Criticism of the View That Virtues Are Animals — Seneca the Younger, Moral Letters to Lucilius 113.1–113.10, Latin & English

§113.1

Desideras tibi scribi a me, quid sentiam de hac quaestione iactata apud nostros: an iustitia, fortitudo, prudentia ceteraeque virtutes animalia sint. Hac subtilitate effecimus, Lucili carissime, ut exercere ingenium inter inrita videremur et disputationibus nihil profuturis otium ferere. Faciam quod desideras, et quid nostris videatur, exponam. Sed me in alia esse sententia profiteor: puto quaedam esse, quae deceant phaecasiatum palliatumque.¹ Quae sint ergo quae antiquos moverint,² vel quae sint quae antiqui moverint, dicam, Animum constat animal esse, cum ipse efficiat, ut simus animalia, cum ab illo animalia nomen hoc traxerint. virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens;³ ergo animal est. Deinde virtus agit aliquid; agi autem nihil sine impetu potest. Si impetum habet, qui nulli est nisi animali, animal est. "Si animal est," inquit, "virtus, habet ipsa virtutem."

You desire me to write to you what I think about this question bandied about among our school: whether justice, courage, prudence, and the other virtues are animals. By this subtlety, my dearest Lucilius, we have brought it about that we seem to exercise our intellect among trivialities and to spend our leisure on discussions that will be of no benefit. I will do what you desire, and I will set forth what seems right to our school. But I confess that I am of another opinion: I think there are certain things that befit one who wears the white shoe and the Greek cloak. Therefore, I will tell what those things are which moved the ancients, or what those things are which the ancients moved, It is agreed that the mind is an animal, since it itself brings it about that we are animals, since animals have derived this name from it. But virtue is nothing other than the mind disposed in a certain way; therefore, it is an animal. Next, virtue does something; but nothing can be done without impulse. If it has impulse, which belongs to nothing except an animal, it is an animal. “If virtue is an animal,” he says, “it itself has virtue.”

§113.3

Quidni habeat se ipsam? Quo modo sapiens omnia per virtutem gerit, sic virtus per se. "Ergo," inquit, "et omnes artes animalia sunt et omnia, quae cogitamus quaeque mente conplectimur. Sequitur, ut multa millia animalium habitent in his angustiis pectoris, et singuli multa simus animalia aut multa habeamus animalia.⁴" Quaeris, quid adversus istud respondeatur? Unaquaeque ex istis res animal erit; multa animalia non erunt. Quare? Dicam, si mihi accommodaveris subtilitatem et intentionem tuam.

Why should it not have itself? Just as the wise man does all things through virtue, so virtue does so through itself. “Therefore,” he says, “all arts too are animals, and all things that we think and embrace with our mind. It follows that many thousands of animals dwell in these narrow limits of our breast, and we as individuals are many animals or have many animals.” You ask what should be answered against this? Each single one of those things will be an animal; they will not be many animals. Why? I will tell you, if you lend me your subtlety and attention.

§113.4

Singula animalia singulas habere debent substantias; ista omnia unum animum habent; itaque singula esse possunt, multa esse non possunt. Ego et animal sum et homo, non tamen duos esse nos dices. Quare? Quia separati debent esse. Ita dico: alter ab altero debet esse diductus, ut duo sint. Quicquid in uno multiplex est, sub unam naturam cadit; itaque unum est.

Single animals ought to have single substances; all those things have one mind; therefore they can be single, but they cannot be many. I am both an animal and a man, yet you will not say that we are two. Why? Because they ought to be separated. I mean this: one must be separated from the other so that they may be two. Whatever is manifold in one falls under one nature; therefore it is one.

§113.5

Et animus meus animal est et ego animal sum, duo tamen non sumus. Quare? Quia animus mei pars est. tunc aliquid per se numerabitur, cum per se stabit.⁵ Ubi vero alterius membrum erit, non poterit videri aliud. Quare? Dicam: quia quod aliud est, suum oportet esse et proprium et totum et intra se absolutum.

Both my mind is an animal and I am an animal, yet we are not two. Why? Because the mind is a part of me. Something will be counted by itself then when it stands by itself. But where it is a member of another, it cannot be seen as another. Why? I will tell you: because that which is another must be its own, proper, whole, and complete within itself.

§113.6

Ego in alia esse me sententia professus sum. Non enim tantum virtutes animalia erunt, si hoc recipitur, sed opposita quoque illis vitia et adfectus, tamquam ira, timor, luctus, suspicio. Ultra res ista procedet; omnes sententiae, omnes cogitationes animalia erunt. Quod nullo modo recipiendum est. Non enim quicquid ab homine fit, homo est.

