- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:113.22-113.32
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-08
Seneca ridicules the absurdity of the Stoic view that virtues and actions are physical "animals," illustrating how this logic would make words and verses animals too. He urges Lucilius to abandon these trivial disputes and focus on acquiring essential virtues like courage and selfless justice, emphasizing that self-mastery is the ultimate empire.
Quid porro? Non interrogabo illos, quam figuram habeant ista animalia? Hominis an equi an ferae? Si rotundam illis qualem deo dederint, quaeram, an et avaritia et luxuria et dementia aeque rotundae sint. Sunt enim et ipsae animalia. Si has quoque conrotundaverint, etiamnunc interrogabo, an prudens ambulatio animal sit. Necesse est confiteantur, deinde dicant ambulationem animal esse et quidem rotundum.
What further? Shall I not ask them what shape those animals have? Of a man, a horse, or a wild beast? If they assign to them a round shape, such as they have given to God, I shall ask whether avarice, luxury, and madness are equally round. For they too are themselves animals. If they make these also round, I shall ask furthermore whether a prudent walk is an animal. They must confess it, and then say that a walk is an animal, and indeed a round one.
Ne putes1 autem primum me ex nostris non ex praescripto loqui, sed meae sententiae esse: inter Cleanthen et discipulum eius Chrysippum non convenit, quid sit ambulatio. Cleanthes ait spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes permissum, Chrysippus ipsum principale. Quid est ergo, cur non ipsius Chrysippi exemplo sibi quisque se vindicet et ista tot animalia, quot mundus ipse non potest capere, derideat? "
But lest you think that I am speaking from outside the rules of our school, and that this is my own opinion: Cleanthes and his disciple Chrysippus do not agree on what a walk is. Cleanthes says it is breath sent from the ruling principle down to the feet, Chrysippus says it is the ruling principle itself. Why is it, then, that following the example of Chrysippus himself, everyone should not assert his own freedom and laugh at those so many animals, which the world itself cannot contain?
Non sunt," inquit, "virtutes multa animalia, et tamen animalia sunt. Nam quemadmodum aliquis et poeta est et orator, et tamen unus, sic virtutes istae animalia sunt, sed multa non sunt. Idem est animus et animus et iustus et prudens et fortis, ad singulas virtutes quodammodo se habens."
’Virtues are not many animals,’ he says, ‘and yet they are animals. For just as someone is both a poet and an orator, and yet is only one person, so these virtues are animals, but they are not many. The mind is the same, and is at once just, prudent, and brave, being disposed in a certain way toward individual virtues.’
Sublata controversia convenit nobis. Nam et ego interim fateor animum animal esse, postea visurus, quam de ista re sententiam feram; actiones eius animalia esse nego. Alioqui et omnia verba erunt animalia et omnes versus; nam si prudens sermo bonum est, bonum autem omne animal est, sermo animal est. Prudens versus bonum est, bonum autem omne animal est; versus ergo animal est. Ita "arma virumque cano," animal est, quod non possunt rotundum dicere, cum sex pedes habeat.2 "
With the dispute removed, we are in agreement. For I too admit for the moment that the mind is an animal, intending to see later what opinion I shall hold on that matter; but I deny that its actions are animals. Otherwise, all words will be animals, and all verses; for if prudent speech is a good, and every good is an animal, speech is an animal. A prudent verse is a good, and every good is an animal; therefore a verse is an animal. Thus, “I sing of arms and the man” is an animal, which they cannot say is round, since it has six feet.
Textorium," inquis, "totum mehercules istud, quod cum maxime agitur." Dissilio risu, cum mihi propono soloecismum animal esse et barbarismum et synlogismum et aptas illis facies tamquam pictor adsigno. Haec disputamus attractis superciliis, fronte rugosa? Non possum hoc loco dicere illud Caelianum: "O tristes ineptias! "Ridiculae sunt. Quin itaque potius aliquid utile nobis ac salutare tractamus et quaerimus, quomodo ad virtutes pervenire possimus, quae nos ad illas via adducat.
’By Hercules,’ you say, ‘all that which is now being discussed is nothing but weaving-work.’ I burst with laughter when I picture to myself that a solecism is an animal, and a barbarism, and a syllogism, and as a painter I assign to them appropriate faces. Do we debate these things with knitted eyebrows and a wrinkled forehead? I cannot say here that phrase of Caelius: ‘O gloomy absurdities!’ They are ridiculous. Why do we not rather treat something useful and salutary for us, and inquire how we can reach the virtues, and what path leads us to them?
Doce me non an fortitudo animal sit, sed nullum animal felix esse sine fortitudine, nisi contra fortuita convaluit et omnis casus, antequam exciperet, meditando praedomuit. Quid est fortitudo? Munimentum humanae imbecillitatis inexpugnabile, quod qui circumdedit sibi, securus in hac Vitae obsidione perdurat; utitur enim suis viribus, suis telis.
