is none that does not have both its own color, its own shape, and its own magnitude.

​Among other things on account of which the intellect of the divine craftsman is wonderful, I think this is also one: that in such an abundance of things he never stumbled upon the same; even things which seem similar, when you compare them, are different. He made so many kinds of leaves: none is not marked with its own characteristic. So many animals: the magnitude of none agrees with another, at any rate there is some difference. He demanded of himself that those things which were different should also be dissimilar and unequal; but all virtues, as you say, are equal. Therefore they are not animals.

​There is no animal that does not act of itself. But virtue does nothing of itself, but only with man. All animals are either rational, as men and gods, or irrational, as wild beasts and cattle. Virtues are indeed rational; and yet they are neither men nor gods; therefore they are not animals.

​Every rational animal does nothing unless it has first been stimulated by the appearance of some thing, then has conceived an impulse, and then assent has confirmed this impulse. I will tell you what assent is. ‘I ought to walk’: then at last I walk, when I have said this to myself and approved this opinion of mine. ‘I ought to sit’: then at last I sit. This assent is not in virtue.

​For suppose that prudence exists; how will it assent to ‘I ought to walk’? This nature does not admit. For prudence provides for him to whom it belongs, not for itself. For it can neither walk nor sit. Therefore, it does not have assent, and is not a rational animal. If virtue is an animal, it is rational.

​But it is not rational; therefore it is not an animal either. If virtue is an animal, and virtue is a good, is not every good an animal? It is. This our school admits. To save one’s father is a good, and to express an opinion prudently in the senate is a good, and to judge justly is a good; therefore, both saving one’s father is an animal and expressing an opinion prudently is an animal. The matter is pushed so far that you cannot hold your laughter: to be silent prudently is a good, to dine frugally is a good; thus both being silent and dining are animals.

​I, by Hercules, will not cease to tickle them and to make sport for myself out of those subtle absurdities. Justice and courage, if they are animals, are certainly terrestrial. Every terrestrial animal gets cold, hungers, thirsts; therefore justice gets cold, courage hungers, and clemency thirsts.