I have professed that I am of another opinion. For if this is accepted, not only will virtues be animals, but also the vices opposed to them and the passions, such as anger, fear, grief, and suspicion. This matter will go further; all opinions, all thoughts will be animals. This must in no way be accepted. For not whatever is done by man is a man.

§113.7

" Iustitia quid est? "inquit. Animus quodammodo se habens. "Itaque si animus animal est, et iustitia." Minime. Haec enim habitus animi est et quaedam vis; idem animus in varias figuras convertitur et non totiens animal aliud est, quotiens aliud facit. Nec illud, quod fit ab animo, animal est.

”What is justice?” he says. The mind disposed in a certain way. “Therefore, if the mind is an animal, justice is too.” By no means. For this is a disposition of the mind and a certain power; the same mind is transformed into various figures, and it is not a different animal as many times as it does a different thing. Nor is that which is done by the mind an animal.

§113.8

Si iustitia animal est, si fortitudo, si ceterae virtutes, utrum desinunt esse animalia, subinde autem rursus incipiunt, an semper sunt? Desinere virtutes non possunt. Ergo multa animalia, immo innumerabilia, in hoc animo versantur.

If justice is an animal, if courage, if the other virtues, do they cease to be animals and then immediately begin again, or are they always so? Virtues cannot cease to be. Therefore, many animals, indeed innumerable ones, dwell in this mind.

§113.9

" Non sunt," inquit, "multa, quia ex uno religata sunt et partes unius ac membra sunt." Talem ergo faciem animi nobis proponimus, qualis est hydrae multa habentis capita, quorum unumquodque per se pugnat, per se nocet. Atqui nullum ex illis capitibus animal est, sed animalis caput, ceterum ipsa unum animal est. Nemo in Chimaera leonem animal esse dixit aut draconem; hae partes erant eius; partes autem non sunt animalia. Quid est, quo colligas iustitiam animal esse? "

”They are not many,” he says, “because they are bound together from one thing and are parts and members of one.” Therefore we picture to ourselves such a form of the mind as is that of the hydra having many heads, each of which fights by itself, harms by itself. And yet none of those heads is an animal, but the head of an animal, while the thing itself is one animal. No one said that the lion in the Chimaera was an animal, or the dragon; these were parts of it; but parts are not animals. What is there by which you gather that justice is an animal?”

§113.10

Agit," inquit, "aliquid et prodest. Quod autem agit et prodest, impetum habet; quod autem impetum habet, animal est." verum est, si suum impetum habet; suum autem non habet, sed animi.

”It acts,” he says, “and is of benefit. Moreover, that which acts and is of benefit has an impulse; and that which has an impulse is an animal.” This is true, if it has its own impulse; but it does not have its own, but that of the mind.

Syntax notes5 items

113.1phaecasiatum palliatumque
"wearing the white shoe and the Greek cloak." Phaecasium was a white shoe worn by Greek priests and philosophers, and the pallium was the typical Greek cloak. Seneca uses these terms to satirize the trivial, scholastic arguments (such as whether virtues are animals) as overly Greek and pedantic, contrasted with Roman practical philosophy.
113.1quae antiquos moverint, vel quae sint quae antiqui moverint
"what things moved the ancients, or what those things are which the ancients moved." A wordplay on the active and passive nuances (or different objects) of the verb moveo. The first clause refers to what agitated or disturbed the older philosophers, while the second refers to the questions or arguments that the ancients themselves initiated or put into motion.
113.2animus quodammodo se habens
"the mind disposed in a certain way." A Latin translation of the Stoic definition of virtue (the soul or pneuma being in a certain state, pos echon). Since virtue is merely a disposition or a state of the mind, rather than a separate entity, Seneca argues against treating virtue as a separate "animal" in its own right.
113.3singuli multa simus animalia aut multa habeamus animalia
"we as individuals are many animals or have many animals." A reductio ad absurdum proposed by the interlocutor: if every virtue and thought were a separate animal, a single human being would house thousands of animals, meaning an individual would not be a single organism but a composite of many.
113.5tunc aliquid per se numerabitur, cum per se stabit
"something will be counted by itself then when it stands by itself." A principle defining individuality. A part (membrum) is subordinate to the whole (totum) and cannot be counted as an independent individual (per se). Therefore, since the mind is a part of me and virtue is a disposition of the mind, they cannot be counted as separate "animals."

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-25)urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:113.1-113.10