Teach me, not whether courage is an animal, but that no animal can be happy without courage, unless it has grown strong against fortuitous events and has premastered every mishap by meditation before receiving it. What is courage? An impregnable rampart of human weakness, which he who has surrounded himself with endures secure in this siege of life; for he uses his own strength, his own weapons.
Hoc loco tibi Posidonii nostri referre sententiam volo: "Non est quod3 umquam fortunae armis putes esse te tutum; tuis pugna. Contra ipsam fortuna non armat; itaque contra hostes instructi, contra ipsam inermes sunt."
At this point, I want to report to you the opinion of our Posidonius: ‘There is no reason why you should ever think yourself safe through the weapons of fortune; fight with your own. Fortune does not arm against herself; therefore, those who are equipped against enemies are unarmed against fortune herself.’
Alexander Persas quidem et Hyrcanos et Indos et quicquid gentium usque in oceanum extendit oriens, vastabat fugabatque, sed ipse modo occiso amico, modo amisso iacebat in tenebris, alias scelus, alias desiderium suum maerens, victor tot regum atque populorum irae tristitiaeque succumbens. Id enim egerat, ut omnia potius haberet in potestate quam adfectus.
Alexander indeed laid waste and put to flight the Persians, the Hyrcanians, the Indians, and whatever nations the East extends as far as the ocean, but he himself, now having killed a friend, now having lost one, lay in darkness, mourning at one time his crime, at another his loss, a victor over so many kings and peoples yet succumbing to anger and sorrow. For he had made it his business to have everything in his power rather than his passions.
O quam magnis homines tenentur erroribus, qui ius dominandi trans maria cupiunt permittere felicissimosque se iudicant, si multas milite provincias optinent et novas veteribus adiungunt, ignari, quod sit illud ingens parque dis regnum.
Oh, by how great errors are men held, who desire to extend their right of dominion across the seas and judge themselves most happy if they hold many provinces with military force and join new ones to the old, ignorant of what that immense kingdom, equal to the gods, really is!
Imperare sibi maximum imperium est. Doceat me, quam sacra res sit iustitia alienum bonum spectans, nihil ex se petens nisi usum sui. Nihil sit illi cum ambitione famaque; sibi placeat. Hoc ante omnia sibi quisque persuadeat: me iustum esse gratis oportet. Parum est; adhuc illud persuadeat sibi: me in hanc pulcherrimam virtutem ultro etiam inpendere iuvet. Tota cogitatio a privatis commodis quam longissime aversa sit. Non est quod spectes, quod sit iustae rei praemium; maius in iusto est. Illud adhuc tibi adfige, quod paulo ante dicebam: nihil ad rem pertinere, quam multi aequitatem tuam noverint.
To command oneself is the greatest empire. Let him teach me how sacred a thing is justice which looks to another’s good and seeks nothing for itself except the practice of itself. Let it have nothing to do with ambition and fame; let it please itself. Before all things, let everyone persuade himself of this: ‘I ought to be just without reward.’ That is not enough; let him still persuade himself of this: ‘let it even please me to spend myself voluntarily on this most beautiful virtue.’ Let all thought be turned as far away as possible from private advantages. There is no reason why you should look to what the reward of a just deed may be; a greater reward is in the being just itself. Affix this still to yourself, which I was saying a little while ago: that it is of no relevance how many know your justice.
Qui virtutem suam publicari vult, non virtuti laborat, sed gloriae. Non vis esse iustus sine gloria? At mehercules saepe iustus esse debebis cum infamia. Et tunc, si sapis, mala opinio bene parta4 delectet. VALE.
He who wishes his virtue to be made public does not labor for virtue, but for glory. Do you not wish to be just without glory? But by Hercules, you will often have to be just with infamy. And then, if you are wise, let a bad reputation well-earned delight you. FAREWELL.
- 113.23Ne putes
The present subjunctive expressing purpose or prevention ("lest you think"). The main clause (such as "I say this beforehand") is elliptically omitted, which is a common idiomatic usage.
- 113.25cum sex pedes habeat
A wordplay on the double meaning of the Latin word "pes" (physical foot and metrical foot). Seneca ironizes that under Stoic logic, Virgil's dactylic hexameter line would be an animal; however, since it has "six feet," it cannot be a "round" animal as they claim.
- 113.28Non est quod
An impersonal construction "non est quod" followed by the subjunctive (putes), meaning "there is no reason why..." or "you should not...".
- 113.32mala opinio bene parta
An oxymoron where "bene parta" (well-acquired, i.e., earned through good actions) modifies "mala opinio" (bad reputation). It vividly expresses the Stoic principle of remaining devoted to virtue regardless of unjust public opinion.